Easements
Easements: the four characteristics required by Re Ellenborough Park, the routes to creation including implication and prescription, how easements interact with Torrens indefeasibility, and how they are extinguished.
Learning outcomes
- Apply the four characteristics to determine whether a right can exist as an easement.
- Identify the routes by which an easement may be created, including by implication.
- Explain how an easement binds a registered proprietor under the Torrens system.
An easement is a proprietary right to use another person’s land in a particular way, or to prevent that person using it in a particular way. It is not a personal permission — a licence — and the distinction matters, because an easement is proprietary and can bind successors in title, subject to the registration and indefeasibility rules discussed under Torrens title below, while a licence binds only the parties. Whether a claimed right can exist as an easement at all is therefore the first question, and it is answered by a settled set of characteristics rather than by the parties’ intention.
The four characteristics
At common law, Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131, consistently applied in Australia, requires four things.1
There must be a dominant and a servient tenement. An easement cannot exist in gross, benefiting a person rather than land. A right granted to a utility provider unconnected to any land it owns is therefore not an easement at common law, though statute frequently creates such rights: in Queensland, for example, a public utility easement may be registered “even though it is not attached to, or used or enjoyed with, other land” (Land Act 1994 (Qld) s 369(1)).11
The easement must accommodate the dominant tenement. The right must benefit the land itself, not merely confer a personal or commercial advantage on its current owner. Proximity is relevant but not determinative; the test is whether the right makes the dominant land a better or more convenient property.
The tenements must be held by different persons. At common law a person cannot have an easement over their own land, though a quasi-easement may exist in fact and become an easement on subdivision. Statute can allow a registered easement between parcels in one ownership: in New South Wales an easement burdening and benefiting separate parcels may be created by registration “even though the same person is the proprietor of those separate parcels of land” (Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 46A(1)),9 and the Land Act 1994 (Qld) allows registration where the same person owns both (s 367).
The right must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant. It must be sufficiently definite, and not so extensive as to amount to exclusive possession, which would make it a lease or a transfer rather than an easement. Re Ellenborough Park upheld a well-defined right to use a private garden in the way gardens are commonly used, though it involved wandering about the garden, and distinguished “the indefinite and unregulated privilege ... of wandering at will over all and every part of another’s field or park”, which the Court described as easily intelligible as the subject-matter of a personal licence. A right to store goods to the exclusion of the owner may fail here: the question is whether a right “substantially deprives the servient owner of proprietorship or legal possession to such an extent as to be inconsistent with ownership”, a matter of fact and degree (Theunissen v Barter [2025] NSWCA 50 at [140]).7
Creation
Express grant or reservation is the ordinary route: a grant confers the easement on the purchaser, a reservation retains it for the vendor. Under Torrens, the legal easement is created on registration. Before then, “an equitable easement may arise where there is a specifically enforceable agreement, for valuable consideration, to grant an easement” (Kitching v Phillips [2011] WASCA 19 at [44]);5 whether it binds a later proprietor is a separate question, taken up under Torrens title below.
Implication arises on subdivision, and takes several forms. An easement of necessity is implied where land would otherwise be entirely inaccessible — the threshold is genuine necessity, not convenience. An easement of common intention may be implied where it is necessary to give effect to the parties’ common intention that the land granted, or land the grantor retains, be used “in some definite and particular manner” (Lord Parker in Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC 634, as quoted in Kitching v Phillips at [55]).5 The rule in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31 implies to a purchaser those quasi-easements that were continuous and apparent, and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land, and in use at the time of the grant.2 An implied easement cannot arise if anything in the terms of the grant, or in a contract the grant gives effect to, negatives or is inconsistent with it (Kitching v Phillips at [58]).
Prescription rests on long user as of right — openly, without force, and without permission — for the prescriptive period. It is of diminished importance under Torrens, and several jurisdictions have abolished or restricted it.
Statute provides an increasingly important route. Several jurisdictions empower a court to impose an easement over servient land where it is reasonably necessary for the effective use of the dominant land and can be granted consistently with the public interest, subject to compensation.
Easements and Torrens title
A registered easement takes effect according to the register and enjoys the protection of indefeasibility. The harder questions concern unregistered easements, and here the statutes differ: several jurisdictions make an omitted or misdescribed easement an express exception to indefeasibility, so that a registered proprietor takes subject to it despite the register’s silence. The scope of that exception — whether it covers easements never recorded, or only those wrongly removed — is a matter on which the authorities and the statutes are not uniform, and the applicable provision must be read rather than assumed.
Implied easements sit awkwardly with title by registration. In New South Wales it has generally been accepted that a Wheeldon v Burrows easement left off the register may be enforced against the registered proprietor who created it, but not against that proprietor’s successors in title; against a later registered proprietor it binds, if at all, only through the in personam exception to indefeasibility. In McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; [2006] NSWCA 1803 the common owner transferred the two lots to different purchasers at the same time. Tobias JA, with whom Giles JA agreed (Hodgson JA agreeing with the orders and substantially with the reasons), held that the simultaneous transfers, “and to the knowledge of each”, were “insufficient to give rise to an equity binding upon” the purchasers of the servient lot, even though they knew of the past use, because there was no conduct on their part, or of “those for whom they were responsible”, that made their reliance on their registered title unconscionable ([108]-[109], [119]-[120]). His Honour saw “much force” in the view that indefeasibility defeats implied easements as it defeats prescriptive ones, but did not decide it ([118]-[119]). In Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 5804 Pike J saw “a real question” whether an implied easement can trump a registered proprietor’s indefeasible title ([244]), but in light of the Court of Appeal’s decisions proceeded on the basis that such a claim can stand outside indefeasibility ([250]).
Extinguishment
At common law an easement may be extinguished by express release, by unity of ownership and possession of both tenements, or by abandonment. Statute can qualify this. In New South Wales an easement created by registering a plan under s 88B of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) is not extinguished because the owner of a benefited parcel holds or acquires a greater interest in a separate burdened parcel (s 88B(3)(c)(iii)).10 Abandonment at common law requires more than long disuse: an intention to give up the right permanently must be shown, and courts are slow to infer it. Separately, the New South Wales Registrar-General may cancel the recording of an easement as abandoned if satisfied it has not been used for at least 20 years, subject to exclusions and a notice procedure (Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) s 49). Statutory powers to modify or extinguish easements exist in most jurisdictions, typically where the easement is obsolete or impedes reasonable use without securing practical benefit.
The scope of the right
An easement confers a defined right, not a general licence. Disputes are usually about scope rather than existence, and three principles govern:
- At common law the grant is construed by reference to its terms and to the circumstances at the date of grant, including the character of the dominant land at that time. A registered Torrens easement is read differently: a person inspecting the register “cannot be expected ... to look further for extrinsic material which might establish facts or circumstances existing at the time of the creation of the registered dealing” (Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [2007] HCA 45 at [39]).6 The New South Wales Court of Appeal has since held that a court construing a registered easement may take into account relevant physical characteristics of the tenements and the surrounding land at the time of the grant that were reasonably ascertainable by a third party at that time: broad and reasonably enduring features, not fine details (Theunissen v Barter at [108]).7
- The dominant owner has the ancillary rights reasonably necessary to use and maintain the easement, but must keep within what the grant authorises and must not use it in a way that unreasonably interferes with the servient owner’s use (Lowe v Kladis [2018] NSWCA 130 at [96], [101]).8 A heavier burden on the servient land does not by itself make a use excessive: in Sertari Pty Ltd v Nirimba Developments Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 324 a development that would greatly increase traffic over a right of carriageway granted for all purposes was within the grant (Lowe v Kladis at [98]-[101]).
- Use under a registered easement “may change with the nature of the dominant tenement, so long as the terms of the grant are sufficiently broad” (Westfield at [42]). Intensifying use within the same character is usually permissible; a change in character — from a single dwelling to a subdivision — may exceed the grant.
The servient owner retains every right not inconsistent with the easement, including the right to use the land subject to it and to build over a right of way provided access is not substantially impaired.
Remedies
The remedies for interference include an injunction, and damages in lieu or in addition. The servient owner may not do anything on the servient tenement that “substantially interferes with the exercise by the dominant owner of such of the rights conferred by the grant” as the dominant owner wishes to exercise, and that test does not balance the servient owner’s wishes against the dominant owner’s rights (Lowe v Kladis at [116], a right of carriageway).
Self-help by way of abatement exists, but removing an obstruction without notice risks liability in trespass if the assessment of the right proves wrong.
Where the parties’ rights are unclear, a declaration as to the scope of the easement is often the more useful remedy, and is commonly sought together with an injunction.
Applying this in a problem question
- Ask first whether the right claimed can exist as an easement, applying the four characteristics in order and stating which is in doubt.
- Distinguish a licence and, where the right approaches exclusive use, a lease.
- Identify the route to creation, and if implication is in play, name which form and apply its own test rather than treating implication as a single doctrine.
- Under Torrens, ask whether the easement is registered; if not, locate the statutory exception in the applicable Act rather than reasoning from general principle. For an implied easement against a later registered proprietor, ask whether conduct of that proprietor, or of those for whom the proprietor is responsible, gives rise to a personal equity.
- Consider extinguishment expressly if the facts include long disuse or a change of ownership.
Self-check
- Have I checked for a dominant tenement, rather than assuming a benefit to a person suffices?
- Have I asked whether the right amounts to exclusive possession?
- Have I named which form of implication applies and applied its specific test?
- Have I read the indefeasibility exception in the relevant statute rather than generalising?