McGrath v Campbell

Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal · 2006

PropertyEasementsLand Registration

McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; [2006] NSWCA 180

A seller disposes of two adjoining lots to different buyers at the same time, and a driveway over one has always served the other. Years later the neighbours fall out. Can the driveway’s user make the registered owner grant a right of way?

Affirmed by Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 580

Pike J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, set out Tobias JA’s reasons ([254]-[256]) and Gleeson JA’s statement in Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55 that something more than notice of an unregistered interest is needed, such as an acknowledgment of it or an undertaking to act in accordance with it ([259]). He held that no implied easement enforceable against the incoming owner as an exception to indefeasibility arose because the necessary undertaking by that owner was absent ([269]-[270]). That is a first instance decision following the approach in this case, not an appellate decision.

Clarified by Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 580

Pike J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, quoted Tobias JA’s comment and noted that he did not express a concluded view ([245]-[247]). Pike J considered whether what Tobias JA said about indefeasibility extended beyond claims against a transferor to claims against a successor in title, noted that Brereton J’s observations appear to confine it to claims against a transferor, and said that, on the Aldridge v Wright basis and earlier Court of Appeal decisions, he proceeded on the basis that a claim of an implied easement of the kind before him can stand outside the cloak of indefeasibility ([247]-[250]). He did not decide the point.

What happened?

Mrs Chiplin was the registered proprietor of Lot 12 and part of Lot 6 under one certificate of title, and the land was subject to a registered right of way, twelve feet wide, created in 1926 for the benefit of the adjoining Lot 20 ([9]-[10]). Lot 6 fronted The Boulevarde at Toronto, and Lot 12, to its south, had its only street frontage on Brighton Avenue ([11]). The primary judge, Barrett J, found that while Mrs Chiplin owned both lots the tenants of Lot 6 and their employees, customers and suppliers used a driveway over Lot 12 to reach Lot 6 ([13], [15]). That use ceased when the supermarket’s lease expired on 30 June 1979, and Mrs Chiplin then decided to sell both lots ([15]).

Mrs Chiplin contracted to sell Lot 6 to Mr and Mrs Campbell for $95,000 and Lot 12 to Mr and Mrs McGrath for $40,000 ([16]). The two transfers bore the same date, 9 September 1980, and were registered on 3 February 1981; there was no challenge on the appeal to the finding that the sales were completed contemporaneously ([17]). Barrett J found that Mr McGrath had been aware in and before 1980 of the driveway being used to reach Lot 6 ([22]-[23]).

A letter of 3 April 1980 had contained draft special conditions about a right of way for Lot 6, but Barrett J found the evidence insufficient to show that either was included in a contract as exchanged ([25]-[27]). He found that a managing clerk at the firm acting for the purchasers erroneously advised the Campbells that Lot 6 already had the benefit of the 1926 right of way, that the McGraths knew nothing of that advice, and that the McGraths were never informed about any right of way over the driveway in favour of Lot 6 ([27]-[29]).

From the settlement until about 1995 the McGraths acquiesced in the Campbells’ use of the driveway; Barrett J found that this was neighbourly acquiescence and that there was no evidence of any express or implied agreement by the McGraths to permit it ([30]). Barrett J held that the simultaneous transfers brought the case within the extension of the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows made in Aldridge v Wright, and that, because of them, the McGraths were not, as against the Campbells, subsequent owners of Lot 12, so that the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) did not prevent enforcement of an implied right of way ([53], [59]). On 29 June 2005 he declared the Campbells entitled to a twelve-foot right of way over Lot 12 and ordered the McGraths to execute an instrument in registrable form granting a right of carriageway appurtenant to Lot 6 ([62]). The McGraths appealed ([62]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Giles, Hodgson and Tobias JJA) allowed the appeal, set aside the declaration and orders made by Barrett J on 29 June 2005, ordered that the proceedings be dismissed, and ordered the Campbells to pay the McGraths’ costs of the proceedings at first instance and of the appeal ([121]). Tobias JA gave the principal reasons ([6]-[121]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Tobias JA recorded that it had generally been accepted that a Wheeldon v Burrows easement, although not noted on the certificate of title of the servient tenement, may be enforced against the registered proprietor who created it but not against that proprietor’s successors in title ([7]). He held, with Giles JA agreeing ([1]) and Hodgson JA agreeing with the orders and substantially with the reasons ([2]), that the primary judge erred in finding that the case came within the in personam exception to statutory indefeasibility, so that the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) did not prevent the Campbells enforcing an implied right of way against the McGraths ([120]).

The question was whether the circumstances gave rise to a personal equity against the McGraths as registered proprietors of Lot 12 ([83]). Tobias JA said that this required some conduct of the McGraths, or of those for whom they were responsible, that constituted a breach of an obligation owed to the party seeking the benefit of the equity or was otherwise unconscionable ([98]). He held that the simultaneous transfers alone could not give rise to a personal equity binding the McGraths “in circumstances where they have not in any way contributed to the creation of the implied easement or conducted themselves in any way which could be regarded as unconscionable”, and that their reliance on the indefeasibility of their title “was in no way unconscionable” ([108]).

The simultaneous transfer of the two lots, to the knowledge of each purchaser, was insufficient to give rise to an equity binding the McGraths, even though Mr McGrath was generally aware that the driveway had been used to reach the rear of Lot 6 ([109]). He added that “mere knowledge on the part of the transferee of the putative servient tenement that both tenements are to be transferred by the common vendor simultaneously does not involve any relevant conduct on the part of that transferee”: the McGraths had not created the easement and were not party to the transfer of Lot 6, such a purchaser is unaware of the terms of the other contract and has no control over its terms or timing, and nothing suggested that the simultaneous transfers were due to any request or conduct of the McGraths ([111]-[112]).

He treated the extension made in Aldridge v Wright for simultaneous transfers by a common owner as dependent on the presumed intention of all three parties, arising by operation of law ([110]), and he accepted that the Campbells’ submission, that the simultaneous transfers gave rise both to an implied right of way and to an implied reservation out of Lot 12, may well be correct for land under old system title ([107]-[108]). Hodgson JA agreed that the McGraths’ involvement would have sufficed at general law to give rise to a Wheeldon v Burrows easement enforceable against them, but not to give rise to a personal equity ([4]).

He added that ss 42 and 43 of the Real Property Act preclude recognition of any such easement and make it misleading to assert that there was an equitable easement of that type ([5]). Tobias JA further said that the requirement of an actual, as distinct from a presumed, common intention that applies to rectification of a contract “may be applied by analogy to the present case”, so that no relevant equity arises unless it was the actual common intention of all three parties that Lot 6 have the benefit, and Lot 12 the burden, of a right of way over the driveway, and that even if that was the intention of Mrs Chiplin and the Campbells it was not the McGraths’ ([113]-[114]).

Tobias JA considered whether the indefeasibility provisions of the Real Property Act defeat an implied easement of the Wheeldon v Burrows type altogether. He said that there was “much force in Professor Butt’s observations about the effect of Williams upon implied easements of the Wheeldon v Burrows type”: prescriptive easements and implied easements both arise by operation of law, and if the indefeasibility provisions defeat prescriptive easements, “logic requires that those provisions should apply to implied easements in the same way” ([115]-[118]), a reference to Williams v State Transit Authority [2004] NSWCA 179; (2004) 60 NSWLR 286.

He then said that “it is unnecessary for me to express a concluded view on this issue” ([119]). He also did not conclusively decide the McGraths’ challenge to the finding that Lots 6 and 12 formed a single tenement while in common ownership, giving only a prima facie view that they did ([36]-[38]), and thought their challenge to the other elements of the first rule in Wheeldon v Burrows prima facie of little merit ([39]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing with the orders and substantially with the reasons)

Read judgment: [98] (opens in a new tab), [108]–[109] (opens in a new tab), [111]–[112] (opens in a new tab), [120] (opens in a new tab)

Tobias JA’s holding that the simultaneous transfers and the McGraths’ knowledge, without conduct of theirs that made it unconscionable to rely on their registered title, gave no personal equity is the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed ([120]-[121]); Giles JA agreed with him and Hodgson JA agreed with the orders and substantially with the reasons.

Classification unresolved · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)

Read judgment: [113]–[114] (opens in a new tab)

The analogy to rectification and the requirement of an actual common intention of all three parties is offered with the words it seems to me and may be applied by analogy, and the result already follows from [108]-[112]. It supports the result as an additional reason, but is expressed tentatively and was not necessary to it, so neither a plain ratio nor a plain obiter label is accurate.

Separate reasoning · Hodgson JA

Read judgment: [4]–[5] (opens in a new tab)

Hodgson JA agreed with the orders and substantially with Tobias JA’s reasons and gave his own short account: the McGraths’ involvement would have sufficed at general law for a Wheeldon v Burrows easement but not for a personal equity, and ss 42 and 43 of the Real Property Act therefore preclude recognition of the easement and make it misleading to assert an equitable easement of that type. He concurs in the result.

Proposition 2

Obiter · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)

Read judgment: [115]–[119] (opens in a new tab)

Tobias JA says in terms at [119] that it is unnecessary for him to express a concluded view and decides the appeal on the personal-equity ground. The observations about Williams are comment, not part of the ground of decision.

Obiter · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)

Read judgment: [36]–[39] (opens in a new tab)

Tobias JA says at [36] and [39] that he does not find it necessary to deal with the single-tenement challenge or the challenge to the other elements of the first rule. His prima facie views are comment, not part of the ground of decision.

Why does this case matter?

The facts read like a textbook claim for the owner of the benefited lot: a common seller, a driveway in regular use and sales on the same day. That makes the case a good test of how far an English implied-easement rule carries in a system of registered title. The dispute arose about fifteen years after the sales, when the neighbours fell out ([30]), which is how unwritten rights over registered land commonly come to be tested.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem about an easement that was not written down or registered over land under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), set out for each purchaser separately how and when the lot was acquired, what the purchaser knew, what the purchaser said or did, and whether that purchaser had any part in the claimed easement. Identify the title system of each lot, and ask whether the claim is against the person who created the claimed easement or against someone who later became registered or who took simultaneously.

This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, so it binds New South Wales courts below it, is persuasive in other jurisdictions, and does not bind the High Court. The judgment applies s 42(1) of the Real Property Act as it stood in 2006 and refers to a former s 42(1)(b) ([102]); check the section in its current form before relying on the judgment’s account of it. Attribute each point to the Justice who made it, and separate what the Court needed to decide from what it said in passing.

Check your understanding

1. Who owned Lots 6 and 12 before 1980, to whom did she sell each lot, and what had the driveway over Lot 12 been used for ([9], [15]-[16])?

2. What did Barrett J declare and order on 29 June 2005, and what did the Court of Appeal do with those orders ([62], [121])?

3. What did Mr McGrath know before the sale about the driveway, and what had the McGraths been told about any right of way for Lot 6 ([22]-[23], [29])?

4. Which Justice wrote the principal reasons, and how did Hodgson JA’s agreement differ from Giles JA’s ([1]-[5])?

5. What did Tobias JA say about a purchaser’s mere knowledge that both lots were being transferred simultaneously, and why did he say so ([111]-[112])?

6. What did Tobias JA say about the effect of Williams v State Transit Authority on implied easements of the Wheeldon v Burrows type, and did he reach a concluded view ([115]-[119])?