Calidad Pty Ltd v Seiko Epson Corporation
Calidad Pty Ltd v Seiko Epson Corporation [2020] HCA 41
Epson sold printer cartridges built to be used once. A recycler refilled and reprogrammed used ones, and Calidad imported them. Did Epson’s patent rights end on the first sale, and did the recycling make a new product?
What happened?
Seiko Epson is the patentee of two patents whose inventions are embodied in the original Epson printer cartridges, which were made and sold in a form permitting a single use ([3]). Ninestar, a third party, obtained empty original cartridges and modified them so that they could be refilled and re-used, and Calidad imported the modified cartridges and sold them in Australia ([3]). The modifications included making a second hole in the container to refill it with ink, reprogramming or replacing the memory chip so that it no longer recorded the cartridge as empty, and, for some cartridges, removing the interface pattern or moving the integrated circuit assembly ([34]). Seiko did not contend that any contractual conditions restricting use were imposed when the cartridges were first sold ([4]).
Burley J, applying the implied licence approach of the Privy Council in Menck, held that the licence was extinguished for some categories of modified cartridge but not others ([35]-[37]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Greenwood, Jagot and Yates JJ) held that none of the modifications was within the implied licence and that each was a making of a new embodiment of the invention ([38]-[44]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed Calidad’s appeal with costs and set aside the Full Court’s orders. In their place it ordered that Calidad’s appeal to the Full Court be allowed and Seiko’s cross-appeal there dismissed, and it remitted the claim for pecuniary relief for breach of a settlement deed to the primary judge ([111]). Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[111]). Gageler J wrote additional reasons ([112]-[141]). Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ dissented in part and would have allowed the appeal only in part ([142]-[143], [267]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Exhaustion. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said that “[t]he rule, that a patentee’s rights with respect to a particular product are exhausted once that product is sold without conditions as to use, should be accepted” ([9]). The doctrine leaves no patent rights to be enforced “with respect to the particular product sold”, while a patentee’s rights to make and sell another product embodying the invention “remained unaffected” ([74]). It does not stop a patentee imposing restrictions on use after sale, but “simply requires that they be obtained by negotiation in the usual way and enforced according to the law of contract or in equity” ([76]).
The joint reasons reached this by construing s 13(1) and the definition of “exploit”, reasoning that an exploitation by selling and using “is completed on that first sale” ([90]), and they described continued adherence to the implied licence doctrine as “an unjustifiable gloss on the statutory language” ([110]). Gageler J agreed and said the doctrine “cuts through that mess” of the implied licence doctrine as it applies to downstream owners ([133]). Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ said the case could be decided without choosing between the theories, and that adopting exhaustion “is not a step we are prepared to take” because stripping patentees of long-held rights “is a question for the legislature, not the courts” ([145], [147]).
Making. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ held that neither doctrine “has any part to play” in deciding whether a new product embodying the claimed invention has been made ([45]). The “real issue” is “whether the modifications resulted in a new product being made” ([49]), and the question “is not addressed to the nature of the article but rather to the invention described by the integers of the claim” ([66]). The Full Court had erred by restricting the cartridges’ use by reference to a characteristic of the product, its single use, rather than by reference to what the patentee had claimed ([61]).
After Ninestar’s work “what remained were the original Epson cartridges with some modifications which enabled their re-use”, and the modifications “did not involve the replication of parts and features of the invention claimed” ([69]). Gageler J’s agreement with the joint reasons covers this question ([112]). Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ held that the work on some categories of cartridge was not a making but that the work on the categories where the interface pattern was cut off, together with the other modifications, was, because it changed each cartridge “into a new and different cartridge adapted to a new and different task” ([143], [266]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ; Gageler J agreeing
Read judgment: [90]–[91] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab), [70] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [112] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)
The four Justices expressly adopted exhaustion as the construction of the statutory rights of sale and use. Its classification as reasoning necessary to the result needs qualification: the joint reasons also held that these modifications were permissible under either doctrine. The adoption is a deliberate majority ruling on the doctrine argued, but the result did not depend on choosing it over implied licence.
Separate reasoning · Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [145]–[147] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices dissented on adopting exhaustion and dissented in part in the result. They considered the choice unnecessary to dispose of the appeal and would have left any removal of the established patent rights to Parliament. Their refusal to adopt exhaustion is not the majority position.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ; Gageler J agreeing
Read judgment: [45] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [66]–[70] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab), [112] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)
This reasoning supplies the ground for rejecting infringement by making: that right is distinct from use and sale, and the inquiry concerns the invention defined by the claim. Applied to all the modified cartridges, the work enabled continued use of the originals without making new embodiments. Gageler J adopted these reasons entirely; this conclusion was necessary to rejecting Seiko’s making claim.
Separate reasoning · Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [266]–[267] (PDF p 114) (opens in a new tab)
These Justices dissented in part in the result. Cutting off the interface pattern together with the other modifications amounted, for them, to making new cartridges in Categories 5, 6, 7 and B. That application supported allowing the appeal only in part and differs from the majority’s conclusion that none of the categories involved making.
Why does this case matter?
A recycler or repairer dealing in second-hand goods is the usual setting. The question the case is best known for is rarely the only one in such a problem, and a problem about modified goods is often decided on another.
Exam and application relevance
Begin with the text the Court construed: s 13(1) and the definition of “exploit” in Sch 1 ([25]-[27]). Then set out the integers of the claim and what was done to the product ([46]-[49]).
Check whether the facts include conditions agreed when the product was first sold ([4], [76]).
Attribute each point to the reasons it comes from. The dissenting Justices’ analysis of the individual categories of cartridge is at [264]-[266]; it was not adopted by the majority.
Check your understanding
1. The joint reasons set two earlier decisions against each other at [5]-[6]. What did each hold, and which approach did the High Court adopt?
2. Which Justices were not prepared to adopt the exhaustion doctrine, and what reasons did they give at [145]-[147]?
3. What can a patentee still do after sale, according to the joint reasons at [76]?
4. What did the joint reasons say at [61]-[64] about the Full Court’s reliance on the cartridges being single-use?
5. Which categories of cartridge did Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ treat as a making, and what change did they regard as significant ([266])?