Theunissen v Barter

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2025

PropertyEasements

Theunissen v Barter [2025] NSWCA 50

A registered easement gives the owners of a house use of the rooftop terrace in front of it for recreation and as a balcony or garden, but does not say that the use is theirs alone. May the owner of the roof also use it?

What happened?

Mr and Ms Theunissen and Ms Barter lived on adjoining blocks in Mosman, Lots 1 and 2, created by a subdivision effected by the registration of a deposited plan on 15 July 1994 (Kirk JA at [17]). Lot 1 is a battle-axe block to the rear of, and at a higher elevation than, Lot 2 ([18]). The Theunissens became registered proprietors of Lot 1 in August 2001 and Ms Barter became registered proprietor of Lot 2 in July 2008 ([19]).

An easement registered on 26 February 1996 replaced a precursor created by the 1994 instrument ([21]). It relates to the flat rooftop of the house on Lot 2, an area of about 78 square metres surrounded on three sides by a wall topped with metal railings, with the Theunissens’ home on the eastern side; the roof has an openable skylight, and Ms Barter currently reaches the roof by attaching a foldable metal ladder to the skylight from her hallway and has no other way to do so ([22]-[23]).

The primary judge found that there was no direct evidence of the form of the skylight at the time of the grant, but that as originally constructed it was not trafficable ([24]).

The Easement gave a right to go, pass and repass on foot, together with “the use and enjoyment of the servient tenement for the purposes of recreation and enjoyment and as a balcony, terrace or garden”, and a right to enter to lay, inspect, clean, repair and maintain the surface, subject to provisos ([29], [31]). The instrument does not state that the rights of recreation and enjoyment are exclusive ([32]). Ms Barter sought declarations and orders about the parties’ rights, and Richmond J held that the rights were not exclusive, Barter v Theunissen [2024] NSWSC 326 ([2], [25]). The Theunissens appealed. Ms Barter filed a motion objecting that the appeal was incompetent, and the Theunissens filed a summons seeking leave to appeal in case it was needed ([2]-[4]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Mitchelmore JA, Kirk JA and Griffiths AJA) heard the matter on 13 September 2024 and gave orders on 31 March 2025. Kirk JA gave the reasons ([2]-[160]); Mitchelmore JA agreed with his reasons and orders ([1]) and Griffiths AJA agreed with Kirk JA ([161]). The Court held that leave to appeal was not required, dismissed Ms Barter’s competency motion with costs and dismissed the summons for leave, with Ms Barter to pay the applicants’ costs of it ([13], [159]-[160]).

It allowed the appeal, set aside orders 3, 8, 9 and 12 made by Richmond J on 15 April 2024 and made a declaration about the proper construction of the Easement in their place, with no order as to the costs of the proceedings below and with Ms Barter to pay the Theunissens’ costs of the appeal ([158], [160]). Kirk JA found it unnecessary to address ground 2, concerning concurrent use by the servient owner ([5]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Kirk JA said that construing an easement created by a written instrument involves determining the intention of the party or parties to the grant in light of the text, context and purpose of the instrument, assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the party or parties, and in light of admissible evidence ([27]). He read the High Court’s statement in Westfield that the rules of evidence assisting the construction of contracts inter partes did not apply to the construction of the easement there as addressed to rules of evidence relevant to contractual interpretation, “not to the basic approach to construction of the legal document” ([27]).

The Easement did not state that the rights of recreation and enjoyment were exclusive, so the issue was whether, “construed in context, it should be understood in that way despite the absence of express words” ([32]). He weighed the textual points one by one: the words “full and free right” and “use and enjoyment” were neutral ([33]-[34]); the words “balcony” and “terrace” had “an overtone of exclusivity” ([35]); the dominant owner’s rights to lay, inspect, clean, repair and maintain the surface, the third proviso, the fourth proviso (under which the dominant owner is to permit the servient owner to enter the roof to repair it) and the fifth proviso each pointed towards exclusivity, with weight that varied from limited to significant ([36]-[37], [41]-[43]); and other points the primary judge had relied on did not advance the debate either way ([38]-[40]).

Reading the Easement in the context of the deposited plan, the servient owner had no ready means of access to the rooftop, which he said offered significant support for the appellants ([46]-[50]). He concluded that the only factor supporting the respondent was that exclusivity was not expressed where that could readily have been done, and that, “Taking them as a whole, a reasonable person in the position of the parties would conclude that the Easement grants the dominant owner the exclusive use and enjoyment of the servient tenement for the purposes of recreation and enjoyment and as a balcony, terrace or garden” ([51]).

Having reached that conclusion on the text and context, which he said “suffices to uphold Ground 1” ([51]), Kirk JA considered the physical characteristics relied on “Lest my reasoning be in error with respect to any of the factors set out above” ([54]). He said that Westfield “did not address the issue in terms”, that the High Court “was not seeking exhaustively to list permissible materials”, and that “the decision does not seem to rule out taking account of physical characteristics” ([63], [72]).

He described a spectrum, from taking no account of physical characteristics to allowing reference to any of them, and said that “A principled approach is to allow some reference to physical characteristics but without going to the other end of the spectrum” ([90]-[92]). As to time, he held that “the physical characteristics relevant to construing the terms of the grant of an easement are, only, those at the time of the grant”, and that such facts “do not flicker out of significance because they have changed, or become harder to identify, since the time of the grant” ([93]); he said that the approach of Slattery J in Australian Unity, which looked only to present characteristics, would produce a variable construction, and he disagreed with Fryberg J’s tentative suggestion in Currumbin that the scope for extrinsic evidence may reduce over time ([83], [94]-[95]).

He added that current physical characteristics may be critical to questions that arise after the easement has been construed, such as whether the dominant owner’s use has been unreasonable or the servient owner has substantially interfered ([97]). Noting that there was no challenge to the idea, expressed in earlier intermediate appellate decisions, that physical characteristics must be reasonably ascertainable ([101]), he accepted that the characteristics that may be considered are those “reasonably ascertainable by a third party at the time of the grant” ([102]); they may include characteristics of the surrounding land so far as that throws light on the nature of the easement ([103]), and they are “the broad and reasonably enduring features of the physical characteristics which are relevant, not fine details of the land or fixtures on the land, nor those which are capable of ready transformation” ([104]).

Reasonably ascertainable sources beyond the registered instruments “generally would include, for instance, what can be observed from outside the properties along with publicly available maps” ([105]); in light of Deguisa v Lynn, “it would also be a step too far to take account of what might have been disclosed by prudent information requests under freedom of information laws” ([106]). He found it unnecessary to resolve whether features not visible from outside the property may be taken into account in any circumstances ([105], [108]), and said that the significance of the characteristics, if any, depends on the case ([107]-[108]).

Applying those statements, whether the skylight could be opened was a matter of fine detail that a third party could not reasonably ascertain, so the specific nature of the skylight could not be taken into account ([112]); the nature of the room looking onto the terrace was a relatively fine detail that could not be taken into account, and the presence of sliding glass doors, which would have been apparent from the street, was on the borderline of permissibility ([114]); but the physical layout of the tenements and the location of the terrace immediately in front of the dominant house raised a privacy and amenity issue, arguably apparent from the deposited plan itself, that gave significant reinforcement to the conclusion that the dominant tenement was intended to have exclusive use for the stated purposes ([115]-[116]).

The respondent argued, as a further ground on which the primary judge’s conclusion could be supported, that an easement construed as the appellants contended would be invalid because it would leave her only a “sterile and nominal right” ([118]); Kirk JA considered the point although no notice of contention had been filed, because the appellants did not object ([16]). He drew the authorities together and said that every easement prevents some ordinary use of the servient tenement, perhaps to a very significant extent; that the question is whether a putative easement “substantially deprives the servient owner of proprietorship or legal possession to such an extent as to be inconsistent with ownership”, a matter of fact and degree; that the assessment involves the physical area affected by reference to the servient tenement as a whole and the effect on the servient owner’s positive and negative rights with respect to the burdened land; that a complete transfer of the servient owner’s rights, as in Bursill Enterprises, cannot be an easement; and that a grant of a sole right to the dominant owner to use the area for a particular purpose, as opposed to exclusive possession for all purposes, “does not of itself establish that the easement is invalid” ([140]).

Applying that analysis, the Easement as the appellants construed it gave the dominant owner sole use for a significant purpose but not exclusive possession for all purposes ([141]); the dominant owner’s rights were limited, and the servient owner kept negative rights to restrict what the dominant owner might do in the area ([143]); the area, which the respondent put at about 27% of the land area of Lot 2 ([145]), was “significant but limited” ([149]); and the servient owner kept the benefit of the airspace below the rooftop, where her three-storey house stands, and of unobstructed sunlight through the skylight ([147]-[148]).

He held that it could not be said that the servient owner had been substantially deprived of proprietorship or legal possession to such an extent as to be inconsistent with ownership, and that the argument of invalidity was not made out ([149]-[150]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kirk JA (Mitchelmore JA and Griffiths AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [27] (opens in a new tab), [32]–[51] (opens in a new tab)

This is the reasoning by which Kirk JA held that the rights of recreation and enjoyment were exclusive. He said that the conclusion at [51] suffices to uphold Ground 1, subject to the validity issue, and the appeal was allowed on it ([51], [117], [150], [160]).

Proposition 2

Classification unresolved · Kirk JA (Mitchelmore JA and Griffiths AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [54] (opens in a new tab), [63] (opens in a new tab), [72] (opens in a new tab), [90]–[108] (opens in a new tab), [112]–[117] (opens in a new tab)

Kirk JA states the position on physical characteristics as what it is sufficient to say for the purposes of resolving the matter ([108]) and applies it to reject the detail of the skylight and accept the layout and privacy point ([112]-[116]). But he had already concluded on text and context that the rights were exclusive ([51]) and took up the physical characteristics only in case that reasoning was in error ([54]), describing the privacy point as reinforcement ([116]-[117]); and he expressly left open exceptional cases of features not visible from the boundary ([105], [108]). A binary label would conceal that the Court of Appeal’s statement of principle was developed with a full survey of authority and stated in terms, yet was not strictly necessary to the result.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Kirk JA (Mitchelmore JA and Griffiths AJA agreeing)

Read judgment: [118]–[150] (opens in a new tab)

The respondent’s validity argument was a further ground on which the primary judge’s conclusion could be supported ([16]), and Kirk JA’s rejection of it ([149]-[150]) was necessary to his upholding ground 1 on the construction he had reached ([117], [150]).

Why does this case matter?

Disputes about the scope of a registered easement are often argued from the words of the instrument alone, or by gathering whatever facts either owner can produce. This decision is a useful vehicle for asking, of each fact a party offers, what it is offered to show.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about a registered easement whose terms do not say whether the dominant owner’s use is exclusive, start with the text of the grant and the registered plan, and say what each term suggests and how strongly. Then ask of each further fact a party offers what it is being used to prove, and give the paragraph for each step. If the argument is that the grant would be invalid, identify what the servient owner keeps as well as what the dominant owner is given. Cite Kirk JA’s reasons by paragraph.

This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia, where registration and easement legislation is State legislation. Later decisions may have applied or qualified these statements, so check for current authority before relying on them in a modern problem.

Check your understanding

1. Which lot was the dominant tenement, which was the servient tenement, and what area did the Easement cover ([17]-[19], [22])?

2. How could Ms Barter reach the rooftop at the time of the appeal, and what did the primary judge find about the skylight as originally constructed ([23]-[24])?

3. What did Kirk JA say about the words “full and free right” and about the words “balcony” and “terrace” ([33], [35])?

4. Which two physical characteristics did the Theunissens rely on, and how did Kirk JA treat each ([52], [112]-[116])?

5. What did Kirk JA say about the time at which physical characteristics are assessed ([93])?

6. What did Kirk JA say about information that might have been obtained through freedom of information requests ([106], [112])?

7. Which orders of the primary judge were set aside, and what did Kirk JA say about ground 2 ([5], [160])?