Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 109 CLR 9
A man signs a deed giving his wife the interest on a loan he has made and the dividends on some shares. Neither has been earned or declared when he signs. Whose income is it when it arrives?
What happened?
Mr Norman assigned by deed to his wife future dividends and interest from his investments, as a gift, before either had arisen. The Commissioner still taxed both sums as his income. The appeal asked whether the judge could or must hold either sum wasn’t the taxpayer’s assessable income. Consider: does a gift of something not yet existing actually transfer it?
What did the Court decide?
The Court answered the question stated so that the judge hearing the taxpayer’s appeal would, on the facts stated, be neither bound nor at liberty to hold that either sum was not the taxpayer’s assessable income for the year ended 30 June 1958. Costs of the case stated were reserved for the judge disposing of the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Three Justices (Dixon CJ, Menzies J, Owen J) held future interest was a mere expectancy. A gift by deed, without consideration, could not transfer it. McTiernan and Windeyer JJ disagreed, finding an existing chose in action validly assigned. On dividends, all five Justices agreed: not the taxpayer’s income.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · Dixon CJ
Read judgment: p 16 (opens in a new tab)
Dixon CJ’s reasons on the future interest: an expectancy that could not be divested by gift. The reasoning turns on the interest on a loan under which the sum had not arisen at the date of the deed.
Ratio · Menzies J (Owen J agreeing)
Read judgment: pp 21–22 (opens in a new tab)
Paragraph 7 of Menzies J’s reasons: interest that may accrue on an existing loan repayable without notice is a right to come into existence, and a deed lacking consideration did not carry it. Owen J agreed with Menzies J, so the majority on the interest is three Justices.
Separate reasoning · Windeyer J
Read judgment: p 38 (opens in a new tab)
Windeyer J dissents on the interest and concurs on the dividends. He treats the contract debt for interest as a presently existing chose in action, which the deed could assign, so his answer ‘Yes’ on the 450 pounds follows a distinct route.
Obiter · Windeyer J
Read judgment: pp 24–25 (opens in a new tab)
Windeyer J’s general statement of the equitable rule for assignments for value of future property. He says the for-value cases are ‘really beside the point’ because the deed was a gift, so the statement was not needed for the answer.
Why does this case matter?
Checking deed validity misses the real question. Ask what the donor still held at the deed’s date, and what the income depended on.
Exam and application relevance
For income-assignment questions, check each sum’s accrual date, the deed’s date, and any consideration given. Dividends raise a separate question under s 44. The interest question split the Court three-two; identify the split and each side’s reasoning. Section 260 wasn’t argued, so no answer exists under it.
Check your understanding
1. Which three Justices answered that the unaccrued interest could not be transferred to the wife, and which two would have answered the question on the interest “Yes”?
2. What did Dixon CJ say the structure of s 44 made impossible for future undeclared dividends?