Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9
A man signs a deed giving his wife the interest on a loan he has made and the dividends on some shares. Neither has been earned or declared when he signs. Whose income is it when it arrives?
What happened?
Mr Norman had deposited £3,000 on loan at interest with a firm. He also held shares in companies, and he was a beneficiary of two estates whose trustees held shares. On 21 December 1956 he and his wife signed a deed, called an indenture. It recited that he was desirous of assigning to her, as a gift, the income arising from his investments and interests, and it assigned to her absolutely the dividends for the period from 1 January 1957 to 30 June 1958, and the interest for the period from 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.
When the deed was signed, no interest had accrued for the year beginning 1 July 1957, and no dividend on the disputed shares existed. The interest on the deposit was 450 pounds. The disputed dividends were 460 pounds, paid on shares that the trustees transferred to Mr Norman after the deed was signed. For the year of income ended 30 June 1958 the Commissioner included both sums in his assessable income. The taxpayer’s case was that the deed had made both sums his wife’s before they arose. The question stated for the appeal asked whether the judge hearing the appeal would be bound or at liberty to hold that either sum was not his assessable income.
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered the question stated so that the judge hearing the taxpayer’s appeal would, on the facts stated, be neither bound nor at liberty to hold that either sum was not the taxpayer’s assessable income for the year ended 30 June 1958. Costs of the case stated were reserved for the judge disposing of the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Interest that has not yet accrued on a loan repayable without notice is, in Menzies J’s words, a right to come into existence rather than an existing right. A gift of it by deed, without consideration, does not transfer it to the donee.
Dixon CJ held that the future interest was “the merest expectancy or possibility” and did not think “the necessary divestment of the future accrual could be made by way of gift”. Menzies J, with whom Owen J agreed, held that the deed, “lacking consideration”, was not effective to entitle the assignee to the interest as it became due. On the interest those three Justices answered that the judge was neither bound nor at liberty to hold it was not the taxpayer’s income.
McTiernan J answered the question on the 450 pounds “Yes”, meaning the judge was at liberty to hold it was not the taxpayer’s income. Windeyer J reached the same answer, holding that a contract to pay interest on a future day was “a presently existing chose in action” that the deed had effectually assigned. The dividends were a different question, and each of the five Justices answered “No” on them.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Dixon CJ
Read judgment: p 16 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon CJ’s reasons on the future interest: an expectancy that could not be divested by gift. The reasoning turns on the interest on a loan under which the sum had not arisen at the date of the deed.
Ratio · Menzies J (Owen J agreeing)
Read judgment: pp 21–22 (opens in a new tab)
Paragraph 7 of Menzies J’s reasons: interest that may accrue on an existing loan repayable without notice is a right to come into existence, and a deed lacking consideration did not carry it. Owen J agreed with Menzies J, so the majority on the interest is three Justices.
Separate reasoning · Windeyer J
Read judgment: p 38 (opens in a new tab)
Windeyer J dissents on the interest and concurs on the dividends. He treats the contract debt for interest as a presently existing chose in action, which the deed could assign, so his answer ‘Yes’ on the 450 pounds follows a distinct route.
Obiter · Windeyer J
Read judgment: pp 24–25 (opens in a new tab)
Windeyer J’s general statement of the equitable rule for assignments for value of future property. He says the for-value cases are ‘really beside the point’ because the deed was a gift, so the statement was not needed for the answer.
Why does this case matter?
A student who checks whether the deed is valid, and whether it says gift, misses the question on which the appeal was decided. Tax and property problems set out a deed of income and then ask about a sum that has not yet arrived. An examiner expects the answer to turn on what the donor still had at the date of the deed, and on what the income depended on.
Exam and application relevance
In an income-assignment question, identify each sum, when it accrues or is declared, and the date of the deed. Then ask what the income depended on when the deed was made, and whether any consideration was given. Dividends on shares transferred after the deed raise a separate question: Dixon CJ’s reasons on dividends rest on the structure of s 44 of the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-1958 (Cth), which he read as making it impossible to assign future undeclared dividends so as to exclude the shareholder from including them in assessable income.
The interest question divided the Court three to two. State the split and the reason for each side rather than a general rule about family deeds. Section 260 of the Act was not relied on and its application was not argued (Windeyer J), so the case gives no answer under it.
Check your understanding
1. Which three Justices answered that the unaccrued interest could not be transferred to the wife, and which two would have answered the question on the interest “Yes”?
2. What did Dixon CJ say the structure of s 44 made impossible for future undeclared dividends?