Commissioner of Taxation v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd
Commissioner of Taxation v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd (2008) 236 CLR 342; [2008] HCA 22
A buyer of land defaults and the vendor keeps a deposit of $297,500. The Commissioner says GST is payable on it; the vendor says it supplied nothing. What was supplied, and in which tax period?
Qualified by Commissioner of Taxation v MBI Properties Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 49
At [44] the High Court said that the observations in Reliance Carpet about supply and taxable supply were directed to the operation of the special rules for a deposit held as security for performance (Division 99), not to the general operation of the GST Act; the decision on the forfeited deposit is not affected.
What happened?
Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd, the taxpayer, owned land at Camberwell in Victoria, where it conducted its business ([16]). By an option agreement of 3 December 2001 it granted a purchaser, for a fee of $25,000, an option to buy the property on the terms of an annexed contract. Exercise required written notice together with payment of $297,500, the deposit payable under the contract ([17]). The contract fixed the price at $2,975,000 and was dated 10 January 2002. The deposit was paid on 5 February 2002 and the taxpayer’s solicitors released it to the taxpayer on 27 February 2002 ([16]-[19]).
The purchaser failed to complete on 10 July 2003 and did not remedy the default within the 14 day notice to complete. On or about 26 July 2003 the taxpayer terminated the contract (the judgment calls this rescission, in the sense of termination for the other party’s breach, [2]) and forfeited the deposit ([20]). The Commissioner assessed the taxpayer to goods and services tax (GST) on the forfeited deposit for the three month tax period that ended on 30 September 2003 ([20]). A Deputy President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s disallowance of the taxpayer’s objection, but the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed the taxpayer’s appeal ([21]).
What did the Court decide?
Five Justices sat and gave one set of joint reasons. The issue was whether the Full Court erred in holding that the taxpayer had made out its objection to the Commissioner’s assessment of GST in respect of a taxable supply by the taxpayer, the consideration being the deposit forfeited on termination of the contract ([1]).
The High Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal, set aside orders 1 and 2 of the Full Court’s orders of 5 July 2007 and ordered in their place that the taxpayer’s appeal to the Full Court be dismissed. In accordance with the terms of the grant of special leave, the Commissioner was to bear the taxpayer’s costs of the appeal to the High Court, and the Full Court’s costs order was not disturbed ([43]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Supply, consideration and attribution. The joint reasons held that the taxpayer made a “supply” for the purposes of s 9-10 of the GST Act when the contract of sale was made, before the deposit was forfeited ([37]). The supply was an entry into obligations (s 9-10(2)(g)), applying the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s analysis of the taxpayer’s obligations under the contract ([37]); and, on exchange of contracts, a grant (s 9-10(2)(d)) of contractual rights exercisable over or in relation to land, in particular the right to require conveyance of the land on completion, which fall within the Act’s expansive definition of “real property” ([38], [6]).
The Full Court’s description of the contract as one for the supply of real property, “nothing more and nothing less”, gave insufficient weight to that definition and to the subject matter of a contract for the sale of land, and the contract’s not proceeding to completion did not “necessarily” prevent there having been a supply when it was made ([13]).
The deposit was paid “in connection with” that supply and so answered the definition of consideration in s 9-15(1)(a) ([33]). Because it was held as security for the purchaser’s obligation to complete, it was treated as consideration only if and when it was forfeited for failure to perform (s 99-5) ([34], [36]). When the deposit was forfeited, the supply represented by the making of the contract became a taxable supply, and under s 99-10 the GST was attributable to the tax period in which the forfeiture occurred, although the supply had been made earlier ([39]-[40]).
The deposit’s characteristics. The taxpayer could not fix upon such of the deposit’s characteristics “as it selects to demonstrate that there was no taxable supply”. It was sufficient for the Commissioner that the deposit operated as security for the purchaser’s performance and was liable to forfeiture on failure ([28]). The contention that the forfeited deposit was received “in the nature of damages” failed because a deposit may be forfeited irrespective of the vendor’s having sustained loss, and the taxpayer had taken no action to recover damages ([24]).
Supply and taxable supply. The joint reasons described the composite expression “a taxable supply” as “of critical importance” to liability for GST. On the facts of a given case there may be consecutive acts each of which answers the statutory description of “supply”, but on examination there may be no more than one taxable supply ([5]).
Completion. The joint reasons also considered a sale that proceeds to completion. There the deposit is not treated as consideration for a supply unless it is applied as all or part of the purchase price; when it is applied, the GST is attributable to the tax period in which that occurs, and there is only one taxable supply ([41]-[42]). That question did not arise on the facts, because the contract was terminated and the deposit forfeited.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [13] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [28] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [33]–[40] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)
[33]-[40] apply the supply, consideration and attribution provisions to the contract and the deposit and reach the answer on which the orders depend; [13] explains why the Full Court’s characterisation of the contract was in error; [28] rejects the taxpayer’s reliance on selected characteristics of the deposit. The first range runs from physical page 16 to page 19. These are the reasoning for the Court’s answer to the question whether the Full Court erred in upholding the taxpayer’s objection.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [24] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)
[24] disposes of the taxpayer’s notice of contention: the contention that the forfeited deposit was received in the nature of damages fails at its first step, so the Court did not consider the taxpayer’s second and third propositions. It is part of the reasoning that the Full Court’s result should not stand.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [5] (PDF p 6) (opens in a new tab), [39]–[40] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
[5] states that a supply and a taxable supply are different things, and [39]-[40] apply the distinction: the supply made by the contract became a taxable supply on forfeiture. The Court’s answer to the issue depends on that distinction.
Obiter · Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [41]–[42] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
[41]-[42] consider a sale that proceeds to completion, which is not this case: the contract was terminated and the deposit forfeited. The Court takes up a question of construction raised by the taxpayer’s structural argument and answers it, but the answer is not necessary to the orders. It is a considered statement of the joint reasons, not a separate view.
Why does this case matter?
GST problems about money paid under a contract that is later terminated invite two opposite shortcuts: treating the payment as outside the tax because the sale never completed, and treating the tax as arising simply because money changed hands. An examiner looks for an answer that takes each statutory step in turn and says which provision governs it.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about a payment made under a contract that does not complete, take three questions in order: what, if anything, was supplied and when; whether the payment is consideration for that supply, and whether a special rule such as Division 99 controls when it counts as consideration; and in which tax period any GST is attributable. Test the statutory criteria against the payment, rather than adopting whichever characteristics of the payment favour your client ([28]).
This decision concerned a deposit held as security under a contract for the sale of land in Victoria ([16], [36]). The High Court later said something about how far its observations in this case travel: state that limit, from MBI Properties [2014] HCA 49 at [44], before applying them to a payment that is not a deposit held as security.
Check your understanding
1. How did the Full Court describe the contract, and what did the joint reasons say that description gave insufficient weight to ([13])?
2. Under s 99-5, in what two circumstances is a deposit held as security for performance treated as consideration for a supply ([34])?
3. Which section did the joint reasons apply to decide the tax period to which the GST was attributable, and what was the tax period in this case ([20], [39])?
4. What did the joint reasons say about the deposit’s several characteristics, and why was it enough for the Commissioner that one of them was present ([28])?