Fejo v Northern Territory

High Court of Australia · 1998

PropertyNative Title

Fejo v Northern Territory [1998] HCA 58; (1998) 195 CLR 96

Land near Darwin was granted in fee simple in 1882, later acquired by the Commonwealth, and held by the Crown again. Could native title that was affected by the grant come back?

Qualified by legislation: Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 47A-47C, from 30 September 1998

Since 30 September 1998 the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) has required earlier extinguishment to be disregarded for a claimant application in some circumstances. Section 47A applies to an area that is held or reserved for the benefit of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, or that is covered by a freehold estate or lease granted or vested under legislation that provides for such grants only for their benefit, where members of the native title claim group occupy the area; extinguishment by the grant, vesting or reservation, and by other prior interests, must then be disregarded, except that for an area held or reserved for their benefit the grant of a freehold estate for the provision of services such as health and welfare services is not disregarded (s 47A(1)-(2)). Section 47B does the same for vacant Crown land that is not covered by a freehold estate or lease, by a public-purpose reservation or the like, or subject to a resumption process, where members of the claim group occupy it (s 47B(1)-(2)). Section 47C, added later, does so for park areas covered by a written agreement (s 47C(1), (8)). Where one of these sections applies and the determination on the application is that the native title claim group hold the native title rights and interests claimed, the determination does not affect the validity of the earlier grant or interest and the non-extinguishment principle applies to it (ss 47A(3), 47B(3), 47C(9)); the applicant must still show the connection with the land that the common law concept of native title requires. Section 237A, inserted by the same amending Act, defines extinguish as permanently extinguish and says that the rights cannot revive even if the act that caused the extinguishment ceases to have effect. Fejo’s account of permanence therefore stands, but it does not by itself decide a claimant application to which one of these sections applies.

What happened?

In December 1996 the Larrakia people lodged an application for determination of native title over extensive areas around Darwin, Palmerston and Litchfield. The Native Title Registrar accepted it in April 1997 ([1]). The land included land south of Darwin that the Northern Territory subdivided in 1996 into 15 parcels and over which it then granted Crown leases, including two to Oilnet (NT) Pty Ltd. Each lease allowed the lessee, on completing development, to surrender it for a freehold title at no further cost ([2]).

In December 1997 the appellants commenced proceedings in the Federal Court seeking declarations, including that native title existed in the area of the leases and that the Larrakia people held it, and injunctions restraining development and the exchange of leases for freehold ([3]-[4]). The Northern Territory applied to dismiss the proceeding ([5]). O’Loughlin J refused the injunctions and dismissed the proceeding, and one ground of the appellants’ appeal was removed into the High Court ([6]). That ground concerned a grant made in 1882, under the Northern Territory Land Act 1872 (SA), to John Benham of a tract that included the land, in the words “to hold unto the said John James Benham, His Heirs and Assigns for ever” ([7]-[8], [10]-[11]).

The Commonwealth acquired the land compulsorily in 1927 for a quarantine station. Under the Lands Acquisition Act 1906 (Cth) the legal estate vested in the Commonwealth, “freed and discharged from all trusts, obligations, estates, interests” ([8], [12]). The appointments of the land as a quarantine station and as a leprosarium were revoked in 1980 ([9]).

What did the Court decide?

Seven Justices sat. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ gave joint reasons, and Kirby J gave separate reasons. The Court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Full Court of the Federal Court to be dealt with consistently with its reasons, and that the appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the proceedings in the High Court.

The questions for the Court were the effect on native title of the 1882 grant and of the later acquisition of the land by the Commonwealth, and the effect of the Native Title Act’s procedures for determining native title on the applications for an injunction and for summary dismissal ([14]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Extinguishment. The joint judgment held that native title was extinguished by the 1882 grant in fee simple. “Native title is extinguished by a grant in fee simple”, because the rights given by such a grant are inconsistent with the native title holders continuing to hold any of the rights or interests which together make up native title ([43]). An estate in fee simple is “for almost all practical purposes, the equivalent of full ownership of the land” and permits no one else to enjoy any right or interest in the land unless conferred by statute, by the owner or by a predecessor in title ([43]).

The result follows from the effect of the grant on the rights that make up native title and not from any intention of the party making the grant ([47]). The grant to Benham was made under a statute that permitted an unqualified grant in fee simple and was not subject to any reservation or qualification, so it was wholly inconsistent with the existence thereafter of any right of native title ([47]-[50], [52]).

What the joint judgment left aside. It accepted that a fee simple can be granted on terms that reserve rights to others, such as easements and profits à prendre ([52]). It said that analogies with rights of common or customary rights were misplaced, because native title rights are not creatures of the common law ([53]), and that the questions about leasehold interests considered in Wik Peoples v Queensland did not arise ([55]).

Permanence. The joint judgment held that the extinguishment was permanent. A grant in fee simple “does not have only some temporary effect on native title rights or some effect that is conditioned upon the land not coming to be held by the Crown in the future” ([45]). Native title “was not, and could not be, revived when the land came to be held again (as it was) by the Crown” ([56]). The argument that it may revive failed because the rights are extinguished by the grant and are not merely suspended ([57]), and because the rights created by the exercise of sovereign power were inconsistent with native title, so that the rights that made up native title were necessarily at an end and could not spring forth again ([58]).

The joint judgment noted, without deciding, difficulties for a revival argument arising from the source of the grant and from ss 16 and 17 of the Lands Acquisition Act 1906 (Cth) ([57]).

Kirby J. Kirby J agreed in the orders. He held that native title is extinguished by a grant in fee simple, a statement of law that “must be taken as settled” and “does not admit of qualification” ([107]). He observed that none of the earlier opinions to that effect had been legally essential to a decision, so that there was no binding holding on the point before this case ([100]). He held the extinguishment irreversible for four reasons ([112]): the test compares the legal character of the interest with the native title interest, and by that test a fee simple always conflicts with native title; native title does not revive in particular factual circumstances, although there may be exceptions where legislation envisages, expressly or by necessary implication, the co-existence of fee simple and native title rights; revival would confer new rights that would at least require legislation; and certainty in the law of land weighs against it.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [43]–[47] (opens in a new tab), [52]–[55] (opens in a new tab)

[43]-[47] state why a grant in fee simple extinguishes native title and that the result follows from the grant’s effect and not from intention, and [52]-[55] explain why the unqualified 1882 grant was inconsistent with native title and why the analogies and the leasehold questions did not alter that. The ground removed into the High Court asked whether the 1882 grant extinguished native title, so these paragraphs are the reasoning for the answer. [54]-[55] also mark what the case did not decide (leases and plenum dominium).

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders and on extinguishment)

Read judgment: [100]–[108] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J reached the same conclusion on extinguishment by his own route, through authority, principle and policy and a comparison of the legal character of the interests, and he said at [100] that the earlier statements were not binding holdings. He concurs in the result; the joint judgment did not adopt his observation about precedent.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [45]–[46] (opens in a new tab), [56]–[58] (opens in a new tab)

The ground removed into the High Court asked whether native title could be recognised once the land was re-acquired by the Crown. [56]-[58] answer that it could not, because the grant extinguished and did not suspend, and [45]-[46] explain why the references to extinguishment in earlier decisions were not loose language. These are the reasoning for the answer.

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ (joint judgment)

Read judgment: [57] (opens in a new tab)

The first two sentences of [57] mention difficulties for a revival argument arising from the source of the grant and from the Lands Acquisition Act 1906 (Cth), and the paragraph says ‘it is not necessary to deal with those matters here’. They are observations, not part of the ground of decision, which is the last sentence of [57] and [58].

Separate reasoning · Kirby J (agreeing in the orders and on permanence)

Read judgment: [109]–[112] (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J reached the conclusion that extinguishment is irreversible by his own four reasons, including the qualification for legislation that envisages co-existence. He concurs in the result; the joint judgment does not state that qualification.

Why does this case matter?

A native title problem usually begins with a tenure history, and students often treat every grant in it alike. An examiner looks for an answer that identifies each dealing with the land in turn, reads its terms, and says which of them a given authority actually concerned.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem with a tenure history, list each dealing with the land in date order and identify what kind of interest each created. Say precisely what kind of grant Fejo concerned and what the Court said about other kinds. Say whose reasons you rely on for each point.

Fejo was decided under the common law and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) as it stood in September 1998. The joint judgment recorded in a footnote that the Act was about to be amended ([1], footnote 1). A problem set today needs the Act as now in force and the authorities decided under it.

Check your understanding

1. Why, according to the joint judgment, did the 1882 grant extinguish native title, and what did it say about the grantor’s intention?

2. What reservations or qualifications on a fee simple did the joint judgment accept as possible, and why did they not apply to the Benham grant?

3. What argument about revival did the appellants make, and how did the joint judgment answer it?

4. What did Kirby J say about whether earlier statements in this Court on the point were binding holdings?