Commissioner of Taxation v Payne
Commissioner of Taxation v Payne [2001] HCA 3
A pilot also operated a deer farm at his home. How were journeys between the farm and airport connected with earning income?
Qualified by legislation: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), from 29 June 2004
Section 25-100 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) allows an individual to deduct a transport expense to the extent that it is incurred in travel directly between two places where the individual was engaged in, and travelled to engage in, activities to gain or produce assessable income, except where one of the places is a place at which the individual resides (s 25-100(3)) or the arrangement or business at the first place has ceased (s 25-100(4)). Payne states the result under s 51(1) of the 1936 Act for travel between two places of unrelated income derivation and should not be read as stating the deductibility of such travel under the 1997 Act; on the facts in Payne the farm was the taxpayer’s residence.
What happened?
Andrew Payne lived with his family on a property near Tamworth, where he ran a substantial deer-farming business. He was also an international airline pilot. He travelled from the farm to Sydney airport when required to report for flying duties and claimed the expenses for the income years ending in 1991 to 1994 ([1]-[2]).
The Tribunal affirmed the disallowance of the deductions but remitted (cancelled) all the penalties ([3]). Payne succeeded on appeal to the Federal Court, and the Full Court dismissed the Commissioner’s appeal. The Commissioner then appealed to the High Court ([3]-[5]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal on the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The travel deductions were not allowable, and the Federal Court’s orders were set aside ([17], [23]). Gaudron and Gummow JJ dissented and would have dismissed the appeal ([57]).
The orders included a remitter to the Tribunal to consider whether Payne should have leave to raise an additional objection ground concerning Taxation Ruling TR 95/19 and, if leave were granted, whether and to what extent the Commissioner was bound. The High Court did not determine that question itself. There was no order for High Court costs, and the costs orders below were left undisturbed ([18]-[23] and the order).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
For the first limb of s 51(1), the majority distinguished expenditure incurred in the course of producing actual or expected income from expenditure merely connected with, or incurred for the purpose of, producing it. Drawing on Ronpibon, the question was where the occasion of the outgoing lay ([9], [11]).
On these facts, neither the pilot employment nor the deer-farming business occasioned the journeys in the required sense. Travel occurred in the intervals between the unrelated income-producing activities and placed Payne in a position to begin the next activity. The majority treated it like travel from home to work, rather than an expense incurred in carrying out either activity ([14]).
The majority acknowledged that part of an outgoing could qualify in other circumstances. Here, however, the characterisation of the journeys denied the necessary connection for any part of the claimed expense. Their reasoning applied a general connection requirement rather than treating Lunney as a rule confined to its precise facts ([15]-[17]).
Gaudron and Gummow JJ took a different view. They confined Lunney’s settled outcome to ordinary movement between a sole workplace and residence and would not make it determinative of travel between multiple income-producing places. Their reasoning is a dissent, not an additional part of the majority’s test ([51]-[57]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint majority reasons)
Read judgment: [9] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [11] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [13] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab), [14]–[17] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)
The majority states the first-limb connection and applies it to journeys occurring between the two activities, rather than during either. The application determines the deduction issue; it preserves the possibility of apportionment in other circumstances. The Ronpibon passage quoted at [9] belongs to that earlier case. Paragraphs [11] and [13] state the test (whether the occasion of the outgoing is found in what produces income) and hold that some causal connection is not enough.
Separate reasoning · Gaudron and Gummow JJ (joint dissenting reasons)
Read judgment: [51] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [54] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
The dissent confines Lunney’s settled result to ordinary travel between a sole workplace and residence, and treats travel between two income-producing places differently. They would dismiss the Commissioner’s appeal at [57]. This is a dissenting route, not the majority holding or a rule to combine with it.
Why does this case matter?
Payne is useful when a taxpayer has more than one source of income and claims the cost of travelling between them.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the income-producing activity, the particular outgoing and the applicable statutory provision. Explain the facts that bear on its characterisation, rather than relying on the labels attached to the taxpayer’s jobs.
Specify the assessment year and check the later s 25-100 conditions and exclusions where applicable. Keep the majority and dissent distinct, and identify any separate public-ruling issue raised by the facts.
Check your understanding
1. Where did the majority locate the occasion of Payne’s journeys?
2. Why did Gaudron and Gummow JJ read Lunney differently?
3. What remained for the Tribunal to consider after the High Court’s orders?