General deductions: incurred in gaining or producing income
Explains the general deduction in s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), the in-the-course-of reading of incurred in gaining or producing assessable income in Ronpibon Tin, Lunney, Payne and Anstis, and the exclusions in s 8-1(2).
Learning outcomes
- State the two limbs of s 8-1(1) and the four exclusions in s 8-1(2) of the 1997 Act.
- Apply the occasion-of-the-outgoing test from Ronpibon Tin, and explain why Lunney holds that a prerequisite of earning income is not enough.
- Explain how Payne and Anstis apply those tests, attributing the Payne majority and dissent correctly.
Income tax is imposed on taxable income, which is assessable income less deductions (Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (“the 1997 Act”), s 4-15), and this article states the Commonwealth rule for the main deduction, in s 8-1. Before asking whether an expense was sensible, necessary or connected with work, a student must ask the question the section asks: was the loss or outgoing incurred in gaining or producing assessable income? The High Court has read “in” as “in the course of”, which is why a cost can be a necessary precondition of earning income and still not be deductible.1
The text of section 8-1
Section 8-1(1) allows a deduction for any loss or outgoing to the extent that it is incurred in gaining or producing assessable income, or is necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income. Section 8-1(2) removes a loss or outgoing to the extent that it is of capital or of a capital nature, is of a private or domestic nature, is incurred in relation to gaining or producing exempt income or non-assessable non-exempt income, or is prevented from being deducted by another provision. Section 8-5 separately allows deductions that other provisions of the Act grant, and s 8-1(3) refers to Division 27 for the effect of GST in working out deductions (see the article on GST: taxable supply and consideration).
The decisions below were made under the predecessor provision, s 51(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), except Anstis, which applied s 8-1. In Anstis the Court said the test under s 8-1(1)(a) “is not materially different from its predecessors”, so that the earlier cases may be consulted.5
Ronpibon Tin: the occasion of the outgoing
Two Victorian mining companies had their mining income exempt from Australian tax. After the Japanese took control of their mines the companies were cut off, and their only assessable income was interest. They claimed their Melbourne head-office costs, including management fees and directors’ fees, against that interest. The Court, in a single joint judgment, said that an outgoing must be “incidental and relevant” to gaining or producing the income, and that “the occasion of the loss or outgoing should be found in whatever is productive of the assessable income or, if none be produced, would be expected to produce assessable income” (at 56-57).2
On that test, payments to dependants of one company’s staff and the cost of cables about a buffer stock scheme were not deductible. Where one outlay serves both an income-producing end and another, such as directors’ fees, the section allows apportionment, and the Court said there must be “some fair and reasonable assessment” of how far the outlay relates to assessable income, which is a question of fact (at 59).
Lunney: a prerequisite is not enough
In Lunney v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1958) 100 CLR 478 the claimants were an employee and a dentist, each of whom claimed the fares paid between home and place of work. The Court, by a majority of four to one, held that the fares were not deductible. Dixon CJ treated the rule as settled for two generations and said that if the subject were to be “ripped up” it was for the legislature, not the Court (at 485-486). Williams, Kitto and Taylor JJ, in a joint judgment, said that “incidental and relevant” was not an exclusive test but an attribute without which an outgoing cannot be deductible, and that to say expenditure on fares is a prerequisite of earning income “is not to say that such expenditure is incurred in or in the course of gaining or producing his income” (at 497, 499). They treated the fares as a personal or living expense, at most “a necessary consequence of living in one place and working in another” (at 501). McTiernan J dissented and would have allowed the deduction.3
Payne: travel between two places of work
Commissioner of Taxation v Payne [2001] HCA 3 asked whether an airline pilot who ran a deer farm could deduct the cost of travelling from the farm to the airport. By a majority of three to two the High Court held that he could not deduct it under s 51(1). The joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ held that the travel was between two unrelated places of income derivation and was not incurred in the course of either activity; it was occasioned by the need to be in a position to begin work, “no different from” travel from home to work. They said the distinction between outgoings incurred in the course of deriving income and other outgoings “applies generally, not just in relation to travel expenses” (at [14]-[17]). The Court also remitted a separate question about reliance on a public ruling to the Tribunal (at [23]). Gaudron and Gummow JJ dissented: they confined the Lunney principle to travel between a sole place of work and the place of residence (at [51]).4
The 1997 Act now contains s 25-100, which allows an individual to deduct a transport expense to the extent that it is incurred in travel directly between two places, where the individual was engaged in activities to gain or produce assessable income at the first, travelled to the second to engage in such activities, and engaged in them there. It does not apply where one of the places is one where the individual resides, and it has further limits (s 25-100(3) and (4)). Payne states the result under s 51(1), not the effect of s 25-100, and the farm in Payne was the taxpayer’s residence.6
Anstis: what produced the income
In Commissioner of Taxation v Anstis [2010] HCA 40 a full-time student who received youth allowance and part-time wages claimed expenses of her university study. The Court treated the depreciation of her computer as a matter for s 40-25 and not raised on the appeal (at [26]). The High Court unanimously dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal. The allowance was ordinary income (s 6-5); the Court had regard to the periodicity of the payments, which Myer Emporium, discussed in the article on income tax fundamentals, records as having been considered a hallmark of income. The joint reasons said it is “[e]ssential to the inquiry of deductibility” to identify “that which is productive of the assessable income”. The occasion of her expenses was what she did to establish and keep her entitlement to the allowance, namely study, and her reason for studying was not determinative. The expenses were not private within s 8-1(2)(b). The Court called the question before it unusual (at [23], [27], [30]-[31], [34], [38]).5
That result has since been displaced for later years. Section 26-19 of the 1997 Act denies a deduction for a loss or outgoing to the extent that it is incurred in gaining or producing a rebatable benefit, a term that includes a benefit paid under Part 2.11 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), the youth allowance provisions (s 160AAA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)). Section 26-19 was inserted by Schedule 1 of the Tax Laws Amendment (2012 Measures No. 1) Act 2012 (Cth), which received assent on 27 June 2012 and applies to assessments for the 2011-12 income year and later income years. The Court’s account of s 8-1(1)(a) is not affected.678
Reading the cases together
This section is a way of organising the cases, not a test any case states. The cases ask what produces the income, whether the outgoing is incurred in the course of that activity and not merely before it, and whether s 8-1(2) removes it. Decisions of the High Court bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Payne is a three-to-two decision and the dissent states a narrower reading of Lunney. Anstis answered a question the Court called unusual, does not make study expenses generally deductible, and has been displaced by s 26-19 for later years as to youth allowance.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the loss or outgoing, and the assessable income it is said to gain or produce, whether actual or expected.
- Ask what produces that income, then whether the outgoing’s occasion lies in it (Ronpibon Tin). A cost that is merely a precondition of earning is not enough (Lunney, joint judgment).
- For travel, separate home-to-work, which Lunney denies, and travel between two places of work, where Payne (three to two) denied a deduction between unrelated activities under s 51(1) and the dissent would not extend Lunney that far. Then check s 25-100, including its exclusion where one place is the individual’s residence.
- Check s 8-1(2): capital, private or domestic, exempt income and other provisions, including s 26-19 for outgoings incurred in gaining or producing a rebatable benefit. Say which limb applies.
- Where an outlay serves two ends, consider apportionment by a fair and reasonable assessment, and check whether a specific deduction or Division 27 applies.
- State no rate or dollar amount, and say which provision and which decision under s 51(1) or s 8-1 supports each step.
Self-check
- Have I asked whether the outgoing was incurred in the course of gaining income, not merely whether it was necessary?
- Have I attributed Payne to a three-to-two majority and noted the dissent?
- Have I said which statutory limb in s 8-1 each conclusion rests on?