Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd
Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50
A patent claimed using a known arthritis drug to treat psoriasis. A generic supplier registered its version for arthritis only and said in its product information that it was not indicated for psoriasis. Could supplying it still infringe?
What happened?
The drug leflunomide is used to treat rheumatoid arthritis and psoriatic arthritis ([3]). Sanofi’s patent has one claim, for a method of preventing or treating psoriasis by administering an effective amount of leflunomide ([3]). Apotex registered a generic version on the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods in 2008 and intended to supply it for psoriatic arthritis and rheumatoid arthritis ([4]). Its approved product information said the product was “not indicated for the treatment of psoriasis that is not associated with manifestations of arthritic disease” ([298]).
Sanofi sued in the Federal Court on 23 October 2008, alleging that supplying Apotex’s product for psoriatic arthritis would infringe the patent ([4]). Apotex cross-claimed for revocation, which failed ([5]). Jagot J held the patent valid and that Apotex’s intended supply would infringe, because use of the compound to treat psoriatic arthritis would inevitably treat or prevent psoriasis ([6]; Hayne J at [65]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Keane CJ, Bennett and Yates JJ) dismissed Apotex’s appeal ([6]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal in Matter S1 of 2013, in which Apotex’s challenge to the validity of the patent failed ([1], [177], [288]), and in Matter S219 of 2012 granted special leave on infringement and allowed the appeal, setting aside the Full Court’s orders and ordering that the infringement claims in paragraphs 14 to 22 of the Amended Application be dismissed ([306]). French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Gageler JJ made those orders. Hayne J would have held the patent invalid and would have revoked it ([173]). The reasons are in four parts: French CJ ([1]-[51]), Hayne J ([52]-[173]), Crennan and Kiefel JJ jointly ([174]-[306]) and Gageler J ([307]-[316]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Infringement by supply. Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that claim 1, a method claim for a hitherto unknown therapeutic use, “cannot be directly infringed by the exploitation of leflunomide for the treatment of PsA” ([294]), so Sanofi’s claim rested on s 117 ([295]). Whether supply infringes under s 117 “depends on the nature of the product and the use or uses to which it is put” ([300]). The approved product information stated indications that excluded the patented use, and in the light of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) the word “indication” was “an emphatic instruction to recipients ... to restrict use of the product to uses other than use in accordance with the patented method”, so s 117(2)(c) was not engaged ([303]).
It was not shown, nor could it be inferred, that Apotex had reason to believe recipients would use the product in accordance with the patented method, so s 117(2)(b) was not engaged either ([304]-[305]). French CJ ([51]) and Gageler J ([316]) agreed with Crennan and Kiefel JJ on construction and infringement. Hayne J said shortly that the Full Court was right to confine the claim to the deliberate administration of the compound to prevent or treat psoriasis, and that Apotex would have reason to believe that its product would be used for the uses within its registered indications, but was not shown to have reason to believe it would be used for psoriasis not associated with arthritic disease ([168]-[172]).
Patentability of medical treatment. French CJ held that methods of medical treatment “can fall within the scope of a manner of new manufacture” within s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and so within s 18(1)(a) of the Patents Act ([50]). Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that, assuming the other requirements are met, a method of medical treatment of the human body that satisfies the test in the NRDC case “can be a manner of manufacture and hence a patentable invention” ([286]).
They distinguished methods involving a hitherto unknown therapeutic use of a pharmaceutical from the activities or procedures of doctors physically treating patients, which they thought unlikely to satisfy the test, while finding it unnecessary to decide that point ([287]). Gageler J found it unnecessary to decide whether all processes for treating the human body qualify ([312]) and answered the narrower question whether a process of using a pharmaceutical product to produce a therapeutic or prophylactic result qualifies in the affirmative ([313]-[314]). Hayne J dissented: a method of prevention or treatment of human disease “is not a proper subject for the grant of a patent” ([165]).
What the Court did not decide. Hayne J did not reach infringement as a ground of decision ([168]). The question whether grant of such a patent would be “generally inconvenient” was not argued ([74], [77]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Crennan and Kiefel JJ; French CJ and Gageler J agreeing on construction and infringement
Read judgment: [294] (PDF p 110) (opens in a new tab), [303]–[305] (PDF p 113) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab), [316] (PDF p 117) (opens in a new tab)
The purpose-limited construction and the conclusions on both asserted routes under s 117 supported allowing the infringement appeal. On the registered indications and product information in evidence, there was neither an instruction to use the patented method nor a demonstrated reason to believe recipients would do so. French CJ and Gageler J expressly adopted the joint reasons on these issues. This treatment concerns that factual basis, rather than a general immunity created by an excluded indication.
Obiter · Hayne J
Read judgment: [168]–[172] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J expressly said that infringement was not reached because he would hold the patent invalid. His ensuing observations about the registered indications, reason to believe and deliberate administration were therefore unnecessary to his proposed disposition, although they addressed the same infringement issue as the majority.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ; Crennan and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [50] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab), [286] (PDF p 108) (opens in a new tab)
Rejecting a categorical exclusion of medical treatment from manner of manufacture was necessary to these judges’ rejection of Apotex’s validity challenge. French CJ rejected the exclusion as anomalous; the joint reasons required a contribution to a useful art having economic utility, with other patentability requirements assumed. Applied here, this establishes that the claimed pharmaceutical treatment method could be patentable; it does not establish that every medical procedure qualifies.
Obiter · Crennan and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [287] (PDF p 108) (opens in a new tab)
The suggestion that doctors’ activities or procedures when physically treating patients are generally unlikely to satisfy the NRDC test was unnecessary to deciding the validity of this pharmaceutical method claim. The judges expressly said it was unnecessary to decide that point, so the observation is not a holding excluding all such procedures.
Separate reasoning · Gageler J
Read judgment: [312]–[315] (PDF p 116) (opens in a new tab)
Gageler J concurred in the result on validity on the narrower basis that using a pharmaceutical product to produce a therapeutic or prophylactic result can be a manner of manufacture. He adopted the seven reasons only for that narrower question and added reliance on established orthodoxy and the legislative assumption. He expressly left the position of all human treatment processes undetermined.
Separate reasoning · Hayne J
Read judgment: [164]–[165] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab), [173] (PDF p 72) (opens in a new tab)
Hayne J dissented on validity and would have revoked the patent. His route treated the result of treatment as personal to the patient and not a commercially exploitable product, placing the process outside manner of manufacture. That reasoning was a ground of his proposed orders, rather than the majority’s holding.
Why does this case matter?
Disputes about generic medicines are the usual setting. Students often ask whether the generic product is the patented compound and stop there, and with a method patent that is not the question the Court asked.
Exam and application relevance
Begin with what claim 1 covers before asking whether s 117 applies ([289], [293]-[295]).
Where a supplier’s own documents are in issue, the paragraphs to compare with your facts are [296]-[304] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ) and [169]-[172] (Hayne J). The conclusions in those paragraphs rest on the registered indications and the product information in evidence.
On validity, the Justices’ views differ in breadth and should be attributed: French CJ at [50], Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [286]-[287], Gageler J at [312]-[314] and Hayne J at [165].
Check your understanding
1. According to Crennan and Kiefel JJ at [294], why could claim 1 not be directly infringed by supplying leflunomide for psoriatic arthritis, and which provision did Sanofi therefore rely on ([295])?
2. What did the approved product information state, and what did Crennan and Kiefel JJ say the word “indication” amounted to ([298], [303])?
3. The joint reasons deal separately with the route through instructions or inducement in s 117(2)(c) and the route through reason to believe in s 117(2)(b). What was the reasoning and the conclusion on each?
4. How does Gageler J’s agreement on patentability differ in breadth from the reasons of French CJ and Crennan and Kiefel JJ ([312]-[314])?
5. On what footing did Hayne J reach his conclusion on patentability, and why did he say the infringement question was not reached ([165], [168])?