Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd
Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd (2012) 247 CLR 286; [2012] HCA 41
A passenger pays a domestic fare and never boards. Qantas kept the money and said that, because the passenger never flew, nothing had been supplied. Was GST payable on that fare?
Clarified by IQ Renew Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2026] FCA 1393
Jackman J of the Federal Court, at first instance on 22 September 2026, applied the statement that a supply for consideration does not depend on contractual principles ([83](c)). Drawing on AP Group Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 105, his Honour added that “for” means “in order to obtain”, so that a merely temporal connection between the supply and the consideration, or satisfaction of a “but for” test, is not enough ([83](a)-(b)). That is one Federal Court judge’s synthesis of the authorities in a different setting, a container deposit scheme, and not a statement of the High Court.
Clarified by Commissioner of Taxation v MBI Properties Pty Ltd [2014] HCA 49
The High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ, joint reasons) cited this decision for the proposition that it is wrong to consider that one transaction must always involve the making of just one supply ([33]). On payment once, it said the general operation of the GST Act avoids double taxation by an exclusive connection between an amount of consideration and a tax period, so that “subject to the operation of any applicable special rule” s 29-5 makes GST payable only once, in the tax period of the first payment or invoice, and that this explanation “was adopted in Qantas” ([43]-[44]). It added that earlier observations in Reliance Carpet were directed to the special rules for a deposit held as security, not to the general operation of the GST Act ([44]).
What happened?
Qantas and Jetstar overbooked domestic flights. Some paying passengers never flew; fares were forfeited or unclaimed refunds. Qantas argued no GST was payable on these fares. The Commissioner assessed GST of $34,275,917 for July 2005–June 2008. The AAT upheld the Commissioner. The Full Court (Stone, Edmonds, Perram JJ) reversed, reasoning the “essence” of each transaction was carriage by air.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal with costs, set aside the Full Court’s orders of 1 September 2011, and ordered that Qantas’s appeal to the Full Court be dismissed with costs (order; [35]). Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave joint reasons. Heydon J dissented.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The majority held “for” in s 9-5(a) needs only a connection between supply and consideration. It does not import contract law. They rejected the Full Court’s “essence and sole purpose” test.
Qantas and Jetstar did not promise an unconditional flight. They promised best endeavours to carry passengers, considering business circumstances. That promise was the taxable supply; the fare was its consideration. The assessments stood.
Heydon J dissented. He saw “supply for consideration” as a bargained-for exchange. Reserving a seat was mere preparation, not a supply itself.
The case only covered fares without refunds claimed. Qantas did not argue Division 19 applied. The outcome depends on how the Court read the airlines’ conditions.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [12]–[14] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [27] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the construction of ‘for’ in s 9-5(a) on which the joint reasons depend, and explain why the Full Court’s reliance on Reliance Carpet and on the ‘essence and sole purpose’ of the transaction was rejected. The result in [33]-[34] could not be reached without displacing the Full Court’s approach. The first range runs from physical page 7 to page 8.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gummow, Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [19] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [33]–[34] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab)
[33]-[34] state the conclusion that the conditions contained at least a best-endeavours promise, that this was a taxable supply for which the fare was received, and that the assessments were not shown to be excessive. [19] explains why the consideration could be received for that supply even though it might also be received for the flight, and states the once-only attribution on which the result in [34] depends.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [36]–[49] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J reached the opposite result by a different route: the reservation was preparation for a supply, the fare was paid for an actual air journey, and nothing was supplied for consideration where the passenger never flew. He would have dismissed the appeal essentially for the Full Court’s reasons ([48]). His reasons do not form part of the Court’s holding. The range runs from physical page 17 to page 20.
Why does this case matter?
The intuitive answer to a no-show fare is that nothing was supplied and so no GST is payable. A student who gives that answer without testing it against the Court’s reasoning is giving the answer that the High Court’s orders displaced.