eSafety Commissioner v Baumgarten
eSafety Commissioner v Baumgarten [2026] FCAFC 12
An officer sends a social media service a message that she says was never meant to use the regulator’s compulsory powers, and she had no authority to use them. The service treats it as binding and hides a post. Can the poster seek review?
What happened?
In late May 2024 Ms Baumgarten posted on the social media service X, and the post was also made on Instagram. An individual complained to the eSafety Commissioner about it ([3]). The Commissioner’s officer, Ms Caruana, sent X a written communication that the Commissioner called a “complaint alert” ([4]). Ms Caruana did so on 3 June 2024 through X’s legal requests submission site ([18]); the Tribunal found that X withheld the post within Australia at 7:18 pm that day, within one hour and 13 minutes of the information being entered ([35]).
It was agreed before the Tribunal that, apart from the removal notice power in s 88 of the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth), the Commissioner had no power in this case to give X a communication that compelled it to remove or withhold the post ([13], [26]). The Commissioner’s case was that her officers used a separate, less formal “complaint alert” process, distinct from a s 88 notice ([14]). The Tribunal accepted that Ms Caruana had considered the post was not cyber-abuse material targeted at an Australian adult, that she did not have delegated authority to give a removal notice, and that she did not subjectively intend to give one ([220]).
Ms Baumgarten applied to the Tribunal for review of what she presumed was a removal notice, relying on s 220(2) of the Act, which confers jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commissioner under s 88 to give a removal notice ([6], [65]). The Commissioner contended that the alert was not a notice for the purposes of s 88, so that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction ([8]). The Tribunal, constituted by Kyrou P, O’Donovan DP and Manetta SM, held that it had jurisdiction ([9], [23], [25]). The Commissioner appealed on three questions of law under s 172 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), directing her challenge at the Tribunal’s first, jurisdictional decision ([2], [9]-[10], [62]).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court of the Federal Court (Mortimer CJ, Beach and Horan JJ) dismissed the appeal and made no order as to costs, as the parties agreed (Orders 1-2; [214]-[215]). None of the three questions of law was answered in the Commissioner’s favour ([83]). On the second and third questions, which challenged findings about the content of the communication and about X’s understanding of it, the Court said the questions did not need to be determined because the Tribunal’s decision did not depend on those findings, and gave reasons why the challenges would fail in any event ([205]-[213]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Mortimer CJ and Beach J gave joint reasons, with which Horan J agreed ([216]). The appeal lay on questions of law, and the Court proceeded on the facts as the Tribunal found them ([59]). It was common ground that the Tribunal’s task was an objective characterisation of the Commissioner’s communication to X in the circumstances in which it was made ([147]). Mortimer CJ and Beach J read the Full Court’s decision in Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (Lawlor) as showing that merits review is “not about validity” ([202]); because a “purported” exercise of power may be sufficient for there to be a decision in fact, the intention or state of mind of the person exercising the power “is not determinative” ([166]).
They held that the Tribunal had not treated Ms Caruana’s intention and state of mind as irrelevant ([154], [170]), and that the Commissioner’s “three important concepts” were not the appropriate or exclusive framework for assessing the Tribunal’s decision ([181]). Relying on Amir and Semunigus, they said there was no doubt that the Tribunal was correct to find that Ms Caruana made a decision: “She went through a mental process and translated that into action and conduct by her communications with X” ([192]).
On the facts as found, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the decision purported to be an exercise of the power in s 88 ([190]). The recipient’s understanding and reaction could be weighed in that assessment, even if Ms Caruana genuinely believed she was making a different kind of decision ([191], [213]). Whether the notice was valid and enforceable was a different question from the characterisation exercise ([201]). They expressed no concluded view on the Commissioner’s argument that the common law supplied a source of power for the alerts, because it was not a ground of appeal, though the source of power could not be entirely disentangled from the Lawlor inquiry ([194]-[195]).
Pintarich v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation was drawn to their attention; they did not need to discuss Kerr J’s observations there about decisions made without human mental processes, and said that nothing Moshinsky and Derrington JJ said at [140]-[153] was directly inconsistent with their analysis ([203]).
Horan J added observations on the first question of law ([216]). He cited Pintarich at [140], with Semunigus and Amir, for a decision involving a mental process of reaching a conclusion that is externally manifested ([221]), and said that the context in which the question arose in Pintarich was different from this case ([223]). He said that Lawlor rejected the decision-maker’s subjective belief or intention as a touchstone or essential element, but that this does not mean the decision-maker’s state of mind can never be taken into account with the objective circumstances ([237]-[239]).
On the Tribunal’s findings, the complaint alert went beyond a mere informal request and imposed an official requirement to remove the post, and Ms Caruana’s subjective intention did not preclude a finding that a purported decision under s 88 was in fact made ([243]-[244]). He added that the findings “were based on the particular circumstances, and the same conclusion would not necessarily be reached in every case” ([246]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Mortimer CJ and Beach J (joint reasons); Horan J agreeing
Read judgment: [166] (opens in a new tab), [169]–[170] (opens in a new tab), [190]–[192] (opens in a new tab), [199]–[202] (opens in a new tab)
The first question of law asked whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction, which depended on whether the Commissioner made a decision under s 88 to give a removal notice. Rejecting the argument that the Tribunal misunderstood Lawlor and finding that a decision purporting to be under s 88 was open on the facts as found were the ground for dismissing the appeal on that question; Horan J agreed with those reasons ([216]).
Obiter · Mortimer CJ and Beach J (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [194]–[195] (opens in a new tab), [203] (opens in a new tab)
The Court expressed no concluded view on the source of power for the complaint alerts ([194]) and said it did not need to discuss Kerr J’s observations in Pintarich ([203]); the comment that the Pintarich majority’s analysis was not directly inconsistent with theirs explains why the appeal outcome did not depend on it.
Separate reasoning · Horan J (concurring in the result and in the reasons of Mortimer CJ and Beach J)
Read judgment: [221] (opens in a new tab), [237]–[239] (opens in a new tab), [243]–[244] (opens in a new tab), [246] (opens in a new tab)
Horan J agreed with the joint reasons and added his own analysis of how the decision-maker’s subjective intention relates to a purported decision under Lawlor and of the limits of the Tribunal’s findings; these are additional observations by a concurring Justice rather than reasons of the Court.
Why does this case matter?
Whether a government communication counts as a decision is often contested by the agency that sent it. Students should be able to say which Justices wrote what, and on which question.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the provision said to confer the power, the provision that gives the tribunal or court its jurisdiction, and the facts the first-instance tribunal found. Then separate a challenge to those findings from a question of law.
Attribute each statement to the Justices who made it, with the paragraph, and keep the joint reasons apart from the additional observations of Horan J. Test the facts of a problem against the findings actually made in this case.
If a problem involves a template, a portal or an automated system, ask what evidence there is of an officer’s conclusion and of how it was communicated.
Check your understanding
1. Who sent the communication to X, by what means and on what day, and what did X do with the post ([4], [18], [35])?
2. What did the parties agree about the Commissioner’s power to compel X to remove the post other than under s 88 ([13], [26])?
3. What did the Tribunal accept about Ms Caruana’s view of the post, her authority and her intention ([220])?
4. How did the Commissioner say the Tribunal had misunderstood Lawlor, and what did Mortimer CJ and Beach J say about whether the Tribunal treated Ms Caruana’s intention as irrelevant ([167], [170])?
5. In whose reasons does [192] appear, and how does Horan J relate his reasons to theirs ([216], [221])?
6. What did Mortimer CJ and Beach J say about the source of power for the complaint alerts, and why ([194])?