Lunney v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
Lunney v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478; [1958] HCA 5
A ship’s joiner paid bus fares every working day to get from his suburban home to the waterfront. Without the trip he could not earn his wages. Was that enough to make the fares a deductible outgoing?
Clarified by Commissioner of Taxation v Payne [2001] HCA 3
In Commissioner of Taxation v Payne, Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ called Lunney the leading decision in the High Court on travel between home and a place where income is derived, and read the majority as holding that some causal connection between an expenditure and the derivation of income is not enough: the outgoing must be incurred in the course of gaining or producing the income ([12]-[13]). They said that the principle Lunney applied excludes outgoings incurred for the purpose of deriving assessable income but not in the course of doing so, that the distinction applies generally and not only to travel, and that it denied a deduction for travel between two unrelated places of income derivation ([14], [16]-[17]). Gaudron and Gummow JJ, dissenting in Payne, stated the principle derived from Lunney more narrowly, as concerned with the costs of movement between a sole place of work and the place of residence ([51]).
What happened?
Two taxpayers claimed deductions for the fares they paid to travel by public transport between their homes and their places of work, and each claim came to the High Court as a case stated (joint judgment at 495). Lunney was a ship’s joiner who travelled by bus from Narraweena, a residential suburb of Sydney, to the waterfront where he was employed, and back again; his fares for the year came to 62 pounds. His employer made him no allowance for fares, and he carried on no income-earning activity at or near his home (McTiernan J at 486). Hayley was a dentist who carried on his practice in Sydney (joint judgment at 495).
What did the Court decide?
In each case stated the Court answered the question: such sum is not deductible. The costs of each case stated were left to the judge disposing of the appeal. Dixon CJ and McTiernan J each gave reasons, and Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ gave a joint judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Dixon CJ said that the deductibility of fares between home and work had been accepted as settled for two generations, and that although he would have misgivings if the matter were worked out again on bare reason, that was what the Court ought not to do: “If the whole subject is to be ripped up now it is for the legislature and not the Court to do it” (at 485-486).
Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ said that the expression “incidental and relevant” was not an exclusive and exhaustive test of deductibility, but an attribute without which expenditure cannot be deductible (at 496-497). An employee must attend his place of employment to earn his income, “But to say that expenditure on fares is a prerequisite to the earning of a taxpayer’s income is not to say that such expenditure is incurred in or in the course of gaining or producing his income”; the answer depends more on the essential character of the expenditure itself (at 498-499). They held that travel between home and place of work is properly characterised as a personal or living expense, at most “a necessary consequence of living in one place and working in another” (at 500-501).
McTiernan J dissented. He would have held that the fares were wholly incurred in gaining the taxpayer’s assessable income and were not of a private or domestic nature (at 494-495).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ (joint judgment)
Read judgment: pp 498–501 (opens in a new tab)
The joint judgment’s reasons for answering each question in the negative: a fare that is a prerequisite to earning income is not for that reason incurred in gaining it, and travel between home and work is a personal or living expense. Together with Dixon CJ’s concurrence it carries the Court’s answer, and Payne [13] describes this reasoning as what the majority in Lunney held.
Separate reasoning · Dixon CJ
Read judgment: pp 485–486 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon CJ concurs in the answers but rests them on adherence to long-settled authority on how an undisputed principle applies, saying he would have misgivings if the matter were worked out again on bare reason and leaving change to the legislature.
Separate reasoning · McTiernan J
Read judgment: pp 494–495 (opens in a new tab)
McTiernan J dissents: he would hold the fares wholly deductible as incurred in gaining the income from the employment and not of a private or domestic nature.
Why does this case matter?
Travel is one of the most common deductions people try to claim, and the instinctive argument runs from necessity: no journey, no income. Examiners look for an answer that identifies the connection the statute requires between an outgoing and the income, and tests the facts of the journey against it.
Exam and application relevance
When a problem involves travel costs, first identify where the taxpayer’s income-earning activity begins and ends, and then ask where the journey falls in relation to it: between home and a single place of work, between two places of work or business, or in the course of the work itself. Read Commissioner of Taxation v Payne [2001] HCA 3 with Lunney before deciding which category the facts fall into, and attribute each statement of principle to the Justices who made it.
Lunney was decided under s 51(1) of the 1936 Act. The general deduction provision is now s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), which allows a deduction for a loss or outgoing to the extent that it is incurred in gaining or producing assessable income and excludes one of a private or domestic nature (s 8-1(1)(a), (2)(b)). Where the travel is directly between two workplaces, apply s 25-100 as well: since 29 June 2004, for assessments for the 2001-2002 and later income years, it allows an individual to deduct a transport expense incurred in travel directly between two places at which the individual engages in income-earning activities, but not where one of the places is a place at which the individual resides, or where the arrangement or business at the first place has ceased (s 25-100(1)-(4)).
Check your understanding
1. Why did Dixon CJ decline to reconsider the rule, even though he said he would have misgivings if the matter were worked out again on bare reason (at 485-486)?
2. What did the joint judgment say about the expression “incidental and relevant”, and why did the fact that fares were a prerequisite to earning income not make them deductible (at 496-499)?
3. On what basis did McTiernan J say that Lunney’s fares were deductible (at 494-495)?
4. How did the Justices in Commissioner of Taxation v Payne differ about the scope of the principle Lunney applied (Payne [16]-[17], [51])?