Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7; (2012) 246 CLR 498
Money was lent under agreements that broke the law. When the scheme collapsed, could the lender get it back as money had and received?
What happened?
Investors borrowed money to pay management fees in tax-driven blueberry farming schemes. The investments were “prescribed interests” offered without the prospectus the applicable Companies Code required, so the loan agreements were connected with contravening conduct. The schemes failed, the loans were assigned to Equuscorp, and it sued — on the agreements and, in the alternative, for money had and received.
What did the Court decide?
Equuscorp failed on both. The loan agreements were unenforceable, and the restitutionary claim also failed: allowing recovery would have stultified the statutory policy the prospectus requirement exists to serve. On a separate question the Court accepted that a right to restitution of this kind was capable of being assigned, but divided evenly on whether the deed in this case had in fact transferred it.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Whether a benefit must be restored depends on the legal basis for its retention, read against any applicable illegality or statutory policy, rather than on the bare fact that one party received money from the other.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ; Gummow and Bell JJ
Read judgment: [45] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [111] (PDF p 57) (opens in a new tab)
French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that recovery as money had and received would defeat the statutory protection of the investors and therefore concluded that Rural had no restitutionary right. Gummow and Bell JJ expressly agreed with that conclusion and likewise treated statutory-policy stultification as dispositive. This reasoning was necessary to the dismissal of the appeals and commanded five Justices.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [126]–[133] (PDF p 65) (opens in a new tab), [149] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab)
Dissenting in the result, Heydon J concluded that the Code did not exclude an action for money had and received and that Rural’s action would have succeeded. His Honour’s distinct statutory analysis rejected the majority’s decisive treatment of statutory-policy stultification.
Why does this case matter?
It is the case to reach for whenever a contract has been struck down and somebody is out of pocket, which happens far more often than the illegality cases suggest — consumer credit, licensing, financial services. The instinct is that unwinding the transaction must be the fair result, and here it was not.
It is also a useful reminder that who is suing can be a question in its own right. Rural advanced the money; Equuscorp arrived later as purchaser of a failed loan portfolio, and a good deal of the argument was about what it had actually acquired.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the qualifying factor Equuscorp alleged. Then use Rural’s relationship to the schemes, the investors’ position and the prospectus provisions to explain the result. Finally, distinguish the restitution issue from the separate questions about assignment.
Check your understanding
Rural advanced the money; Equuscorp bought the loan portfolio and sued. Why did neither fact help it recover?