Lowe v Kladis
Lowe v Kladis [2018] NSWCA 130
A landowner with no vehicle access proposes an elevated driveway over strips where neighbours hold rights of carriageway, and asks a court to make them consent to his development application. What should the court ask about those rights?
What happened?
Mr Kladis was the registered proprietor of No 26 Musgrave Street, Mosman, a waterfront battleaxe block created by a 1940 subdivision ([7], [10]). Ms Lowe was the proprietor of No 28, next to No 26 on its eastern side, and SP 30459 was the proprietor of the common property of No 30, next to No 28 on the east ([7]). No 26 is connected to Musgrave Street by a narrow strip that forms part of its own title, Strip 1, which runs past the rear boundaries of Nos 28, 30 and 34 ([10]).
No 26 also has a right of carriageway over Strip 2, which forms part of the title to No 28 and runs beside Strip 1 to Musgrave Street ([11]). Strip 1 is subject to rights of carriageway in favour of Nos 28, 30 and 24 ([108]). The transfers creating the easements used the expression “right of Carriageway” (except No 24’s “Right of Way” over Strip 1), and s 181A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), as the judgment sets it out, gives that expression the meaning in Part 1 of Schedule 8 ([30]).
From the end of the existing pebblecrete driveway the land in Strips 1 and 2 is a steep winding track with stairs, and the topography made it impossible under current conditions for Mr Kladis to have vehicular access to No 26 ([13]).
Mr Kladis’ solution was a very substantial ramped concrete driveway ([15]). As finally formulated, the elevated driveway was to be built partly on Strip 1, partly on Strip 2 (part of No 28, over which No 26 has a right of carriageway) and partly over Strip E (part of No 30, over which No 26 has a right of carriageway) ([6]). The primary judge described it as elevated from the ground, supported by at least four concrete supports, at an angle of about 15 degrees, with a highest support 4.981 metres above the surface on the southern side ([16]). The estimated cost was $780,000 ([16]).
On 3 November 2014 Mr Kladis began proceedings in the Equity Division seeking orders that the appellants consent, for the purposes of cl 49(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW), to the lodgement of a development application on his behalf; cl 49(1) provides that a development application may be made by the owner of the land or by another person with the owner’s written consent ([17]). Beech-Jones J concluded that Mr Kladis was entitled to relief against Ms Lowe but not against SP 30459 ([18]).
The primary judge accepted that, even with the gates Mr Kladis offered, the proposed works would affect the rights of Nos 24 and 28 in ways that were not insubstantial, but was not satisfied that the proposed use was unreasonable ([40]). On 23 June 2017 his Honour ordered the appellants to give their consent within 21 days, with the Registrar to execute the consent in the name of a non-complying appellant ([20]). The appellants gave their consents, a development application was lodged with Mosman Council on 1 August 2017, and an appeal against the Council’s deemed refusal in the Land and Environment Court was stayed pending the appeal ([22]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of New South Wales (Meagher JA, White JA and Sackville AJA) heard the appeal on 14 March 2018 and gave judgment on 20 June 2018. The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by Beech-Jones J on 23 June 2017 and the costs orders made on 19 September 2017. In their place it dismissed Mr Kladis’ proceedings with costs against him, and it ordered him to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal ([132]). Because Mr Kladis had given an irrevocable undertaking to withdraw the development application and discontinue the Land and Environment Court proceedings if the appeal succeeded, the Court made no further orders about them ([23], [133]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Sackville AJA, with whose reasons Meagher JA ([1]) and White JA ([2]) agreed, said that Mr Kladis was proposing to exercise two distinct sets of rights: on Strip 1 he was the owner of a servient tenement subject to rights of carriageway held by the owners of Nos 28, 30 and 24, and on Strip 2 he was the holder of a right of carriageway, that is the owner of a dominant tenement ([84]). The argument in the Equity Division and in the Court of Appeal had tended to conflate the two, so the principles governing each had to be restated ([84]-[85]).
As to the servient owner, he said that the owner of the servient tenement is not entitled to obstruct the use of a right of carriageway by the owner of the dominant tenement ([91]). He relied on Powell v Langdon and Zenere v Leate for the tests that the question is one of degree, whether what is proposed is “a real substantial interference with the right of way”, and whether the servient owner is doing something “which substantially interferes with the exercise by the dominant owner of such of the rights conferred on him by the grant as for the time being he wishes to exercise” ([92]).
He set out Palmer J’s statement in Middleton v Arthur that what amounts to a substantial interference is “essentially and ultimately a question of common sense judgment founded upon the circumstances of each particular case” as accurately reflecting the authorities ([93]). He added that the principle does not make every interference actionable: a right of carriageway does not generally confer a right to enter the carriageway from every part of the dominant tenement adjoining it, and the servient owner is generally entitled to fence the right of way provided the dominant owner retains access through gates that permit reasonable exercise of the right ([95]).
Applying those principles to Strip 1, he held that the rights appurtenant to the three dominant tenements were not identical, contrary to what the parties seemed to have assumed ([109]). The owner of No 30 could use the carriageway for pedestrian or vehicular access to the western section of No 30 ([110]). Ms Lowe, as proprietor of No 28, had a right to unimpeded pedestrian access from No 28 along Strip 1 to Musgrave Street, and that was not lost because No 28 also had access to a public street by another route ([111]).
The primary judge’s finding of “not insubstantial affectations” of No 28’s rights was not challenged by Mr Kladis ([113]), and the elevated driveway would effectively deny the occupants of No 28 access to a substantial segment of Strip 1 at ground level, which “is to be effectively obliterated” between No 28’s western boundary and the commencement of the pebblecrete driveway ([114]). The primary judge had found the interference not unreasonable because otherwise there would be no realistic possibility of constructing a driveway to No 26; Sackville AJA observed that there appeared to be no evidence that the elevated driveway was the only practicable means of securing vehicular access ([115]) and then said, “More fundamentally”, that the test “does not involve balancing the desires of the owner of the servient tenement to gain better access to his or her land and the rights of the dominant owner”.
The relevant question “is whether the servient owner proposes to do something on the servient tenement that substantially interferes with the exercise by the dominant owner of such of the rights conferred by the grant as the dominant owner wishes to exercise”, and Mr Kladis’ proposal “necessarily involves a substantial interference with the rights of the owner of No 28” ([116]). The effective destruction of Strip 1 at ground level from just beyond the end of the pebblecrete driveway was also a substantial interference with No 30’s right of carriageway over Strip 1 ([117]).
Mr Kladis’ offer to ameliorate the effect on No 30 by a staircase on No 30’s land required works on land over which he had no rights, and the question was to be determined “by reference to the works to be undertaken on land over which the servient owner (Mr Kladis) has rights”, so that it was “not to the point” that a dominant owner might agree to works on his or her own land ([118]). “These conclusions are sufficient to warrant allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders made by the primary Judge” ([119]).
Sackville AJA acknowledged that this reasoning departed slightly from the appellants’ arguments and was satisfied that the grounds of appeal and the appellants’ submissions raised the matter and that counsel for Mr Kladis had an opportunity to answer it ([129]-[130]).
On Strip 2 Mr Kladis was the dominant owner, and Sackville AJA said that the primary judge’s finding there was not strictly necessary to address but that he would address it ([120]). He stated that a dominant owner has such ancillary rights as are reasonably necessary for the exercise or enjoyment of an easement ([96]), and that, applying Sertari, they include where appropriate the right to obtain the servient owner’s written consent to the dominant owner’s development application for improvements on the right of way that are reasonably necessary for its proper enjoyment ([97]).
He noted that Handley AJA accepted in Sertari that the servient owner would have a lawful reason to refuse consent if the proposed use was excessive and so not authorised by the terms of the grant ([99]), and said that the dominant owner is not entitled to use a right of carriageway in a manner that is not authorised by the terms of the easement or that unreasonably interferes with the use by the servient owner of the carriageway ([101]).
The older authorities on these propositions were influenced by what the parties to the grant had in contemplation, which departs from the approach in Westfield to the construction of easements, but he held that the principles in cases such as Todrick v Western National Omnibus Co and Jelbert v Davis were not displaced for easements registered under the Torrens system, and that Hare v Van Brugge confirmed that Westfield does not affect the principle that the owner of a dominant tenement cannot use a right of carriageway in a manner that interferes with the rights of the servient owner ([104]-[106]).
It was common ground that a dominant owner cannot interfere unreasonably with a right of carriageway enjoyed by another dominant owner over the same strip ([107]). On the facts he found that the elevated roadway would effectively deny No 28 the use of Strip 2, and in effect would deny the owner of Strip 2 the right to use that land even as a pathway ([122]-[124]). The primary judge had treated as the decisive factor whether the elevated driveway was necessary if No 26 was to have vehicular access to and from Musgrave Street ([125]).
Sackville AJA found two difficulties: there was no evidence and no finding that the works constituted the least intrusive means of providing vehicular access ([126]); and he did not accept that unreasonable interference is determined simply on the basis that the development is necessary to allow the dominant owner to exploit fully his or her rights of carriageway, regardless of the extent of interference with the servient owner. In his words, “The impact on the dominant owner if the works cannot proceed is a relevant consideration on the question of reasonableness, but it cannot be decisive” ([127]).
If the works could not proceed there would be no vehicular access to No 26 from Musgrave Street, but No 26 would not be landlocked, because the right of carriageway could continue to be used for pedestrian access, which had been the position since No 26 was created in 1940 ([128]). He concluded that the primary judge erred in finding that the proposed elevated driveway would not interfere so substantially with the rights of the owner of No 28 as to be unreasonable, and did not consider it necessary to consider separately other ways in which the works would interfere with the rights of the owner of No 28 or the extent of interference with the rights of the owner of No 30 ([131]).
Sackville AJA said that the question whether the proprietors of Nos 24 and 34 were necessary parties had been raised with both senior counsel at the outset of the hearing ([68]). He set out Leeming JA’s statement in Ross v Lane Cove Council that a person directly affected by the orders sought is a necessary party, that the obligation to join that person rests on the plaintiff or applicant, and that joinder, not notice, is the default position ([70]), together with Leeming JA’s qualification that, because the underlying concern is natural justice and r 6.23 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) provides that proceedings are not defeated merely because of non-joinder of a party, joinder is not essential where the party would suffer no prejudice ([71]).
He held that it was not necessary to join Mr Conen, who had notice of the proceedings, actively participated in them and had the opportunity to adduce evidence and advance arguments ([72]). In his view the owners of No 24 should have been joined: it was the responsibility of Mr Kladis as the party seeking relief to join all those whose rights were directly affected, and it was not simply a matter for the appellants to decide whether to argue about the effect of the proposal on No 24 ([76]).
He reasoned that cl 49(1) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation requires the consent of the owner of the land on which development is to take place and not of a person whose right of carriageway is affected ([78]), but that the proceedings were intended to remove an “otherwise insuperable barrier” to lodgement of the development application, so that the owners of No 24 lost the opportunity to be heard in opposition ([79]); that the owners’ ability to sue in nuisance later was not an equivalent opportunity ([80]); and that s 63 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) required the Court to determine matters in controversy finally and completely and to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings ([81]).
He considered that the Equity Division proceedings directly affected the rights of the owners of No 24 ([82]). The absence of necessary parties would ordinarily justify setting aside the orders, but after the hearing the solicitors for the owners of No 24 confirmed that their clients had been aware of the proceedings since they commenced and did not wish to be joined, and because the appeal was to be allowed in any event, he said “it is not necessary to carry further the consequences of non-joinder of the owners of No 24” ([83]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [91]–[95] (opens in a new tab), [108]–[119] (opens in a new tab)
Sackville AJA held that the proposal substantially interfered with the rights of the owners of Nos 28 and 30 over Strip 1 and said that these conclusions were sufficient to warrant allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders ([116]-[119]). White JA recorded the same conclusion as sufficient for the disposal of the appeal ([2]).
Proposition 2
Classification unresolved · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [96]–[107] (opens in a new tab), [120]–[128] (opens in a new tab), [131] (opens in a new tab)
Sackville AJA said it was “not strictly necessary” to address the finding on Strip 2 ([120]), and the appeal could be and was allowed on the Strip 1 reasoning ([119]). But White JA records the conclusion on Strip 2 as one of two that suffice for the disposal of the appeal ([2]), and Sackville AJA’s conclusion at [131] is expressed by reference to the rights of the owner of No 28 generally. A binary label would conceal that the Strip 2 analysis was fully reasoned and agreed in, yet was described by its author as not strictly necessary.
Proposition 3
Obiter · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [68]–[83] (opens in a new tab)
Sackville AJA expressed a firm view that the owners of No 24 should have been joined ([76], [82]), but did not carry the consequences of non-joinder further because those owners had said they did not wish to be joined and the appeal was to be allowed in any event ([83]); the orders rest on the interference reasoning ([119]), not on non-joinder.
Why does this case matter?
Disputes about works on a strip of land that several neighbours may cross are easily argued as a single contest between the owner who wants the works and the neighbours who object. A better answer separates the problem: who holds which right over which part of the land, what each grant entitles its holder to do, and who ought to be before the court when an order is sought. The Court of Appeal’s reasons are useful for that exercise because they work through the strips one at a time and because they deal with a point of procedure alongside the property question.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about works proposed on land crossed by several rights of way, start by listing the strips of land and, for each strip, the capacity in which each person acts: as owner of the burdened land, or as holder of a right of way over land that someone else owns. For each person with a right of way, read the grant and say between which places it runs. Then say what the proposed works would do to that person’s use of the land and what the grant entitles that person to do, and give the paragraph of Sackville AJA’s reasons for each step. Where one party asks the court to order a neighbour to consent to a development application, also ask whom the order sought would affect and whether each of them is before the court ([68]-[83]).
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales. It binds courts below it in that State and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. The legislation it applies is New South Wales legislation, stated as the judgment set it out in 2018. The Court recorded that the evidence before it was incomplete and not presented in a form that was easy to follow ([54]), and its conclusions depended on the plans and findings in this case. Later decisions may have applied or clarified these statements, so check for current authority before relying on them in a modern problem.
Check your understanding
1. Which strips of land did the proposed elevated driveway cross, and whose land was each part of ([6])?
2. What did cl 49(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation require for a development application to be made by someone other than the owner of the land, and what orders did Beech-Jones J make about it on 23 June 2017 ([17], [20])?
3. What did the primary judge find about the effect of the proposal on the rights of Nos 24 and 28, and was that finding challenged on appeal ([40], [113])?
4. In what two capacities did Sackville AJA say Mr Kladis was proposing to exercise rights, and why did he distinguish them ([84]-[85])?
5. Why did Sackville AJA say that the rights of Nos 28 and 30 over Strip 1 were not identical ([109]-[111])?
6. Which of the owners of Nos 24 and 34 did Sackville AJA say should have been joined, and what did he say about the consequences of non-joinder ([72], [76], [83])?
7. Which Justices sat, which of them wrote reasons on the merits, and what orders were made ([1]-[4], [132])?