Postponing an earlier equitable interest: Heid v Reliance Finance

How a later equitable holder can displace the first-in-time rule: the High Court’s decision in Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation, where an unpaid vendor’s lien was postponed to later equitable mortgages, and the three ways the Justices explained postponement (estoppel by arming, the better equity, and risk).

Learning level
Intermediate
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw
Subjects
equity-and-trusts
Topics
equitable-assignment-and-priorities

Learning outcomes

  • State the first-in-time rule for competing equitable interests and the circumstances in Heid v Reliance Finance in which the High Court held the earlier interest was postponed.
  • Distinguish the explanations given by Gibbs CJ (estoppel by arming), Mason and Deane JJ (the better equity in all the circumstances) and Murphy J, and attribute each proposition to the right Justices.
  • Apply the postponement analysis to a priority dispute, treating a failure to lodge a caveat as one circumstance and not a rule, and stating where the Justices’ reasons differ, including on delivery of the documents to a solicitor.

When two equitable interests in the same property compete, the interest created first usually prevails. Before applying that rule, a student must ask whether the conduct of the earlier holder makes it unfair that the earlier holder should keep priority over a later holder who acquired an interest innocently and for value. The High Court answered that question in Heid v Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 326, a New South Wales case in which an unpaid vendor’s lien was postponed to two later equitable mortgages. This article states the facts, the test the Justices applied and the different ways they explained it. It builds on the general priority rules in Assignment and priorities. It does not state the Torrens legislation of any State, and it states the law as the case decided it, without any later treatment.

The facts

The appellant, Mr Heid, was the registered proprietor of land at Glenhaven. In May 1977 he agreed orally to sell it to Connell Investments Pty Ltd, one of a group of companies controlled by Newman, McKay & Co, a firm of mortgage brokers, for $165,000. The price was to be paid as $15,000 in cash, $100,000 to be deposited on call with another company in the group, and $50,000 secured by a mortgage over the land (Gibbs CJ at 331).1 The firm’s principal introduced Peter Gibby as the “company solicitor”, who could act for both sides. Gibby was not a solicitor but an unqualified employee of the firm (at 331).

Mr Heid signed and left with Gibby a contract of sale and a memorandum of transfer. The transfer acknowledged receipt of the whole price, and he also authorised the bank to hand Gibby the certificate of title (at 331). The $100,000 was never deposited, and it was not disputed that he had a vendor’s lien for that sum (at 331).

Mr McKay used the documents to raise money. On 10 June 1977 Reliance Finance Corporation Pty Ltd advanced $80,000 to Connell Investments under a mortgage. Its solicitor was given the certificate of title and the transfer, and handed over the money in reliance on the acknowledgement of receipt of the purchase money and on the transfer being regular on its face (at 331-332). Reliance Finance lodged the transfer for registration and a caveat on 22 June, and the transfer was registered on 30 June. Mr Alexander then advanced $40,000 on a mortgage executed on 4 July and lodged a caveat. Neither mortgage was registered. Mr Heid lodged no caveat until 23 September 1977, and neither lender knew of his claim when it made its advance (at 332).

At first instance Kearney J ranked the vendor’s lien ahead of the two mortgages. The Court of Appeal of New South Wales varied that order and held that the lien was postponed to the interests of Reliance Finance and Mr Alexander (at 332-333). The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs (Gibbs CJ at 338; order). Gibbs CJ held that Mr Alexander, who had not seen the transfer, stood in the same position, because the Court of Appeal had held that registration of the transfer allowed Connell Investments to hold out to him that, subject to Reliance Finance’s interest, it had a good title, and that he acted on that representation; that finding was not attacked (at 338).

The starting point and the exception

Gibbs CJ began from a passage in Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265 at 276, which his Honour quoted: where the merits of two equitable interests are equal, priority in time of creation gives the better equity, but where they are unequal, “as for instance where conduct on the part of the owner of the earlier interest has led the other to acquire his interest on the supposition that the earlier did not exist”, the maxim may be displaced and priority given to the later interest (at 333). Mason and Deane JJ stated the same principle (at 339). In the case, the earlier interest was Mr Heid’s, and the question was whether his conduct in handing Gibby a completed transfer acknowledging payment, with the certificate of title, so that Connell Investments could present itself as having a title free of outstanding equitable interests, gave Reliance Finance the better equity (Gibbs CJ at 333).

Three explanations of the result

All the Justices who gave reasons reached the same result. They did not explain it in the same way.

Gibbs CJ (Wilson J agreeing) treated the case as falling within the line of decisions in which an owner who arms another with the apparent ownership and the means of disposing of property is estopped against a person who deals with that other in good faith and for value (at 333-336). His Honour held that no direct representation to the lender was needed, because delivering the documents armed Connell Investments “with the power of going into the world under false colours” (at 335-336). The appellant had enabled the representation that Connell Investments held an absolute interest, and Reliance Finance acted to its detriment on the assumption that no adverse equitable interest existed (at 335-336). Gibbs CJ said that the vendor’s failure to lodge a caveat was “not in itself fatal to his case”, but that a prompt caveat would have been a means of giving notice to the lenders (at 338). Wilson J agreed with the Chief Justice’s reasons (at 348).

Mason and Deane JJ declined to rest postponement exclusively on estoppel, because it is “difficult, if not impossible” to accommodate all the cases of postponement under that doctrine, in particular because the operative representation is usually made by the third party and not by the holder of the first equity (at 340-341). They preferred “a more general and flexible principle that preference should be given to what is the better equity in an examination of the relevant circumstances”. It is necessary to characterise the conduct of the earlier holder “to determine whether, in all the circumstances, that conduct is such that, in fairness and in justice, the earlier interest should be postponed to the later interest” (at 341-342). Their Honours added that a causal link between an act or omission of the earlier holder and the later holder’s assumption that the earlier interest did not exist may not be enough by itself. Fairness and justice require attention to acts during which it is reasonably foreseeable that a later equitable interest will be created and that its holder will assume the earlier interest does not exist (at 342).

Applying that test, they identified two features of the appellant’s conduct: the transfer he signed acknowledged receipt of money that was unpaid and that lay at the heart of his lien, and he left the signed transfer and the authority to collect the certificate of title with Gibby, whom he believed to be a solicitor but who was in fact an employee of a group of which the purchaser was a member (at 343-344). They held that the risk of the deception that occurred was reasonably foreseeable and that it was the natural consequence of his positive act, concluding that he had been negligent and that the lenders had the better equities (at 344-345).

Murphy J put the matter in terms of risk. Signing an untrue acknowledgement of receipt on a transfer created “a dangerous instrument”, and as between the vendor and innocent third parties who acted without negligence, the vendor should bear the loss (at 347). He would not confine the rule to natural consequences or to negligence (at 346-347).

The caveat and the ordinary solicitor

Two qualifications in the reasons matter for the next problem. First, a failure to lodge a caveat does not by itself cost an earlier equitable holder its priority. Mason and Deane JJ said that it “is just one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether it is inequitable that the prior equitable owner should retain his priority”, even if the later holder searched the register and found no caveat (at 342). Secondly, the reasons differ on the independent solicitor. Gibbs CJ found it unnecessary to decide whether the principle applies when the documents are delivered to a solicitor in conformity with ordinary conveyancing practice (at 336-338). Mason and Deane JJ agreed with the Court of Appeal that in the ordinary case the risk of deceptive use by the vendor’s own solicitor is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of entrusting the documents (at 344). Murphy J said that it made no difference whether the appellant reasonably believed the recipient to be a solicitor, whether the recipient was a solicitor, or whether the recipient acted for or was employed by the purchaser (at 346). Delivery to an employee of the purchaser’s group was material to the reasoning of Gibbs CJ and of Mason and Deane JJ, alongside the receipted transfer and the lenders’ reliance; Murphy J took a broader approach.

What the case does not decide

The case is authority for the result on its facts, and for the approaches the Justices took. It does not establish one reason for postponement that a majority of the Court adopted. A proposition about “the better equity” should be attributed to Mason and Deane JJ, and a proposition about estoppel by arming to Gibbs CJ, with Wilson J agreeing. The case concerned unregistered equitable interests in land in New South Wales, and Murphy J described the competition as one between unregistered interests under the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) (at 346). The statutory rules on caveats and priority in each State are not stated here.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Classify each competing interest as legal or equitable (or a mere equity), and date its creation.
  2. Start with the rule that, where the merits are equal, the earlier equitable interest prevails.
  3. Look for conduct of the earlier holder that put another in a position to represent that no earlier interest existed: a signed transfer acknowledging payment that has not been made, title documents, or a failure to take a protective step.
  4. Ask whether the later holder gave value, lacked notice and acted on the assumption that the earlier interest did not exist.
  5. Ask whether, in all the circumstances, it would be unfair for the earlier holder to keep priority (Mason and Deane JJ), and separately whether the earlier holder is estopped (Gibbs CJ). On facts like Heid, the approaches led to the same result.
  6. Treat a missing caveat as one circumstance and not as a rule that priority is lost.
  7. State the authority accurately: the Justices agreed on the result and differed in their reasons, and the case concerned New South Wales unregistered interests.

Self-check

  • Have I applied the first-in-time rule before looking for postponing conduct?
  • Have I identified which Justice’s reasons support each proposition, and said that Wilson J agreed with Gibbs CJ?
  • Have I treated the failure to caveat as one circumstance and not as decisive?
  • Have I avoided presenting the better-equity test as the single reasoning of a majority?

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