Commissioner of Patents v Thaler

Federal Court of Australia (Full Court) · 2022

Intellectual Property And Technology LawPatents

Commissioner of Patents v Thaler [2022] FCAFC 62

Could a machine be named as the inventor on an Australian patent application? A single judge said yes, and the Commissioner of Patents took the question to a Full Court of five.

What happened?

Dr Stephen Thaler filed a Patent Cooperation Treaty application in Australia, No 2019363177, on 17 September 2019 for a “Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention”. As the name of the inventor he gave “DABUS”, with the comment that the invention was autonomously generated by an artificial intelligence ([2]). The parties agreed that DABUS is an artificial intelligence system that incorporates artificial neural networks, that its output is the alleged invention, that it is not a natural or a legal person, and that Dr Thaler is not the inventor. They agreed too that Dr Thaler owns the copyright in the DABUS source code and the computer on which DABUS operates, and bears its maintenance and running costs ([8]).

When the application entered the national phase on 9 September 2020, IP Australia wrote that it did not comply with reg 3.2C of the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), because it did not identify a natural person as the inventor, and invited Dr Thaler to supply the name of one or more natural persons or to explain how DABUS could be recorded as an inventor ([3]). The Deputy Commissioner of Patents decided that the Patents Act and Regulations were inconsistent with an artificial intelligence being treated as an inventor, and the application lapsed ([4]).

On judicial review the primary judge concluded that an inventor under the Act can be an artificial intelligence system or device, and set the Deputy Commissioner’s determinations aside ([5]). The Commissioner appealed on the basis that the primary judge misconstrued s 15 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and reg 3.2C(2)(aa), and that he made factual findings beyond the evidence ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The Full Court of the Federal Court, constituted by Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Yates, Moshinsky and Burley JJ, gave a single set of reasons. It allowed the appeal, set aside orders 1, 2 and 3 of the orders made on 30 July 2021, and made no order as to costs ([123]). It held that the first ground of appeal, which concerned the construction of s 15 and reg 3.2C(2)(aa), must succeed and found it unnecessary to consider the second ([123]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Full Court held that “inventor” in reg 3.2C(2)(aa) has the same meaning as in the Patents Act ([84]), and that where s 15(1)(a) provides that a patent may only be granted to “a person who is an inventor”, the reference to “a person” emphasises, in context, that the inventor is a natural person. The extended meaning of “person” in s 2C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) does not apply to s 15(1)(a), because the Patents Act shows a sufficient contrary intention ([106]).

The rest of s 15(1) points the same way. Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) each provide for a person who becomes entitled by receiving that entitlement from the inventor in paragraph (a), and “something without a legal identity cannot give effect to an assignment” ([107]-[109]). The Court found support in the history of patent law, from the Statute of Monopolies and the earlier Australian Patents Acts ([85]-[99], [111], [115]-[116]). It concluded that “Only a natural person can be an inventor for the purposes of the Patents Act and Regulations”, so that naming DABUS did not comply with reg 3.2C(2)(aa), and that it was beside the point that Dr Thaler may have rights to the output of DABUS ([113], [117]).

The Court was careful about how far this went. It did not accept the premise, which it said the primary judge had accepted and apparently found influential, that if DABUS is not an inventor then no invention devised by an artificial intelligence system can be granted a patent ([121]). Whether the application had a human inventor had not been explored in the litigation and remained undecided, because the characterisation of a person as an inventor is a question of law ([121]). The Court added that the policy questions raised by artificial intelligence and inventions require consideration with some urgency, and that caution is needed in construing a statute by reference to what a court regards as desirable policy ([119]-[120]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Yates, Moshinsky and Burley JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [106]–[109] (opens in a new tab), [113] (opens in a new tab), [117] (opens in a new tab)

The construction of s 15(1) and reg 3.2C(2)(aa), that an inventor is a natural person, is the ground on which the first ground of appeal succeeded and the orders of the primary judge were set aside ([123]).

Proposition 2

Obiter · Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Yates, Moshinsky and Burley JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [118]–[121] (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs are introduced as two further matters that warrant observation ([118]). The orders rest on the construction of s 15(1) and reg 3.2C(2)(aa) and on the finding that naming DABUS did not comply ([117], [123]), so the observations about policy and about the undecided question whether the application has a human inventor were not necessary to that ground.

Why does this case matter?

Questions about artificial intelligence invite sweeping answers about what the law allows or forbids. A marker will credit an answer that stays within the question the Court was actually asked, and that discipline is easy to lose on this topic.

Exam and application relevance

Identify whose name the application gave as inventor and under which provision the objection arose. Then check the Court’s own words at [118]-[122] about the wider debate before you rely on the case for anything beyond that question.

The High Court later refused Dr Thaler special leave to appeal: on 11 November 2022 Gordon J announced for Gordon, Edelman and Gleeson JJ that the case was not the appropriate vehicle to consider the questions of principle the applicant sought to raise. That refusal decides nothing on the merits.

Check your understanding

1. What name did the application give as the inventor, and why did IP Australia say that did not comply with reg 3.2C?

2. How do paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of s 15(1) contribute to the Court’s reading of paragraph (a)?

3. How many sets of reasons did the Full Court give, and who gave them?

4. Which question does the Court say at [121] has not been explored in the litigation, and why does it say that characterising a person as an inventor is a question of law?