Kitching v Phillips
Kitching v Phillips [2011] WASCA 19
Buyers of a lot in a dog-owners’ estate were told the large central lot would stay open for every owner to train dogs on. Years later it was sold on and built over. Did the buyers hold any right against the new owners?
What happened?
In 1988 a developer, the Lakes Road Pastoral Co Pty Ltd, offered for sale subdivided two-hectare lots in an estate at Nambeelup in Western Australia, and the plan showed a larger lot in the middle, Lot 81, marked as public open space (Murphy JA at [4]). Mr and Mrs Kitching were looking for a property where they could live and keep more than three dogs and be close to training facilities ([4]). The subdivision approval contained condition 7, which provided in effect that, within two years from 30 April 1987, proposed Lot 81, which “may include a communal training area”, was to be transferred free of cost to the local authority on the basis that the authority would lease it back to the developer for use and management by the lot owners as a communal training and obedience area ([5]).
The developer’s pamphlet described a communal area and walkways to it ([7]), and its representative, Mr McNally, told Mr and Mrs Kitching that Lot 81 would remain open space for all lot owners to use for that purpose ([8]).
On 21 December 1988 they contracted to buy Lot 61 for $34,000; the written terms made no mention of the open space, the plan of subdivision had not been registered, and a plan attached to the contract showed Lot 61 and part of Lot 81 ([9]). Condition 7 was never complied with, although the Western Australian Planning Commission apparently believed when it approved the plan for registration that it had been ([11]). Mr and Mrs Kitching settled on 23 November 1989 and became registered proprietors of Lot 61; neither certificate of title mentioned any right over Lot 81 ([12], [13]). They used Lot 61 and Lot 81 to exercise their dogs and later built a house on Lot 61 ([14]).
Mr and Mrs Hodgson contracted in 2001 to buy Lot 81 and became registered proprietors in 2002; in 2005 they subdivided it into Lots 500 and 501 ([16], [17]). Mr and Mrs Phillips contracted on 29 November 2005 to buy Lot 500 from the Hodgsons and became registered proprietors on 1 March 2006 ([20]). Mr and Mrs Kitching sued the Phillips and the Hodgsons, claiming a declaration that as registered proprietors of Lot 61 they were the beneficiaries of an easement, in common with the owners of the other lots, to enjoy Lots 500 and 501 as a dog training and obedience area, and they said the easement precluded dwellings on the land ([22], [23]). The primary judge, Jenkins J, rejected the claim ([3]), and Mr and Mrs Kitching appealed on five bases ([25]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal of Western Australia (Pullin JA, Newnes JA and Murphy JA) dismissed the appeal. Pullin JA and Newnes JA each said only that they agreed with Murphy JA ([1], [2]), so that Murphy JA gave the only reasons, and he concluded that the primary judge had not been shown to be in error and that the appeal should be dismissed ([3], [107]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Murphy JA said that the law may imply the grant of an easement, having regard to the maxim of non-derogation from grant ([50]). He described the maxim as an aspect of a wider consideration by which the law gives effect to the common intention of the parties to the grant or demise of real property ([54]). He set out Lord Parker’s statement in Pwllbach Colliery Co Ltd v Woodman [1915] AC 634 at 646-647: “The law will readily imply the grant or reservation of such easements as may be necessary to give effect to the common intention of the parties to a grant of real property, with reference to the manner or purposes in and for which the land granted or some land retained by the grantor is to be used.”
Lord Parker continued: “But it is essential for this purpose that the parties should intend that the subject of the grant or the land retained by the grantor should be used in some definite and particular manner. It is not enough that the subject of the grant or the land retained should be intended to be used in a manner which may or may not involve this definite and particular use.” ([55]). Murphy JA said that the implied easements in respect of continuous and apparent easements, or quasi-easements, existing when land is severed by a grant, which the law recognises in accordance with the principle enunciated by Thesiger LJ in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31 at 49, are also based on the maxim of non-derogation of grant ([56]).
An easement implied by law from a conveyance or demise by reference to the maxim is based on the presumed intention of the parties ([57]). He said: “If there is anything in the terms of the grant (conveyance or demise) itself which negatives the asserted implication, it cannot arise.” Similarly, where the grant is preceded by a contract that the conveyance or demise is intended to give effect to, if there is anything in the underlying contract that is inconsistent with the asserted implied easement it cannot arise ([58]). An easement implied in this way is a legal interest under the general law ([59]).
Murphy JA held that the primary judge had not been shown to be in error in finding that Mr and Mrs Kitching had no easement over the respondents’ land for training their dogs ([3]), and rejected each of the five bases on which they put the claim ([25], [67], [83], [85], [89], [93]). On the first basis (an actually intended term, inferred), he saw no scope for inferring a term of the kind alleged where there was a formal written contract and a formal transfer, and there was no claim for rectification ([65]).
On the second basis (a term implied in the transfer or the contract), the transfer did not on its face contain or justify the implication of the term alleged, and extrinsic evidence of matters known to Mr and Mrs Kitching and the developer at the time of the transfer was inadmissible as an aid to its construction, “at least as against the respondents” ([68]). As to the written contract, the alleged term failed the criteria in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings ((1977) 180 CLR 266): it was not reasonable where the parties had agreed in effect that the sale was conditional on the developer selling Lot 81 to the local authority in compliance with condition 7 ([72]); by the subdivision term the parties did not contemplate Lot 81 being retained by the developer subject in perpetuity to use by lot owners for training dogs, and “the clear intention was to transfer Lot 81 to the local authority (perhaps, although it is not clear, with a view to preserving flexibility in the event that the general character and zoning of the area changed over time), rather than to create an easement by which the land could be burdened in perpetuity for the private use of Lot 61 or other lot owners in the training of dogs” ([73]); it was not necessary for business efficacy, since the contract was conditional on compliance with condition 7 and Mr and Mrs Kitching could terminate if it was not fulfilled ([74]); it was not shown to be capable of clear expression, given the inconsistent forms in which it was put ([26], [27], [75]); and it would be inconsistent with the written contract’s right to terminate if condition 7 was not complied with ([76]).
Shepperd v Council of the Municipality of Ryde (1952) 85 CLR 1 did not assist, because the contract’s description of Lot 61 was by way of identification only and, even if the contract contained an implied promise to give effect to the subdivision scheme, the scheme did not contemplate the developer granting an easement over Lot 81 ([82]). He found it unnecessary to consider whether the right claimed satisfied the essential features of an easement, including whether it was more in the nature of a jus spatiandi ([77]).
On the third basis (non-derogation from grant), he said that for the reasons given on the second basis the grant of an easement was not to be implied ([84], [85]). On the fourth basis (an oral collateral contract enforceable by part performance), the statement by the developer’s agent and the diagram had to be shown to be promissory of an easement in the context in which they were made, and in context they were to be understood as relating to the creation of the communal area by transfer of Lot 81 to the local authority and a lease back to the developer; even if promissory, a promise of an easement would be inconsistent with the written contract and so not enforceable ([87], [88]).
On the fifth basis (estoppel), the primary judge was right that Mr and Mrs Kitching had assumed not that they would be granted an easement but that condition 7 would be fulfilled, and the contract did not require them to complete absent compliance with condition 7 ([92]).
Murphy JA said that equity has never insisted on a formal deed for the disposition of an interest in land and that, in accordance with the principle in Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9, “an equitable easement may arise where there is a specifically enforceable agreement, for valuable consideration, to grant an easement”; because such an interest is enforceable only in equity, under the general law it does not bind a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate in the servient tenement for value without notice ([44]).
The respondents also relied on that defence in the appeal, but the primary judge had not addressed it and it appeared that only Mr and Mrs Phillips had pleaded it ([94]). Murphy JA said it was strictly unnecessary to deal with it ([95]) and made observations on it. He set out Barton J’s statement in Milne v James that a party relying on an agreement to grant an easement against a registered proprietor must establish an enforceable agreement and that the proprietor purchased with notice of it ([98]).
He said that Mr and Mrs Phillips clearly had no notice of the alleged equitable easement ([102]); that the observations in Milne v James (1910) 13 CLR 168 were, even if not technically binding, “at the very least, highly persuasive” ([101]); and that he would be inclined to the view that, at least in relation to Mr and Mrs Phillips, who pleaded the defence, the alleged equitable easement could not prevail against them ([103]). He found it unnecessary to reach a concluded view on that or on the construction of the proviso to s 68 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), which would need a close examination of the Act as a whole and of the history and purpose of the proviso that the parties had not undertaken ([104]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Classification unresolved · Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [50]–[59] (opens in a new tab)
Murphy JA sets out the law on implied easements as the framework for the third basis of appeal ([50]-[59]), but disposes of that basis by referring back to his reasons on the second basis ([85]), so the statement is the law the Court says it works from rather than a rule it separately applies to the facts; a binary ratio or obiter label would hide that.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [65] (opens in a new tab), [68] (opens in a new tab), [71]–[76] (opens in a new tab), [82] (opens in a new tab), [84]–[85] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are the reasons for rejecting the first three bases, which are the grounds on which the claim to an easement by grant or implication failed and on which the appeal was dismissed ([107]).
Ratio · Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [87]–[88] (opens in a new tab), [92] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are Murphy JA’s reasons for rejecting the collateral contract and estoppel bases, each an independent route to an equitable easement and each necessary to the dismissal of the appeal.
Proposition 3
Classification unresolved · Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [44] (opens in a new tab)
Paragraph [44] states the general law on equitable easements as background to the fourth and fifth bases, but no equitable easement was found to which it was applied. Its precise status is left unresolved here: it states the general-law framework, but the Court found no equitable easement and expressly declined to determine the purchaser defence at [95] and [104].
Obiter · Murphy JA (Pullin JA and Newnes JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [94]–[104] (opens in a new tab)
Murphy JA says the question was strictly unnecessary to decide ([95]), expresses only an inclination as to Mr and Mrs Phillips ([103]) and reaches no concluded view on the construction of the proviso to s 68 ([104]).
Why does this case matter?
Cases about land sold from a plan or a scheme invite an answer that moves quickly from what the buyer was told to a right over someone else’s land. This decision is a useful vehicle for asking, of each route a buyer might argue, what the documents say, what the parties contemplated would deliver the intended use, who is resisting the claim, and what evidence may be used against them.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem where a buyer says a seller of part of the land impliedly granted a right over the land the seller kept, set out what each document (contract, transfer, plan, brochure) says about the right and about how the intended use was to be provided, whether the person resisting the claim is the original grantor or a later registered proprietor, and what extrinsic material is offered and for what purpose. Then decide which of the routes argued in this case the facts engage, and attribute each statement to Murphy JA, noting where he quotes Lord Parker or another authority.
This is a decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, which is binding on the lower courts of that State and persuasive elsewhere. The provisions of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) that Murphy JA discusses are quoted as they stood when the parties obtained registered title ([62]), so check the current text before relying on the Act in a modern problem. For each paragraph you cite, ask whether Murphy JA is deciding a point, stating the law, or expressing a view.
Check your understanding
1. What did condition 7 of the subdivision approval say about proposed Lot 81, and was it ever complied with ([5], [11])?
2. What did Mr and Mrs Kitching ask the court to declare, and what did they say the claimed easement prevented the owners of Lots 500 and 501 from doing ([22], [23])?
3. What five bases of appeal did counsel put forward ([25])?
4. Which of Lord Parker’s words did Murphy JA set out at [55], and from which case do they come?
5. What did Murphy JA say about the use of extrinsic evidence of matters known to Mr and Mrs Kitching and the developer when construing the transfer ([68])?
6. How did Murphy JA dispose of the third basis of appeal ([84], [85])?
7. Why did Murphy JA say it was unnecessary to decide the respondents’ bona fide purchaser defence, and what view did he express about Mr and Mrs Phillips ([95], [102]-[104])?