Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd

Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2025

PropertyEasementsLand Registration

Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 580

A buyer picks a beachfront house built for northern sun and sea breezes, and asks the incoming owner of the next lot what he plans to build. A large house is later approved there. What must she show to protect her light and air?

What happened?

Ms Conway was the registered proprietor of Lot 52, a beachfront parcel at Casuarina on the far north coast of New South Wales, and Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd (Leeroy) was the registered proprietor of the two lots adjoining it to the north, Lots 50 and 51 (Pike J at [1]-[3]). Before 2020 the three lots had been in the common ownership of Lazy Axle Pty Ltd, and only Lot 52 had been developed; its dwelling had a curved aluminium and glass curtain wall on its north-eastern side, about 20 metres long and seven metres high, designed to capture natural light and ventilation ([18]-[19]).

Lot 51 had a garage and swimming pool on it, and Lot 50 was largely vacant ([20]). Mr Dunlop, the principal of Leeroy, agreed that the north-facing design of the house on Lot 52 was obvious to him and was an important feature to him and to any other prospective purchaser ([11], [32]).

Ms Conway was concerned about what would be built on Lots 50 and 51. Before she bought, the vendor’s agent, Ms Savage, asked Mr Dunlop about his building plans so that she could tell prospective purchasers of Lot 52, and on 22 May 2020 Mr Dunlop sent her a text message saying that he had no real plans yet, that most of the building would be towards the street and that he had no interest in a house bigger than his current one ([37]-[38]).

On 12 June 2020 Ms Conway, Mr Dunlop, Mr Weel (the principal of Lazy Axle) and Ms Savage met on Lot 52 and discussed what Leeroy intended to build ([45]). Ms Conway, a solicitor, signed a contract to buy Lot 52 on 18 June 2020 for $3,400,000, having asked for contract amendments; her request that the vendor not consent to or make a development application for Lot 51 without her consent was rejected, and a special condition requiring notice of any development application for Lot 51 and lodging her objection was accepted ([56]-[58]).

She accepted that she did not ask the vendor to create an easement and that no conversation mentioned one ([54], [60]). Leeroy contracted to buy Lot 51 on 10 August 2020 ([61]).

On 14 June 2022 Council granted consent to a development application by Leeroy for a dwelling on Lots 50 and 51 ([5], [93]). Ms Conway began proceedings in the Land and Environment Court for a declaration that the consent was invalid, a declaration that on the transfer of Lots 50 and 51 to Leeroy, Lot 51 was burdened by an implied easement in favour of Lot 52 to provide adequate solar access to its principal private open space, and an alternative order under s 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) imposing an easement over Lot 51 for the same purpose ([6]). Because of doubt about that Court’s jurisdiction over the second and third claims, the proceedings were transferred to the Supreme Court ([7]).

What did the Court decide?

Pike J heard the proceedings in the Real Property List of the Equity Division on 4 to 6 March 2025 and gave judgment on 6 June 2025 ([9], [364]). He held that each of Ms Conway’s three claims failed: the Council’s decision was not vitiated by jurisdictional error, the claim of an implied easement failed, and the claim for an order under s 88K failed ([10]). On the first claim he rejected the contentions that Ms Conway was denied procedural fairness, that Council failed to consider the Development Control Plan in its terms, and that the decision was unreasonable ([192], [198], [233]). He ordered that the further amended statement of claim be dismissed and that Ms Conway pay Leeroy’s costs, with the parties able to notify the Court within 14 days if either contended for a different costs order ([363]-[364]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Pike J recorded that senior counsel for Leeroy did not dispute that an implied easement could exist over Torrens land, a concession he said was properly made on the current state of the authorities ([241]). He noted Brereton J’s observation in Rixon v Horseshoe Pastoral Co Pty Ltd that it is doubtful that implied easements can arise in respect of land under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) because of s 42, and that, although it had generally been accepted until McGrath v Campbell that a Wheeldon v Burrows easement could be enforced against the registered proprietor who created it, it could not be enforced against successors in title ([242]).

Brereton J was dealing with a claim against the registered proprietor at the time of the sale to the owner of the putative dominant tenement, whereas Pike J’s case, like McGrath v Campbell, concerned a successor in title ([243]). Pike J said: “There is a real question, in my view, as to whether an implied easement can trump the registered proprietor’s indefeasible title” in light of Williams v State Transit Authority (NSW) ([244]). He noted that Tobias JA in McGrath v Campbell at [118] saw much force in Professor Butt’s view that, if prescriptive easements are trumped by the indefeasibility provisions, logic requires the same of implied easements, but that at [119] Tobias JA indicated that it was not necessary to express a concluded view, and he questioned whether what Tobias JA said about indefeasibility extended beyond claims against a transferor ([245]-[247]).

He referred to Court of Appeal decisions holding that implied easements may be enforced in personam against the owner of the burdened land in a claim against the transferor, and to Tobias JA’s explanation that a claim against a successor in title of the servient tenement in a simultaneous or near simultaneous transaction rests on the Aldridge v Wright exception ([248]-[249]). He then said: “Given this basis, and the earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal I have referred to above, I proceed on the basis that a claim of an implied easement of the kind brought in the present case, can stand outside the cloak of indefeasibility” ([250]).

Pike J set out Tobias JA’s reasons in McGrath v Campbell: the Aldridge v Wright extension depends on the presumed intention of all three parties, the purchaser of the putative servient tenement is a grantee and not a grantor, and for that purchaser to take subject to the implied easement an intention to take title subject to the burden must be imputed, which is a question of implying a term into the contract of sale ([254]); simultaneous transfers alone, even with the purchaser’s knowledge of them, did not give rise to a personal equity binding the McGraths, who had not contributed to the creation of the implied easement or conducted themselves unconscionably ([255]-[256]).

He also set out Gleeson JA’s statement in Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55 at [110]-[111], which described the additional ingredient beyond notice of an unregistered interest as conduct involving some form of acknowledgment of the unregistered interest, or an agreement or undertaking to act in accordance with it, from which the registered proprietor later resiles, and which recorded Young CJ in Eq’s observation that acknowledgement connotes that a person not only recognises that the right exists but also undertakes to respect it ([259]).

Ms Conway put her case on two bases: that the sales of Lots 51 and 52 were contemporaneous, so that the Aldridge v Wright extension applied, and an undertaking was made on behalf of Leeroy to preserve the light and air; or, if they were separate conveyances, that a personal equity arose from such an undertaking on which she relied ([263]). Pike J recorded the contention that the sales were sufficiently contemporaneous and that it did not appear to be in dispute that they were occurring with the apparent knowledge of each party from at least May or June 2020 ([260]-[261]), but his reasons turned on the absence of an undertaking ([266]-[270]).

He did not accept that Mr Dunlop, for Leeroy, gave any assurance or undertaking about what would be built or that Leeroy would respect Ms Conway’s solar access and natural ventilation: he preferred Mr Dunlop’s account of the meeting of 12 June 2020 and found that Mr Dunlop made general statements and nothing more ([78], [88]-[92], [267]); he thought Ms Conway’s later request, as a solicitor, for contract amendments about notice of and objection to development applications inconsistent with her account of an assurance ([83]-[86]); and he said that nothing beyond Mr Dunlop’s text message of 22 May 2020 should be attributed to Mr Dunlop from what the agent, Ms Savage, told Ms Conway, which was in any event overtaken by the later direct discussion ([68], [75], [268]).

He concluded: “Without more, however, this is not sufficient to create an implied easement enforceable against Leeroy as an in personam exception to indefeasibility. At the very least, the necessary undertaking by Leeroy is absent” ([269]). Accordingly he did not accept that any implied easement arose ([270]).

On Ms Conway’s alternative claim for an order under s 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), Pike J recorded that counsel had not been able to locate a case in which the Court had considered whether to impose an easement of the kind sought ([273]). He set out principles drawn from Rainbowforce Pty Ltd v Skyton Holdings Pty Ltd, 117 York Street Pty Ltd v Proprietors of Strata Plan No 16123 and Moorebank Recyclers Pty Ltd v Tanlane Pty Ltd: reasonable necessity for the effective use or development of the land to have the benefit of the easement is a precondition of the power, decided objectively and in light of the circumstances at the time of hearing ([276]-[277]); it does not mean absolute necessity but must be something more than mere desirability or preferability, and may be satisfied even if the land could be used without the easement if the use with the easement is at least substantially preferable; the effect on the servient tenement is considered, and what is reasonably necessary is assessed on the whole picture, with the onus on the plaintiff ([279]).

Pike J was not satisfied that the claimed easement was reasonably necessary for the effective use of the Conway Land: without it the land could continue to be used as a residential dwelling and had areas of open space other than the boundary area ([296]-[297]); that the dwelling had been built to maximise solar access and natural ventilation from the north did not mean that an easement should be imposed to maintain them, and, citing ING Bank (Aust) Ltd v O’Shea, “Reasonable necessity cannot be reduced to substantial preference, or something “nice to have”” ([298]-[299]); and the easement would prevent Leeroy building where it proposed, a dwelling which Council had approved, it was by no means certain that Leeroy’s proposal could be amended as Mr Andren’s report proposed, and his concept was out of character with surrounding homes ([300]-[302]).

Having reached that conclusion, Pike J said that it was not strictly necessary to determine the public interest requirement, on which he thought there was some force in Leeroy’s contentions ([304]); he was satisfied that reasonable attempts to obtain the easement had been made ([308]); he assessed compensation, “Lest I be wrong”, at $345,547.20 ([309], [331]); and he observed, while saying it was not necessary to decide the point, that cl 1.9A of the Tweed Local Environmental Plan 2014 did not provide a valid reason for refusing an easement if the requisite elements were otherwise satisfied, although there was much force in Leeroy’s contention that the easement would not apply by reason of that clause in relation to the Consent ([332]-[333], [356]-[361]).

Ms Conway appealed on the judicial review ground and on the s 88K ground, and did not challenge Pike J’s decision on the claimed implied easement (Kirk JA at [5]). In Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 123, decided on 2 July 2026, the Court of Appeal (Kirk JA, with whom McHugh JA and Free JA agreed ([104]-[105])) dismissed the appeal with costs ([101], [103]). On reasonable necessity, Kirk JA said that it involves something more than mere convenience or mere desirability or preferability over alternative means, though not absolute necessity ([79]), and requires an evaluative judgement that may involve a range of considerations depending on the case ([80]).

He said that the debate about the words substantially preferable involved a degree of artificiality, because Hodgson CJ in Eq in 117 York St had not said that substantial preferability would necessarily suffice; all relevant aspects of the evaluative analysis must be taken into account, and a conclusion that substantial preferability was established would be relevant and would conduce to a finding of reasonable necessity ([87]). Because the proposed easement would significantly restrict the future development of Lot 51, a significant justification was required ([90]), and he held that the matters relied on fell well short, so that Pike J was correct to conclude that reasonable necessity was not established ([100]). The Court of Appeal’s reasons do not discuss the implied easement or indefeasibility, so they neither endorse nor question Pike J’s treatment of those matters.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Pike J

Read judgment: [241]–[250] (opens in a new tab)

Pike J records a doubt ([244]) and says in terms that he proceeds on a basis taken from earlier Court of Appeal decisions ([250]); he does not decide the question. The basis was the premise on which he went on to the elements of the claim, but the claim failed on a different ground ([269]-[270]), so a binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that the passage is neither a holding on indefeasibility nor an irrelevant aside.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Pike J

Read judgment: [252]–[270] (opens in a new tab)

Pike J stated at the outset that the implied easement claim failed for want of the necessary undertaking by Mr Dunlop on behalf of Leeroy ([10(b)]), and the conclusion at [269]-[270] is the ground on which the claim was dismissed.

Proposition 3

Ratio · Pike J

Read judgment: [276]–[302] (opens in a new tab)

Reasonable necessity is a precondition of the power in s 88K(1) ([276]), and Pike J’s finding that it was not satisfied ([296]-[302]) was the ground on which the s 88K claim failed; he said so in relation to the public interest requirement at [304] and the compensation inquiry at [309].

Obiter · Pike J

Read judgment: [304] (opens in a new tab), [308]–[331] (opens in a new tab), [332]–[361] (opens in a new tab)

Pike J said that it was not strictly necessary to decide the public interest requirement ([304]), that compensation need not be considered given his conclusion ([309]), and that it was not strictly necessary to decide the effect of cl 1.9A ([332], [356], [361]). The findings on reasonable attempts ([308]) and the assessed compensation ([326]-[331]) were made on the footing that he might be wrong and were not needed for the result.

Why does this case matter?

Neighbour disputes about light and air are often argued as if a right must exist because the claimant’s house was built to enjoy it. This decision is useful for asking, of each route a claimant relies on, where the right is said to come from, what has to be shown for it to bind the present registered owner, and what evidence goes to each step. It also shows how much of a case about conversations depends on the findings of fact a judge makes from competing accounts.

Exam and application relevance

In a problem where an owner who built to enjoy light and air claims against the later owner of an adjoining lot, take each route separately (an easement said to have arisen by implication, an order under s 88K of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), and any challenge to a planning consent) and for each say what must be shown and what evidence goes to it, with the paragraph of Pike J’s reasons. Where a claim depends on what a purchaser said, identify the competing accounts, which the judge preferred and why (Pike J at [78]-[92]).

This is a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at first instance. It does not bind other judges of the Court and is persuasive elsewhere in Australia. The position on the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) and on s 88K is stated as the judgment states it on 6 June 2025. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal in Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 123 without reviewing the implied easement decision, so on s 88K read Pike J’s reasons with Kirk JA’s (Kirk JA at [79]-[87], [90], [100]). Later authority may also have dealt with these matters, so check for current authority before relying on any part of these reasons in a modern problem.

Check your understanding

1. Which lots did Ms Conway and Leeroy each own, and what feature of the dwelling on Lot 52 was designed to capture natural light and ventilation ([2]-[3], [18]-[19])?

2. What three claims did Ms Conway bring, and why did the second and third go to the Supreme Court ([6]-[7])?

3. What did Ms Conway ask for in her request to amend the contract for Lot 52, and which parts of that request were rejected and accepted ([57]-[58])?

4. What did Brereton J say in Rixon about implied easements and the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW), and how did Pike J distinguish the claim before him ([242]-[243])?

5. In what words did Pike J express his doubt about indefeasibility, and in what words did he state the basis on which he proceeded ([244], [250])?

6. What did Gleeson JA say in Pirrottina v Pirrottina about the additional ingredient beyond notice of an unregistered interest ([259])?

7. Whose account of the meeting of 12 June 2020 did Pike J prefer, and what did he find about assurances and undertakings ([78], [92], [267])?

8. What reasons did Pike J give for not being satisfied that an easement under s 88K was reasonably necessary ([296]-[302])?

9. Which matters did Pike J address although he said it was not strictly necessary to decide them ([304], [309], [332], [356])?