Pintarich v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2018

Intellectual Property And Technology LawEmerging Technology Regulation

Pintarich v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2018] FCAFC 79

A tax office letter produced from a computer template reads as though the interest has been dealt with, but the officer who keyed it in says he never reached a conclusion about it. Can the taxpayer treat the letter as the decision?

Clarified by eSafety Commissioner v Baumgarten [2026] FCAFC 12

In a later Full Court decision, one member of the Court applied this formulation and explained the different context of Pintarich. In eSafety Commissioner v Baumgarten [2026] FCAFC 12, Horan J, agreeing with Mortimer CJ and Beach J and adding his own observations, cited Pintarich at [140] with other authority for the view that a decision involves a mental process of reaching a conclusion that is externally manifested ([221]). His Honour said the case was not directly comparable to Pintarich: the taxpayer there was not seeking to review the asserted decision but to prevent a later, less favourable exercise of the same power; the majority in Pintarich was sensitive to the differing contexts in which the question arises; and it would not have been enough for that taxpayer to show a purported decision, so the majority gave that issue no attention ([222]-[223]). He added that the majority treated Finn J’s formulation as a general statement that “may not be applicable in relation to all issues”, and described the circumstances in Pintarich as “unusual” and “unlikely to arise very often” ([224]).

What happened?

In November 2014 Mr Pintarich (the taxpayer) owed the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) about $1,156,787.72, made up of approximately $821,000 of primary tax and approximately $335,000 of general interest charge (GIC) ([91]). On 24 November 2014 his accountant asked for full remission of the GIC ([92]). Mr Celantano, an authorised officer, was allocated the request and spoke to the taxpayer and his accountant in early December ([93]). His note of the call with the taxpayer records that the ATO required the primary tax to be paid in full “whilst we consider the remission of general interest charge” ([96]).

On 8 December 2014 the ATO sent the taxpayer a letter headed “Payment arrangement for your Income Tax Account debt”. It said that the ATO agreed to accept a lump sum payment of $839,115.43 on or by 30 January 2015, and that the “payout figure” was “inclusive of an estimated general interest charge” amount ([101]). Mr Celantano had keyed information into a computer-based “template bulk issue letter”, which generated the document; he did not read the letter before it was despatched, and he said that its first two paragraphs did not accord with his conversations with the taxpayer and the accountant.

He gave evidence that he had not made any decision under s 8AAG of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) to remit any GIC ([101]). The taxpayer paid the lump sum on 30 January 2015 ([102]). Later statements of account showed a growing balance because of accruing interest ([103]), and on 13 May 2016 the first Deputy Commissioner granted only partial remission of the GIC ([116]).

The taxpayer sought judicial review of the May 2016 decision under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), arguing that the December 2014 letter had already decided to remit the GIC, so that the later decision was beyond power ([117], [120]). The primary judge found that no such decision had been made and dismissed the application ([121], [129]-[130]). On appeal the taxpayer did not challenge the primary judge’s findings of fact ([134]). After the Court raised the possibility, he also sought leave to add grounds based on contract and estoppel ([86], [155]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court of the Federal Court (Kerr, Moshinsky and Derrington JJ) dismissed the appeal and dismissed the taxpayer’s interlocutory application of 8 March 2018 for leave to raise the new grounds. It ordered the taxpayer to pay the Deputy Commissioner’s costs of the appeal and of the interlocutory application (Orders 1-3; [164]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Moshinsky and Derrington JJ gave joint reasons. They held that, for there to be a decision to remit GIC under s 8AAG, “there needs to be both a mental process of reaching a conclusion and an objective manifestation of that conclusion” ([140]). They took the two elements from Finn J’s statement in Semunigus v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, accepted by a Full Court, that the making of a decision involves reaching a conclusion as a result of a mental process and translating it into a decision by an overt act ([141]-[142]).

Semunigus had concerned the overt act, and the issue here concerned the mental process, but their Honours considered the statement “to accurately capture the elements that are generally involved in the making of a decision” and saw no reason why it should not apply to s 8AAG ([143]). They accepted that it “may not be applicable in relation to all issues” ([148]).

On the primary judge’s unchallenged findings, Mr Celantano concluded that a payment arrangement should be agreed, but he reached no conclusion on the application for remission, which was a separate matter requiring its own conclusion ([144]-[145]). So, even if the letter was read as the taxpayer contended, it was not established that a decision to remit GIC was made ([153]). Their Honours accepted that the result might be perceived as unfair and might produce administrative uncertainty, but said that the circumstances were “quite unusual”, arising from an officer keying information into a computer-based template that produced a letter which in some respects did not reflect his intentions, and that this was unlikely to arise very often ([151]-[152]).

Kerr J dissented on the result. He shared the majority’s view of what the letter said ([30]), but held that inputting data into the template manifested by an overt act the mental processes the officer had applied, and that there is no requirement that the overt manifestation align with the decision-maker’s subjective intention, so that the letter was a decision or at least a purported decision which the Deputy Commissioner could not renounce ([53], [55]-[56], [63]-[64]). He thought the question was specific to the facts and context and could not be answered by comparison with a general statement of what decision-making usually involves ([50]-[51]).

He observed that the expectation that a decision involves human mental processes “is being challenged by automated ‘intelligent’ decision making systems”, and that the legal conception of a decision cannot be static ([46], [49]). He agreed with the majority that the application to raise new grounds should be dismissed ([78]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Moshinsky and Derrington JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [140] (opens in a new tab), [143]–[145] (opens in a new tab), [153]–[154] (opens in a new tab)

The appeal was dismissed because, on unchallenged findings, no conclusion had been reached on the remission application, even if the letter was read as the taxpayer contended; the requirement of a mental process of reaching a conclusion and the application of the facts to it are the ground of the decision.

Obiter · Moshinsky and Derrington JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [148] (opens in a new tab), [151]–[152] (opens in a new tab)

Their Honours accepted that the general statement may not apply to all issues, and commented on perceived unfairness, administrative uncertainty and the unusual circumstances; those observations qualify and explain the result but the result did not depend on them.

Separate reasoning · Kerr J (dissenting on disposition)

Read judgment: [30] (opens in a new tab), [46]–[56] (opens in a new tab), [63]–[64] (opens in a new tab), [76] (opens in a new tab)

Kerr J agreed with the majority on the construction of the letter ([30]) but would have allowed the appeal ([76]) on a different view of what makes a decision; he agreed with the majority that the application to raise new grounds should be dismissed ([78]). His observations on automated decision-making are part of a dissent.

Why does this case matter?

Questions about whether a government decision exists are often answered by pointing to a document that reads like one. This case arose from a letter produced by software from a template, and it is cited in discussions of automated systems, so students need to keep what the Justices decided apart from what any of them observed about technology.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the statutory power, the officer who exercised it and the officer’s authority, and then state the evidence relied on and the findings that were open.

Attribute each statement to the Justices who made it, with the paragraph: Moshinsky and Derrington JJ for the joint reasons and Kerr J for his separate reasons. If a problem mentions automated decision-making, work out whose reasons the observation comes from, and whether the facts involved an officer using a template or a computer making the decision itself.

If the power or the kind of proceeding differs from a taxpayer’s challenge to a later decision under s 8AAG, say how the context differs, and check whether later authority has addressed how Pintarich applies there.

Check your understanding

1. What did the letter of 8 December 2014 say about the lump sum and the GIC, and how was it produced ([101])?

2. What evidence did Mr Celantano give about whether he had made a decision to remit GIC ([101], [144]-[145])?

3. In whose reasons does [140] appear, and what two elements did they say a decision to remit GIC requires ([140])?

4. Where did that statement come from, and what did the majority say about its limits ([141]-[143], [148])?

5. On what point did Kerr J agree with the majority, and on what point did he differ ([5], [30], [53])?

6. What did all three Justices do about the application to raise contract and estoppel grounds ([78], [163])?