Lowe v Kladis

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2018

PropertyEasements

Lowe v Kladis [2018] NSWCA 130

A landowner with no vehicle access proposes an elevated driveway over strips where neighbours hold rights of carriageway, and asks a court to make them consent to his development application. What should the court ask about those rights?

What happened?

Mr Kladis owned No 26 Musgrave Street, Mosman, a waterfront block created by a 1940 subdivision. Ms Lowe owned neighbouring No 28; SP 30459 owned the common property of No 30, further along.

No 26 reached Musgrave Street via Strip 1, part of its own title, running past Nos 28, 30 and 34. No 26 also had a right of carriageway (a right to pass over someone else’s land) over Strip 2, part of No 28’s title. Strip 1 itself carried rights of carriageway for Nos 28, 30 and 24.

The steep terrain made ordinary vehicle access to No 26 impossible. Mr Kladis proposed a large elevated concrete driveway, costing about $780,000, crossing Strips 1, 2 and E.

In the Equity Division, Mr Kladis sought orders that the appellants consent, under cl 49(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW), to his development application. Beech-Jones J found for Mr Kladis against Ms Lowe, but not against SP 30459, despite accepting the works would affect No 24 and No 28’s rights in a non-trivial way.

What did the Court decide?

The NSW Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge’s orders, dismissed Mr Kladis’ case, and ordered him to pay costs. Because he’d undertaken to withdraw if he lost, no further orders followed.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Sackville AJA (with Meagher JA and White JA agreeing) said Mr Kladis held two different kinds of rights.

On Strip 1, he was the servient owner. That means he owned land burdened by rights of carriageway (a right of way) held by the owners of Nos 28, 30 and 24.

On Strip 2, he was the dominant owner. That means he held a right of carriageway over someone else’s land.

The courts below had blurred these two roles together. So Sackville AJA restated the separate principles for each.

For a servient owner, the rule is that they cannot obstruct the dominant owner’s use of the right of carriageway. He relied on two earlier cases for the test to apply here.

The question is one of degree. It asks whether the interference is “a real substantial interference with the right of way”. It also asks whether the servient owner’s conduct substantially interferes with the dominant owner’s present use of the rights granted.

He adopted a judge’s statement that this is “essentially and ultimately a question of common sense judgment” based on each case’s facts.

But not every interference is actionable. A right of carriageway does not usually let the dominant owner enter from every point along the boundary. The servient owner can generally fence the right of way, provided gates still allow reasonable use.

Applying this to Strip 1, he held the three dominant tenements did not all have identical rights. This contradicted what the parties had assumed.

The owner of No 30 could use the carriageway for pedestrian or vehicle access to the western part of No 30.

Ms Lowe, owner of No 28, had a right to unimpeded pedestrian access along Strip 1 to Musgrave Street. She kept that right even though No 28 had another route to a public street.

The trial judge found “not insubstantial” effects on No 28’s rights. Mr Kladis did not challenge that finding.

The elevated driveway would effectively block occupants of No 28 from a large part of Strip 1 at ground level.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [91]–[95] (opens in a new tab), [108]–[119] (opens in a new tab)

Sackville AJA held that the proposal substantially interfered with the rights of the owners of Nos 28 and 30 over Strip 1 and said that these conclusions were sufficient to warrant allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders ([116]-[119]). White JA recorded the same conclusion as sufficient for the disposal of the appeal ([2]).

Proposition 2

Classification unresolved · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [96]–[107] (opens in a new tab), [120]–[128] (opens in a new tab), [131] (opens in a new tab)

Sackville AJA said it was “not strictly necessary” to address the finding on Strip 2 ([120]), and the appeal could be and was allowed on the Strip 1 reasoning ([119]). But White JA records the conclusion on Strip 2 as one of two that suffice for the disposal of the appeal ([2]), and Sackville AJA’s conclusion at [131] is expressed by reference to the rights of the owner of No 28 generally. A binary label would conceal that the Strip 2 analysis was fully reasoned and agreed in, yet was described by its author as not strictly necessary.

Proposition 3

Obiter · Sackville AJA (Meagher JA and White JA agreeing)

Read judgment: [68]–[83] (opens in a new tab)

Sackville AJA expressed a firm view that the owners of No 24 should have been joined ([76], [82]), but did not carry the consequences of non-joinder further because those owners had said they did not wish to be joined and the appeal was to be allowed in any event ([83]); the orders rest on the interference reasoning ([119]), not on non-joinder.

Why does this case matter?

Neighbour disputes over shared land are often treated as one simple fight. This case shows a better approach: separate who holds what right, over which strip, and who must join the court case.

Check your understanding

On NSW facts, five questions test land, strips, parties and procedure (easements, joinder, development consent). Question 4 flags two capacities Mr Kladis argued in; question 5 flags why rights over Strip 1 weren’t identical. Appeal allowed; bench: Meagher, White, Sackville AJJA.

A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail. The full case note is the complete statement.