McGrath v Campbell
McGrath v Campbell (2006) 68 NSWLR 229; [2006] NSWCA 180
A seller disposes of two adjoining lots to different buyers at the same time, and a driveway over one has always served the other. Years later the neighbours fall out. Can the driveway’s user make the registered owner grant a right of way?
Affirmed by Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 580
Pike J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, set out Tobias JA’s reasons ([254]-[256]) and Gleeson JA’s statement in Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55 that something more than notice of an unregistered interest is needed, such as an acknowledgment of it or an undertaking to act in accordance with it ([259]). He held that no implied easement enforceable against the incoming owner as an exception to indefeasibility arose because the necessary undertaking by that owner was absent ([269]-[270]). That is a first instance decision following the approach in this case, not an appellate decision.
Clarified by Conway v Leeroy Property Investments Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 580
Pike J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, quoted Tobias JA’s comment and noted that he did not express a concluded view ([245]-[247]). Pike J considered whether what Tobias JA said about indefeasibility extended beyond claims against a transferor to claims against a successor in title, noted that Brereton J’s observations appear to confine it to claims against a transferor, and said that, on the Aldridge v Wright basis and earlier Court of Appeal decisions, he proceeded on the basis that a claim of an implied easement of the kind before him can stand outside the cloak of indefeasibility ([247]-[250]). He did not decide the point.
What happened?
Mrs Chiplin owned Lot 12 and part of Lot 6 under one NSW certificate of title. Tenants of Lot 6, and their customers and suppliers, used a driveway over Lot 12 until the supermarket lease ended in 1979.
She then sold Lot 6 to the Campbells and Lot 12 to the McGraths. Both transfers were dated 9 September 1980 and registered on 3 February 1981. Barrett J found the sales were completed contemporaneously.
He found Mr McGrath knew of the driveway’s use. But the McGraths were never told of any right of way for Lot 6. Their later acquiescence was neighbourly, with no agreement found.
Barrett J declared the Campbells entitled to a twelve-foot right of way over Lot 12. He ordered the McGraths to execute a registrable grant. The McGraths appealed.
Ask yourself what the McGraths themselves actually did.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Giles, Hodgson and Tobias JJA) allowed the appeal, set aside the declaration and orders made by Barrett J on 29 June 2005, ordered that the proceedings be dismissed, and ordered the Campbells to pay the McGraths’ costs of the proceedings at first instance and of the appeal ([121]). Tobias JA gave the principal reasons ([6]-[121]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
This case is from New South Wales. Tobias JA noted a general rule about Wheeldon v Burrows easements. Such an easement can bind the original registered proprietor who created it. But it generally cannot bind that proprietor’s successors in title, even if unrecorded on title.
The main issue was indefeasibility under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). The primary judge found an in personam exception applied, letting the Campbells enforce an implied right of way. Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing on orders and substantially on reasons) held this was wrong.
The real question was whether the facts raised a personal equity against the McGraths as registered proprietors. Tobias JA said this needs conduct by the McGraths breaching an obligation, or otherwise unconscionable conduct (meaning conduct unfair enough to override their legal rights).
Simultaneous transfer of both lots, even known to both purchasers, was not enough alone. The McGraths had not contributed to creating the easement or acted unconscionably. Relying on indefeasibility of title was not unconscionable.
Mere knowledge that both lots were being transferred together does not count as relevant conduct. The McGraths did not create the easement and were not parties to the Lot 6 transfer. Such a purchaser lacks knowledge of, or control over, the other contract’s terms.
Tobias JA treated the exception recognised in Aldridge v Wright, for simultaneous transfers by a common owner, as resting on the presumed intention of all three parties, arising by operation of law.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing with the orders and substantially with the reasons)
Read judgment: [98] (opens in a new tab), [108]–[109] (opens in a new tab), [111]–[112] (opens in a new tab), [120] (opens in a new tab)
Tobias JA’s holding that the simultaneous transfers and the McGraths’ knowledge, without conduct of theirs that made it unconscionable to rely on their registered title, gave no personal equity is the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed ([120]-[121]); Giles JA agreed with him and Hodgson JA agreed with the orders and substantially with the reasons.
Classification unresolved · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)
Read judgment: [113]–[114] (opens in a new tab)
The analogy to rectification and the requirement of an actual common intention of all three parties is offered with the words it seems to me and may be applied by analogy, and the result already follows from [108]-[112]. It supports the result as an additional reason, but is expressed tentatively and was not necessary to it, so neither a plain ratio nor a plain obiter label is accurate.
Separate reasoning · Hodgson JA
Read judgment: [4]–[5] (opens in a new tab)
Hodgson JA agreed with the orders and substantially with Tobias JA’s reasons and gave his own short account: the McGraths’ involvement would have sufficed at general law for a Wheeldon v Burrows easement but not for a personal equity, and ss 42 and 43 of the Real Property Act therefore preclude recognition of the easement and make it misleading to assert an equitable easement of that type. He concurs in the result.
Proposition 2
Obiter · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)
Read judgment: [115]–[119] (opens in a new tab)
Tobias JA says in terms at [119] that it is unnecessary for him to express a concluded view and decides the appeal on the personal-equity ground. The observations about Williams are comment, not part of the ground of decision.
Obiter · Tobias JA (Giles JA agreeing; Hodgson JA agreeing substantially)
Read judgment: [36]–[39] (opens in a new tab)
Tobias JA says at [36] and [39] that he does not find it necessary to deal with the single-tenement challenge or the challenge to the other elements of the first rule. His prima facie views are comment, not part of the ground of decision.
Why does this case matter?
The dispute arose about fifteen years after the sales, when neighbours fell out. This shows how unwritten rights over registered land often get tested in court.