Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd
Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 326
A vendor signed a transfer acknowledging payment of the whole price, but $100,000 was never paid. The buyer then mortgaged the land to lenders who relied on the paperwork and the register. Whose interest ranks first?
What happened?
Mr Heid was the registered proprietor of land at Glenhaven in New South Wales. On 27 May 1977 he orally agreed to sell it to Connell Investments Pty Ltd, one of a group of companies controlled by Newman, McKay & Co, mortgage brokers whose principal was Mr McKay. The price was $165,000: $15,000 in cash on completion, $100,000 to be deposited on call with another company in the group, and $50,000 to be secured by a mortgage over the land (page 331). Mr McKay introduced Mr Heid to Mr Gibby as the “company solicitor” who could act for both sides. Mr Heid, who trusted Mr McKay, agreed. Mr Gibby was not a solicitor but an unqualified employee of Newman, McKay & Co (page 331).
Mr Heid signed an authority for his bank to hand the certificate of title to Mr Gibby, and signed and left with him a contract of sale and a memorandum of transfer. The memorandum acknowledged receipt of the whole $165,000 from the transferee. He also signed, as mortgagee, a memorandum of mortgage for $50,000 that was never registered (page 331). The $15,000 was paid. The $100,000 was never deposited, and it was not disputed that Mr Heid had a vendor’s lien on the land for that sum (page 331).
Mr McKay used the documents to raise money. On 10 June 1977 Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd advanced $80,000 on a mortgage from Connell Investments, its solicitor having been given the certificate of title and the memorandum of transfer and having relied on the acknowledgement of payment. The transfer was registered on 30 June 1977, after Reliance Finance had lodged it and a caveat for its mortgage on 22 June (pages 331-332). On 4 July 1977 Connell Investments gave Mr Alexander a mortgage for $40,000, and he lodged a caveat on 6 July. None of the mortgages to the lenders was registered. Mr Heid lodged no caveat until 23 September 1977, and that caveat referred only to his interest as mortgagee. Neither lender knew, when it advanced money, that Mr Heid had or claimed an equitable interest in the land (pages 332, 338).
Kearney J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that Mr Heid’s lien ranked ahead of all the other equitable interests in the land (page 333). The Court of Appeal varied that order (page 333). Mr Heid appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Gibbs CJ gave reasons with which Wilson J agreed (pages 331-338, 348), Mason and Deane JJ gave joint reasons (pages 339-345) and Murphy J gave separate reasons (pages 346-347).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gibbs CJ began from the statement in Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd that where the merits of competing equitable interests are equal, priority in time of creation gives the better equity, but where they are unequal, as where the conduct of the owner of the earlier interest has led the other to acquire his interest on the supposition that the earlier did not exist, the maxim may be displaced (page 333). He accepted the general correctness of the proposition in Rimmer v Webster that an owner who clothes another with apparent ownership, including by acknowledging that the consideration has been paid, is estopped from asserting his title against a person who took from that other in good faith and for value (page 335).
He said that decisions such as Rimmer v Webster and Abigail v Lapin might be based on a principle about handing title deeds to an agent with restricted authority or on estoppel, that either would determine the case, and dealt with estoppel (pages 335-336).
No direct representation to the later lender was needed. By allowing Mr Gibby to have the certificate of title and the memorandum of transfer, Mr Heid armed Connell Investments “with the power of going into the world under false colours”, and Reliance Finance acted to its detriment on the assumption that no adverse equitable interest existed (pages 335-336). Even if Mr Gibby had been a solicitor, Gibbs CJ found no proof of a custom of delivering a receipted transfer to a solicitor employed by the purchaser before the price was paid, and said that if a breach of duty must be found it occurred when the vendor delivered the indicia of title (pages 336-338). Mr Alexander’s interest also took priority over Mr Heid’s, because Connell Investments’ registration allowed it to hold out a good title to him, subject to Reliance Finance’s interest, and he acted on that (page 338).
Mason and Deane JJ said that it is difficult, if not impossible, to accommodate all cases of postponement of an equity under the umbrella of estoppel, noting that the operative representation is usually made by the third party and is neither made nor authorised by the holder of the first equity (pages 340-341). They preferred “a more general and flexible principle that preference should be given to what is the better equity in an examination of the relevant circumstances”. It will always be necessary to characterise the conduct of the holder of the earlier interest in order to decide “whether, in all the circumstances, that conduct is such that, in fairness and in justice, the earlier interest should be postponed to the later interest” (pages 341-342).
They said that it may be that an equitable interest will not be postponed merely because there is a causal nexus between an act or omission of the prior equitable owner and the later owner’s assumption that the earlier equity did not exist, and that fairness and justice demand primary concern with acts during which it is reasonably foreseeable that a later equitable interest will be created and that its holder will assume the earlier interest does not exist (page 342).
In the ordinary case, delivering title documents to the vendor’s own solicitor does not make deceptive use a reasonably foreseeable consequence, but here the transfer acknowledged receipt of money that had not been paid and was left with an employee of the purchaser’s group; the risk of deception was reasonably foreseeable, the conduct was a natural consequence of Mr Heid’s positive act, and there was negligence, so that the lenders had the better equities (pages 343-345).
Murphy J held that the issue was between competing unregistered interests under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW). Mr Heid had signed an untrue acknowledgement of receipt of the price and handed it, with the certificate of title, to a person he believed to be a solicitor. Murphy J said that it made no difference whether the recipient was a solicitor or was employed by the purchaser, that the rule should not be confined to natural consequences or to negligence, and that a party who makes an untrue statement must, as between himself and an innocent third party, bear the resulting loss (pages 346-347).
Gibbs CJ said that Mr Heid’s failure to lodge a caveat for his lien was not in itself fatal to his case, although a prompt caveat would have given the lenders notice (page 338). Mason and Deane JJ said that the mere failure of the holder of a prior equitable interest in land to lodge a caveat does not in itself involve the loss of the priority that time of creation would otherwise give, even if the later holder searched the register and found no caveat, and that it is “just one of the circumstances to be considered” (page 342).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Separate reasoning · Gibbs CJ (Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: pp 335–338 (opens in a new tab)
Gibbs CJ treats the case as falling within the principle in Rimmer v Webster and Abigail v Lapin, or alternatively as one of estoppel, and holds that no direct representation to the later lender is needed because the vendor armed the purchaser to go into the world under false colours; he then holds that the vendor was imprudent and that, even if a breach of duty must be found, it occurred when the indicia of title were delivered (pages 335-338). Wilson J agrees with his reasons and conclusion (page 348). It concurs in the order but is a different route from the joint reasons and from Murphy J.
Separate reasoning · Mason and Deane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: pp 341–342 (opens in a new tab), pp 342–345 (opens in a new tab)
Mason and Deane JJ say it is difficult to accommodate all cases of postponement under estoppel, prefer the general better-equity principle and its fairness-and-justice question, caution that a causal nexus alone may not suffice and that attention is primarily on acts whose consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and then apply that to the vendor’s conduct, finding negligence (pages 341-345). They concur in the order by their own route; it is not the reasoning of Gibbs CJ or Murphy J.
Separate reasoning · Murphy J
Read judgment: pp 346–347 (opens in a new tab)
Murphy J says it makes no difference whether the vendor reasonably believed the recipient was a solicitor, that the rule should not be confined to natural consequences or to negligence, and that a party who makes an untrue statement must bear the loss as between himself and an innocent third party (pages 346-347). He concurs in the order; the route is his own.
Proposition 2
Obiter · Gibbs CJ (Wilson J agreeing)
Read judgment: p 338 (opens in a new tab)
Gibbs CJ introduces the comment by saying that in reaching his conclusions it is unnecessary to rely on the vendor’s failure to act when the erroneous deposit notes arrived, and says that the failure to lodge a caveat was not in itself fatal (page 338). His reasons for the result rest on the vendor having armed the purchaser, so the caveat observation is not necessary to that ground.
Classification unresolved · Mason and Deane JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: p 342 (opens in a new tab)
The statement that failure to caveat does not in itself lose priority and is one circumstance qualifies how the better-equity question is answered, and the later application lists the absence of steps such as lodging a caveat among the vendor’s conduct (page 345). The result is reached on foreseeability and negligence, so a binary ratio or obiter label would conceal that the statement is part of the stated principle but not itself the ground on which the vendor lost.
Why does this case matter?
Priority problems tempt students to apply one maxim and stop. Examiners reward an answer that sets out the order in which the interests arose and what each holder did or failed to do before deciding what the outcome should be, and that is clear about whose formulation of the test it is using.
Exam and application relevance
When two equitable interests in land compete, set out the sequence of events: when each interest arose, what the earlier holder did with the title documents, what any later holder knew or could have found out, and whether and when a caveat was lodged.
Then apply the reasoning of the Justice whose approach you adopt, and name the Justice and the pages: Gibbs CJ (pages 335-338), Mason and Deane JJ (pages 339-345) or Murphy J (pages 346-347). Say what the facts show about caveats and apply what Gibbs CJ (page 338) and Mason and Deane JJ (page 342) said about them.
Check your understanding
1. What did Mr Heid sign and leave with Mr Gibby, and why did the lenders rely on it (pages 331-332)?
2. How did Mason and Deane JJ treat estoppel as the basis for postponing the earlier interest, and what approach did they adopt (pages 340-342)?
3. What did Gibbs CJ and Mason and Deane JJ each say about Mr Heid’s failure to lodge a caveat for his lien (pages 338, 342)?