Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd
Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] FCAFC 21
Two carriers signed a detailed agreement on confidential information, and one then used the other’s call data in market share reports. Could the injured carrier also sue in equity, and what would it have to prove?
What happened?
Optus and Telstra each operated a telecommunications network, and the networks were interconnected under an Access Agreement dated 14 August 1992 ([1], [2]). When traffic generated by one carrier’s customers crosses the other’s network, the second carrier has access to information about it, including its quantity, source, destination, duration, time and value (traffic information) ([3]). Optus alleged that from at least 1995 until at least September 2003 Telstra used its traffic information, without its knowledge or consent, to prepare weekly market share reports for marketing, promotional and related purposes ([4]). It pleaded breach of the agreement’s provisions restricting the use of Confidential Information, breach of the duty of confidentiality owed by Telstra, and unconscionable conduct under s 51AA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ([5]).
The agreement defined Confidential Information in cl 1.1 and restricted its use and disclosure in cl 15 ([8], [9]). The primary judge heard the issues of liability and reserved relief and quantum for later ([6], [7]). On 30 April 2009 he upheld the contract claim, and on 10 July 2009 he dismissed the claims in equity and under s 51AA ([25]). On the contract claim he found that Telstra had breached cl 15.2 by using traffic information that was Confidential Information to prepare the weekly market share reports, by distributing them among its personnel, and by using them for marketing, promotion and selling ([25]).
He dismissed the equity claim in three short paragraphs ([27]). He reasoned that, where the contract defined Confidential Information exhaustively and regulated its use comprehensively, there was no need for equity to intervene in respect of conduct common to the breach of contract and the equitable ground, that cl 16.1 reinforced that view, and that he declined to find a breach of an overlapping or concurrent duty of confidentiality ([27]). Optus sought leave to appeal from that dismissal, contending that a successful claim in equity would make an account of profits available, whereas its pecuniary remedy for breach of contract was limited to damages ([28]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Finn, Sundberg and Jacobson JJ), in joint reasons, granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal ([41], orders 1 and 2). It set aside the order dismissing Optus’s claim in equity and entered judgment for Optus on that claim ([41], order 3). It remitted the matter to the primary judge for disposition together with the remaining unresolved issues, and ordered Telstra to pay Optus’s costs of the leave application, the appeal and the proceedings before the primary judge on 7, 8 and 10 October 2008 (orders 4 and 5).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Full Court said that the issue raised by the application for leave and the appeal was “whether by the Access Agreement the parties have excluded equitable obligations of confidence” ([29]). It accepted that Confidential Information was defined exhaustively, but did not see that as showing an intention to exclude equitable obligations: “All the parties have done by their definition is codify what is to be treated as confidential information for the purposes of their contract” ([29]). It did not agree that the detailed cl 15 showed such an intention.
Clause 15.6, which provides that “in addition to other remedies that may be available” a party may seek injunctive relief ([11]), pointed the other way, and an account of profits seemed to the Court an obvious further remedy ([30]). Clause 20.22 made the remedies provided in the agreement cumulative with, and “not exclusive of the rights, powers or remedies provided by law independent of this agreement”, and an account of profits is such a remedy ([31]). The Court found the contrast with cl 14.11, which makes cll 14.6 and 14.9 “the only remedies and forms of compensation available” for infringement allegations, “striking” ([32]).
Having worked through cl 16, which the primary judge had treated as reinforcing his view, it found nothing in it indicating that equitable principles were excluded, and called cll 20.22 and 15.6, and also cl 16.8, “powerful indications to the contrary” ([33]).
Telstra relied on Gordon J in Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Ltd [2008] FCA 1915 at [63], who rejected an argument that equitable and legal obligations of confidence can co-exist, relying on Campbell JA in Del Casale v Artedomus (Aust) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 172 at [118]. The Full Court said that observation did “not cover the present case, where Optus wishes to be able to seek an account of profits, and the question is whether the contract permits that”, and that cll 15.6 and 20.22 showed that it did ([34]).
It said the reasoning in Deta Nominees Pty Ltd v Viscount Plastic Products Pty Ltd, that equity withholds relief where the contractual remedies are adequate, did not apply because it was not yet known whether damages would be an adequate remedy ([35]). Gordon J had also reasoned that allowing an election would eliminate the efficient breach theory ([36]); the Full Court noted the High Court’s unfavourable observations about that theory in Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd, but did not pursue the matter because the agreement preserves equitable rights ([37]).
The Court could “discern no reason why parties cannot agree that one who claims that its confidential information has been misused can elect to sue either for damages for breach of contract under clause 15 or for an account of profits under clauses 15.6 and 20.22” ([37]). It also said that “The notion that no equitable duty of confidence arises where there is a comparable contractual duty is opposed to much authority”, citing Dean, The Law of Trade Secrets and Personal Secrets, and a series of cases ([38]).
The result was that Optus was entitled to make an informed election between damages for breach of cl 15 and an account of profits; if it elected for an account, whether to grant that relief remained a matter for the Court ([41]). The Court’s reasons for upholding the equity claim rest on the terms of the agreement ([29]-[37]); the statement at [38] is a further, general observation that those reasons did not depend on.
On the elements of the equitable claim, the Full Court said that the primary judge had made no specific findings on them, given the manner in which he proceeded ([39]). It stated that “There are four elements”: “the information in question must be identified with specificity”; “it must have the necessary quality of confidence”; “it must have been received by Telstra in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence”; and “there must be an actual or threatened misuse of the information without Optus’ consent”. It cited Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health (1990) 22 FCR 73 at 87 ([39]).
It then found each element made out. The primary judge’s reasons on the contract claim and the first paragraph of his orders showed that the information was identified with specificity, because he was satisfied that it fell within the definition of Confidential Information ([40]). That definition requires information “of a confidential nature”, so the quality of confidence was established ([40]). The existence of the Access Agreement established that Telstra received the information in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence, and Telstra’s use of the information to prepare its market share reports established misuse ([40]). The four elements as stated do not include detriment to the confider, and the judgment does not discuss whether a separate requirement of detriment exists; the point is not decided by this case.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Finn, Sundberg and Jacobson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [29]–[37] (opens in a new tab)
The issue was whether the Access Agreement excluded equitable obligations of confidence ([29]). Holding that it did not, by reference to cll 15.6, 20.22, 16 and 16.8, was the ground on which the Court set aside the dismissal of the equity claim ([33], [37], [41]). The Court distinguished Coles Supermarkets, Del Casale and Deta Nominees on the footing that Optus sought an account of profits and the question was whether the contract permitted it ([34], [35]).
Obiter · Finn, Sundberg and Jacobson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [38] (opens in a new tab)
The statement that the notion that no equitable duty arises where there is a comparable contractual duty is opposed to much authority is a general observation. The Court had already said it need not pursue the efficient breach point because the agreement preserves equitable rights ([37]), so the result did not depend on the wider statement.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Finn, Sundberg and Jacobson JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [39]–[40] (opens in a new tab)
The Full Court gave judgment for Optus on the equity claim after stating the four elements and finding each made out ([39]-[41]), so the statement was the framework of the decision. The list is taken from Smith Kline & French at 87 and is stated for this claim; the Court did not discuss detriment.
Why does this case matter?
A student asked about misuse of information between businesses that have signed a confidentiality agreement can go wrong by running the contract analysis alone, or the equitable one alone, without asking what the claimant is trying to obtain and what the parties’ own agreement says about it. Examiners reward the answer that reads the whole agreement rather than one clause, and that takes each step of the equitable claim to the facts instead of asserting that information was confidential and was misused.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where parties have a written agreement dealing with confidential information and one is said to have misused information, identify what the agreement says about what is confidential, how it may be used, what remedies it provides and how those remedies relate to remedies outside the agreement. Ask which remedy the claimant actually wants and why that matters. For a claim in equity, work through the elements the Full Court set out, giving for each the fact in the problem that answers it.
This is a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It is persuasive, not binding, in the courts of the States and Territories. Later decisions, including Streetscape Projects (Australia) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney [2013] NSWCA 2 and New Aim Pty Ltd v Leung [2026] FCAFC 49 (where a Full Court found it unnecessary to explore the debate), discuss the Full Court’s wider statement about contractual and equitable duties, and should be read before that statement is put as settled law.
Check your understanding
1. Which claims did Optus make against Telstra, and which did the primary judge uphold and which did he dismiss ([5], [25])?
2. What reasons did the primary judge give for dismissing the claim in equity ([27])?
3. Why did Optus say the claim in equity mattered to it, although it had succeeded in contract ([28])?
4. What did the Full Court say was the issue raised by the application for leave and the appeal ([29])?
5. Which clauses of the Access Agreement did the Full Court rely on in disagreeing with the primary judge, and what did it say each of them showed ([30]-[33])?
6. How did the Full Court deal with Telstra’s reliance on Gordon J in Coles Supermarkets and on the efficient breach theory ([34]-[37])?
7. For each of the four elements, what did the Full Court point to in finding it made out ([39], [40])?
8. Which Justices gave reasons in Optus, and did a Justice write separately ([1]-[41] and the certificate after [41])?