Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd
Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 286; [2012] HCA 41
A passenger pays a domestic fare and never boards. Qantas kept the money and said that, because the passenger never flew, nothing had been supplied. Was GST payable on that fare?
Clarified by IQ Renew Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2026] FCA 1393
Jackman J of the Federal Court, at first instance on 22 September 2026, applied the statement that a supply for consideration does not depend on contractual principles ([83](c)). Drawing on AP Group Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 105, his Honour added that “for” means “in order to obtain”, so that a merely temporal connection between the supply and the consideration, or satisfaction of a “but for” test, is not enough ([83](a)-(b)). That is one Federal Court judge’s synthesis of the authorities in a different setting, a container deposit scheme, and not a statement of the High Court.
Clarified by Commissioner of Taxation v MBI Properties Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 49
The High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ, joint reasons) cited this decision for the proposition that it is wrong to consider that one transaction must always involve the making of just one supply ([33]). On payment once, it said the general operation of the GST Act avoids double taxation by an exclusive connection between an amount of consideration and a tax period, so that “subject to the operation of any applicable special rule” s 29-5 makes GST payable only once, in the tax period of the first payment or invoice, and that this explanation “was adopted in Qantas” ([43]-[44]). It added that earlier observations in Reliance Carpet were directed to the special rules for a deposit held as security, not to the general operation of the GST Act ([44]).
What happened?
Qantas and its subsidiary Jetstar sold domestic air travel and overbooked their flights, expecting that not every booked passenger would board ([1]). Some passengers paid and never flew. Their fares were either forfeited under the conditions of carriage or were refundable on application within a stipulated period, and no refund was claimed ([3]). The fares had been calculated to recover the GST, and on payment the airline recorded the GST component as a debt due to the Commissioner; for flights not taken it did not refund that component ([6]).
Qantas contended that no GST was payable on the unused fares and that GST already paid on them should be refunded ([7]). The Commissioner assessed the monthly tax periods from July 2005 to June 2008, with assessments totalling $34,275,917 ([6]-[7]). The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s disallowance of the objection ([8]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Stone, Edmonds and Perram JJ) set that decision aside and allowed the objection in full ([9]). It reasoned that what each customer pays for is carriage by air, which was “the essence, and sole purpose, of the transaction” ([11]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court’s orders of 1 September 2011, and ordered that Qantas’s appeal to the Full Court be dismissed with costs (order; [35]). Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave joint reasons. Heydon J dissented.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The meaning of “for”. The joint reasons held that in the phrase “the supply for consideration” in s 9-5(a), “the word ‘for’ is not used to adopt contractual principles. Rather, it requires a connection or relationship between the supply and the consideration” ([14]). They rejected the Full Court’s method of distilling the “essence and sole purpose” of the transaction and treating the flight as the only relevant supply ([11]-[12]). Reliance Carpet concerned the “wait and see” rules for deposits in Division 99, and the joint reasons said it gave that approach no support ([12], [27]).
The supply and the consideration. The Qantas and Jetstar conditions “did not provide an unconditional promise to carry the passenger and baggage on a particular flight”. They “supplied something less than that”, which was “at least a promise to use best endeavours to carry the passenger and baggage, having regard to the circumstances of the business operations of the airline”. That promise was “a ‘taxable supply’ for which the consideration, being the fare, was received” ([33]). The GST was attributable to the tax periods in issue and the assessments were not shown to be excessive ([34]). The joint reasons accepted that one consideration may be received for more than one supply, with the GST payable once and attributable to the first tax period in which any of the consideration is received or invoiced ([19]).
Heydon J. Heydon J would have dismissed the appeal essentially for the Full Court’s reasons ([48]). He said that “supply for consideration” connotes a bargained-for exchange of value for performance, and that setting a seat aside on the airline’s reservation system was preparation for a supply, not a supply ([37]). The reservation stage was “incidental and preparatory” to an actual air journey ([43]), and “What the passenger wants is an actual air journey, not a heavily conditional promise to supply one” ([44]).
Limits. The dispute concerned fares where no refund was claimed or none was available; Qantas did not contend that Division 19, which treats a refund as an adjustment event, applied directly ([3]). The conclusion rests on the Qantas and Jetstar conditions as the Court read them ([33]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [12]–[14] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [27] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the construction of ‘for’ in s 9-5(a) on which the joint reasons depend, and explain why the Full Court’s reliance on Reliance Carpet and on the ‘essence and sole purpose’ of the transaction was rejected. The result in [33]-[34] could not be reached without displacing the Full Court’s approach. The first range runs from physical page 7 to page 8.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [19] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [33]–[34] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)
[33]-[34] state the conclusion that the conditions contained at least a best-endeavours promise, that this was a taxable supply for which the fare was received, and that the assessments were not shown to be excessive. [19] explains why the consideration could be received for that supply even though it might also be received for the flight, and states the once-only attribution on which the result in [34] depends.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [36]–[49] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J reached the opposite result by a different route: the reservation was preparation for a supply, the fare was paid for an actual air journey, and nothing was supplied for consideration where the passenger never flew. He would have dismissed the appeal essentially for the Full Court’s reasons ([48]). His reasons do not form part of the Court’s holding. The range runs from physical page 17 to page 20.
Why does this case matter?
The intuitive answer to a no-show fare is that nothing was supplied and so no GST is payable. A student who gives that answer without testing it against the Court’s reasoning is giving the answer that the High Court’s orders displaced.
Exam and application relevance
Use the case for GST questions about prepayments that are forfeited or never claimed back. The result depended on what the conditions of carriage contained, so an answer should identify what the contract terms actually promised and ask whether the payment was received for that promise ([14], [33]). A different set of terms may support a different conclusion.
Where the question is whether GST is payable once or more than once, or in which tax period, add what the High Court said in MBI Properties about s 29-5 and special rules. Refunds that were actually claimed fall under Division 19, which this decision did not decide ([3]).
Check your understanding
1. What did the Full Federal Court treat as the only relevant supply, and why did the joint reasons say Reliance Carpet did not support that approach?
2. The conditions of carriage did not give an unconditional promise to carry a passenger on a particular flight. Why did the joint reasons nonetheless find a taxable supply?
3. Why was Division 19 not part of the dispute in this appeal?