PhotoCure ASA v Queen’s University at Kingston
PhotoCure ASA v Queen’s University at Kingston [2002] FCA 905
A law firm acts for a patent licensee against a company that once gave an affiliated attorney firm confidential instructions about the same patent. The old file is isolated only after the company objects. Can the firm keep acting?
Qualified by Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181
In Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [67] Brereton J described Goldberg J’s reasoning in this case, which limited the basis of intervention in a former-client case to the protection of confidential information and preferred Belan v Casey to the views of Brooking JA in Spincode, as probably the strongest direct expression of a view that the court’s supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors is no longer available. At [76] his Honour did not accept that view. He stated that, once the retainer is at an end, the court’s jurisdiction in a former-client case rests on the protection of the former client’s confidences (unless there is no real risk of disclosure), and that there is no continuing duty of loyalty to found intervention (listing Photocure among the decisions to that effect), but that the court always has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain solicitors from acting in a particular case, as an incident of its jurisdiction over its officers and to control its process, which Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG does not address. The test in that jurisdiction is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that the practitioner be prevented from acting. The three questions stated at [50] of this case are therefore not the only basis on which a New South Wales court may restrain a solicitor from acting.
What happened?
On 12 April 2002 PhotoCure ASA applied to the Federal Court for a declaration that Australian Patent No 624985 was invalid and should be revoked. The respondent was the registered proprietor of the patent, Queen’s University at Kingston ([1]). On 30 May 2002 PhotoCure moved for an order restraining the firm of solicitors Freehills from acting against its interests in the proceeding or otherwise in relation to the patent. Freehills’ Sydney office was acting for Dusa Pharmaceuticals Inc (“Dusa”), a non-exclusive licensee of the patent ([2]).
PhotoCure’s concern arose because in November 1999 a firm of United Kingdom patent attorneys, Frank B Dehn & Co, had sought advice on PhotoCure’s behalf about issues concerning the patent from the Victorian firm then known as Freehills Patent Attorneys, which later became part of Freehills Carter Smith Beadle (“FCSB”) ([10]). Mr Paul Jones was the principal person handling the matter, with Mr James Cherry and Dr John Davy also involved ([29], [33]). The two firms were separate but had common partners and worked closely together, and Goldberg J treated them as parts of one firm for the purposes of the motion ([11]-[15]). Mr Anthony Muratore, who was retained by Dusa in early February 2002, led the team in Freehills’ Sydney office acting for Dusa ([37], [40]). Mr Jones and his group were in Melbourne ([72]).
PhotoCure’s solicitors wrote to Freehills on 6 May 2002 asking it to confirm that it would not act for any party adverse to PhotoCure in relation to the patent ([16]). Freehills replied on 8 May 2002 that it acted for Dusa, that Mr Muratore and his team had no knowledge of Mr Jones’ advice, and that Mr Jones had been instructed to isolate any files ([17]). The PhotoCure file was locked on 8 May 2002 and, from 4 June 2002, only one Freehills person who was not involved in the proceeding had access to it ([31]). Freehills offered undertakings that those acting for Dusa would not discuss the matter with Mr Jones and others or seek access to the files ([19], [32], [75]).
What did the Court decide?
Goldberg J dismissed PhotoCure’s notice of motion ([87]). The dismissal was on the footing that Freehills undertake to the Court to procure that any solicitor, patent attorney or paralegal acting for Dusa or in the retainer sign an undertaking in the form annexed to the order ([86]), and Freehills gave that undertaking. His Honour also ordered PhotoCure to pay fifty per cent of Freehills’ costs of the motion (orders of 22 July 2002).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Goldberg J, sitting alone, followed Lord Millett in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 in holding that, where the person seeking to restrain a firm from acting is a former client, the court’s jurisdiction is founded on the protection of confidential information and not on a conflict of interest ([47]-[48], [53], [55]-[56]). He identified three questions: whether the firm possesses information confidential to the former client; whether that information is, or may be, relevant to a matter in which the firm proposes to act for another party with an interest adverse to the former client; and whether there is any risk that the information will come into the possession of those in the firm working for the other party ([50]).
The former client bears the burden on the first two; once they are satisfied the burden of establishing the third moves to the firm ([51]). The firm must show that there is no real risk of disclosure. Lord Millett, quoted at [49], said that the risk “must be a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical. But it need not be substantial”. Lord Millett, quoted at [51], also said that there is no rule of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are insufficient to eliminate the risk.
Goldberg J accepted that the integration between the patent attorney firm and the law firm was such that the two should be treated as one for these purposes ([15], [65]), and that the firm held confidential information of PhotoCure relevant to the proceeding ([21]-[28], [62]). He held that Freehills had discharged the burden of showing that there was no real risk that the information would come into the possession of those acting for Dusa ([81], [84]).
Goldberg J held that, although the information barrier created in the case was an ad hoc arrangement, he was satisfied that, taken in conjunction with the other matters to which he had referred, it was effective to ensure that there was no real risk of disclosure of PhotoCure’s confidential information to Mr Muratore and his team ([78]). The other matters included that the persons who had acted for PhotoCure (Mr Jones and Mr Cherry) were not and never had been involved in the retainer by Dusa and Dr Davy had left the firm ([65]); that the PhotoCure file had been quarantined and could not be reached by the Sydney team through the firm’s information systems ([82]); that the earlier work was done in Melbourne by a limited group who did not have regular contact with the Sydney team ([74]); and the undertakings that had been proffered ([74], [75], [82]).
His Honour adopted a similar approach to that of Ryan J in Bureau Interprofessionnel Des Vins De Bourgogne v Red Earth Nominees Pty Ltd (t/as Taltarni Vineyards) [2002] FCA 588, where Chinese walls erected ad hoc were accepted ([79]). He distinguished Bolkiah, in which about 168 personnel had worked on the assignment and a substantial body of confidential information was involved ([76]-[77]), and Newman v Phillips Fox (1999) 21 WAR 309, where a wall was held inadequate because of the expected interaction between the persons who had acted for the former client and those acting for the other party ([80]).
He accepted Bryson J’s remark in D & J Constructions Pty Ltd v Head (1987) 9 NSWLR 118 that the appearance that a lawyer can readily change sides is subversive of the appearance that justice is being done, but balanced it against the principle that a lawyer may in certain circumstances act against a former client where there is not a real risk of misuse of confidential information ([60]), and observed that courts are now more prepared to accept Chinese walls than when D & J Constructions was decided ([61]).
He concluded that a reasonable observer aware of the relevant facts would not think there was a real, as opposed to a theoretical, possibility or risk that PhotoCure’s confidential information might be used to advance Dusa’s interests ([85]). Goldberg J added that, even if the basis of loyalty to the client or supervision of solicitors as officers of the Court were relevant, there was no room for those principles on the facts, because none of the persons who had acted for PhotoCure was involved in acting for Dusa ([57]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Goldberg J
Read judgment: [47]–[51] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the principles on which Goldberg J decided the motion: the basis of the jurisdiction in the former-client case, the three questions and the shifting burden. He applied them in finding that Freehills had discharged its burden ([81]-[84]).
Obiter · Goldberg J
Read judgment: [57] (opens in a new tab)
Goldberg J said that even if the basis of loyalty to the client or supervision of solicitors as officers of the Court were relevant, there was no room for those principles on the facts, because none of the persons involved in acting for PhotoCure was involved in acting for Dusa. The remark is unnecessary to the ground of decision, which he had already stated as the confidential information basis.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Goldberg J
Read judgment: [78]–[85] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the application of the principles to the facts: that the ad hoc barrier, with the other matters, was effective, that Bolkiah and Newman v Phillips Fox were distinguishable, and that Freehills had discharged the burden. They are the ground on which the motion was dismissed.
Why does this case matter?
Questions on a firm that wishes to act against a client it has previously served usually turn on facts about the firm: how the firms are organised, who worked on the earlier matter, where they sit and what has been done to keep the files apart. A student who answers from the word “conflict” alone, without asking what the earlier relationship was and what information it produced, will not reach the points an examiner is looking for. This decision, by a single judge at first instance, is a worked example of how that factual inquiry is run.
Exam and application relevance
Begin by identifying whether the person seeking to restrain the firm is a current client or a former client, and what the court is being asked to protect. Then consider what the facts show about the firm’s organisation and the safeguards in place, rather than relying on assurances alone. Say who decided the case and in which court, because this is a decision of a single Federal Court judge in 2002, and check later appellate decisions and the professional conduct rules in force in the relevant jurisdiction before applying it. Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181 is worth reading alongside it for what it says about the court’s inherent jurisdiction over solicitors.
Check your understanding
1. On what basis did Goldberg J say the court intervenes when a former client, rather than a current client, seeks to restrain a firm, and whose reasoning did he follow?
2. What are the three stages Goldberg J identified at [50], and on whom does the burden lie at each?
3. What did Lord Millett say about the size of the risk, and about whether Chinese walls can ever be enough?
4. Which facts did Goldberg J rely on in finding that no real risk existed, and why did he distinguish Bolkiah and Newman v Phillips Fox?
5. What did Goldberg J say about the appearance that justice is being done, and how did he weigh it?