Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd

High Court of Australia · 1980

Intellectual Property And Technology LawConfidential Information

Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] HCA 44; (1980) 147 CLR 39

Two newspapers were about to print leaked Defence and Foreign Affairs documents, many of them classified. Could the Commonwealth stop them by relying on confidentiality alone?

What happened?

In October 1980 the publishers of a book of government documents, Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1968-1975, granted the publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald first serialisation rights, and extracts were prepared for The Age as well (at 46). The book set out government memoranda, assessments and cables, and recorded the security classification of many of them (at 51). The Commonwealth owned the copyright in the great bulk of the documents (at 47).

The Commonwealth learned of the plan on the afternoon of Friday 7 November and obtained ex parte injunctions (at 45). By then the first instalment, on the ANZUS Treaty, had been distributed in the early editions of both papers, more than 60,000 copies in the case of The Age (at 45). Of 2,511 copies of the book, 662 had reached retailers before the Monday and at least 71, possibly 100, had been sold, including five to the Indonesian Embassy and one to the United States Embassy (at 45). The Commonwealth asked that the injunctions be continued until the hearing of its action.

What did the Court decide?

Mason J, sitting alone in the original jurisdiction of the High Court, decided the motion for interim relief. He did not accept that s 79 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) was a foundation for an injunction (at 50), and he refused interim protection of the documents as confidential information (at 54). He granted an interlocutory injunction, on the usual undertaking as to damages, restraining the defendants until the hearing from printing or publishing the material in Exhibits 4 and 5 in a way that infringed the Commonwealth’s copyright in the documents (at 59 and the order).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Detriment when the government is the plaintiff. Mason J said that the equitable principle protecting confidential information “has been fashioned to protect the personal, private and proprietary interests of the citizen, not to protect the very different interests of the executive government”. Equity can protect information in government hands, but “when equity protects government information it will look at the matter through different spectacles” (at 51). The detriment the government must show is not exposure to scrutiny: it “can scarcely be a relevant detriment to the government that publication of material concerning its actions will merely expose it to public discussion and criticism” (at 52). The court therefore determines the government’s claim “by reference to the public interest”, and “Unless disclosure is likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected” (at 52).

Mason J gave the content of that test. The court “will not prevent the publication of information which merely throws light on the past workings of government, even if it be not public property, so long as it does not prejudice the community in other respects”. If disclosure will be “inimical to the public interest because national security, relations with foreign countries or the ordinary business of government will be prejudiced”, disclosure will be restrained, and there will be finely balanced cases (at 52).

Application. Mr Pritchett, the Secretary of the Department of Defence, had not said that disclosure of any particular document would prejudice national defence, and in the absence of such evidence Mason J was not prepared to assume that publication would now prejudice national security, except perhaps in the limited sense that other countries might become less willing to provide information in confidence (at 53). He raised the possibility that the officials attached too much importance to classification, because a classification given when a document is created “lingers on” without regular reconsideration (at 53).

He was “not persuaded that the degree of embarrassment to Australia’s foreign relations which will flow from disclosure is enough to justify interim protection of confidential information”, and the question was in any event “resolved against the plaintiff by the publication that has taken, and is likely to take, place”. The book sales, including those to Indonesia and the United States, and the first instalment indicated that “the detriment which the plaintiff apprehends will not be avoided by the grant of an injunction” (at 54). He added that in other circumstances the circulation of about 100 copies might not disentitle the possessor of confidential information from protection (at 54).

Limits. This was an interlocutory decision by one Justice, in which the Commonwealth had to show a probability of success on the evidence then before him (at 49). Mason J said that the Commonwealth’s claims on confidential information and s 79 were “not necessarily finally resolved by this interlocutory judgment” (at 59).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Mason J

Read judgment: pp 51–52 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J states the principle that equity treats the government’s claim to confidentiality by reference to the public interest, and the examples of prejudice that will justify restraint. He then applies it to refuse interim protection of the documents as confidential information, so it is part of his reasons for that part of the decision. The injunction actually granted rests on copyright, not on this reasoning.

Ratio · Mason J

Read judgment: pp 53–54 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J applies the test to the evidence on the confidence claim: he would not assume prejudice to national security without evidence, raised the possibility that the officials attached too much importance to classification, found that embarrassment to foreign relations was not enough for interim protection, and held that the publication already made meant an injunction would not avoid the detriment. Either the first or the second of the last two findings was sufficient to resolve that claim against the Commonwealth at the interlocutory stage.

Why does this case matter?

Students who learn breach of confidence from private disputes tend to run the same checklist on a leaked government document and reach an answer the Commonwealth did not obtain here. Examiners look for whether the identity of the claimant has been noticed, and for the observation that a claimant who fails on confidentiality may still hold another cause of action, as the Commonwealth did in copyright.

Exam and application relevance

Use the case when a government seeks to restrain disclosure of its own information. State the elements of the equitable action, then ask what harm the government can point to, using Mason J’s statements at 51-52. Describe those statements as Mason J’s, made on a motion for interim relief, and not as the final determination of the Commonwealth’s confidence claim.

The facts matter to the outcome, so apply the test to the problem’s facts: the government’s evidence of harm, and how far the information has already circulated (at 53-54). Ask also what disclosure of this particular information would be likely to prejudice, and apply Mason J’s statement of the test at 52 to those facts.

Check your understanding

1. According to Mason J, whose interests was the equitable principle fashioned to protect, and what follows when the claimant is the executive government?

2. What kinds of prejudice did Mason J identify as justifying restraint, and why was exposure to public discussion and criticism not enough?

3. Why did the confidence claim fail at the interlocutory stage, and on what ground was the injunction granted?