Proportionate liability and concurrent wrongdoers in New South Wales
Proportionate liability under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): which claims are apportionable, who is a concurrent wrongdoer (Hunt & Hunt), and when a defendant liable for a non-delegable duty cannot apportion (Pafburn).
Learning outcomes
- Decide whether a New South Wales claim is an apportionable claim under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), and whether an exclusion applies.
- Identify the damage or loss that is the subject of a claim and decide whether another person is a concurrent wrongdoer, attributing the Hunt & Hunt majority and dissent correctly.
- Explain why a defendant liable for a non-delegable duty may be unable to apportion liability, and state the limits of Pafburn.
This article states New South Wales law only: Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), as it stood on the compilation read.1 The High Court recorded in 2013 that the other States and Territories also adopted proportionate liability provisions, but the current provisions of those jurisdictions are not stated here, and nothing in this article should be assumed to hold for them.2 The prior question is whether the claim is one to which Part 4 applies at all: if it is, a defendant who shows that another person also caused the same loss may be liable for only a part of it.
What Part 4 changes
At common law a negligent defendant can be treated as the effective cause and bear the whole loss, with a right to seek contribution from other wrongdoers; the risk that those others cannot pay lies with the defendant sued. The joint reasons in Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 10 described Part 4 as a departure from that regime, because under proportionate liability the risk that another wrongdoer cannot pay shifts to the plaintiff.2 Section 35(1) is the central provision. In proceedings involving an apportionable claim, the liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer is limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of the damage or loss claimed that the court considers just, having regard to the extent of the defendant’s responsibility, and the court may give judgment for no more than that amount.1
Which claims and which wrongdoers
An apportionable claim is, under s 34(1)(a), a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, arising from a failure to take reasonable care, but not a claim arising out of personal injury. Section 34(1)(b) adds claims for economic loss or property damage for a contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (NSW), which concerns misleading or deceptive conduct, or of the former s 42 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW). Section 34(1A) provides for a single apportionable claim in proceedings concerning the same loss or damage, even where that loss or damage is claimed on more than one cause of action, and s 34(3) limits apportionable claims to those in s 34(1). Section 34(3A) takes out claims for breach of the statutory warranty under Part 2C of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) brought by a person with the benefit of the warranty.1
A concurrent wrongdoer is one of two or more persons whose acts or omissions “caused, independently of each other or jointly, the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim” (s 34(2)). It does not matter that a concurrent wrongdoer is insolvent, has ceased to exist or has died (s 34(4)), and s 35(4) applies whether or not all concurrent wrongdoers are parties.1
Section 34A removes the benefit of apportionment from an “excluded concurrent wrongdoer”: one who intended to cause the loss, caused it fraudulently, or whose civil liability is of a kind excluded from Part 4 by s 3B. The liability of any other concurrent wrongdoer is determined under Part 4 (s 34A(3)). The list in s 3B(2) of provisions that still apply to motor accidents does not mention Part 4.1
Who counts as a concurrent wrongdoer: Hunt & Hunt
Mitchell Morgan lent money on the security of a mortgage over land, and Hunt & Hunt, its solicitors, drew the mortgage and the loan agreement. Mr Caradonna had forged Mr Vella’s signature on the loan documents. On the primary judge’s findings the loan agreement was void and the mortgage, which secured the debt only by reference to that agreement, secured nothing. Hunt & Hunt’s negligence in drafting the mortgage was not in issue on the appeal, and the fraudsters were bankrupt.2 The question was whether the fraudsters were concurrent wrongdoers with Hunt & Hunt, so that its liability was limited.
The joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ held that they were. Their reasoning can be put as the two questions s 34(2) poses. First, what is the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim? The joint reasons distinguished “damage” from “damages”, the sum awarded, and identified Mitchell Morgan’s harm as its inability to recover the money advanced, not the immediate effects of the negligence and the fraud, such as the inefficacy of the security. Second, did the acts or omissions of another person also cause that damage? The joint reasons said there is no requirement in Part 4 that one wrongdoer contribute to the other’s wrongful acts, and held that the fraudsters’ conduct materially contributed to the inability to recover.2 They also said that deciding whether the defendant is a concurrent wrongdoer is a different step from deciding the proportion, which involves value judgments that “differ from, and are more extensive than” those in causation. The primary judge’s limit of 12.5 per cent of the loss was restored.
Bell and Gageler JJ dissented in joint reasons. They would have required that the other person be, or have been, legally liable to the plaintiff for the same harm, and would have identified the harm from Hunt & Hunt’s breach as the lack of security, which the fraudsters did not cause. On that view Hunt & Hunt was not a concurrent wrongdoer.2 The majority’s reasons bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. The dissent is not binding authority, but it shows where the contest lies where a defendant’s duty was to protect the plaintiff from another person’s wrong. No later decision applying or qualifying Hunt & Hunt is cited here.
When a defendant cannot use Part 4: Pafburn
Part 4 interacts with other provisions of the Act. Section 5Q provides that the extent of liability in tort for breach of a non-delegable duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken by a person to whom work was delegated or entrusted is determined as if the liability were the vicarious liability of the defendant for that person’s negligence. Section 39(a) provides that nothing in Part 4 prevents a person being held vicariously liable for a proportion of an apportionable claim for which another is liable.1
In Pafburn Pty Limited v The Owners - Strata Plan No 84674 [2024] HCA 49 an owners corporation sued a developer and a head contractor exclusively under s 37 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW), a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid economic loss caused by defects, which s 39 of that Act says the person is not entitled to delegate. The defendants pleaded that the claim was apportionable and named others, including a subcontractor, an architect, a certifier and the council, as concurrent wrongdoers. The Court of Appeal struck those paragraphs out, and the High Court dismissed the appeal.3
The joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ treated the s 37 duty as a non-delegable duty of the kind s 5Q contemplates. The consequence was that the defendants were to be treated as vicariously liable for those to whom they delegated or entrusted the work, so that “there can be no apportionment of liability” between them and those persons, and, under s 39(a), their proportion of liability for those persons’ failures to take care is 100 per cent. The reasoning was tied to a claim about the whole building and to the scope of the duty on the construction work each defendant carried out. The joint reasons also said that the defendants would be liable only to the extent that their own breaches caused the loss, and that ss 37(1) and 39 of that Act do not prevent them from cross-claiming against others who they allege breached a duty of care owed to them.3 Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ dissented in joint reasons: they held that s 5Q does not apply to the s 37 duty and that a claim under s 37 is an apportionable claim, and would have allowed the appeal in part.3 The majority reasons bind lower Australian courts on that duty; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Pafburn concerned the s 37 duty and was decided on a challenge to a pleading, so it is not authority that Part 4 is unavailable to every defendant who owes a non-delegable duty. How far the reasoning reaches beyond a claim about the whole of a building, against defendants who delegated or entrusted the work, the decision does not say.
A single judge of the Supreme Court has since taken the exclusion further for s 37 claims, on different reasoning. In Kapila v Monument Building Group Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1306 Richmond J accepted that it was arguable, on the Pafburn majority’s reasoning, that Part 4 is displaced only where work was delegated or entrusted. He held, however, that the broader reasoning of the Court of Appeal below, that s 39 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) takes the s 37 duty outside Part 4 without any question whether the others were delegates, was part of the ratio of that decision and binding on him, so the defendant sued under s 37 had no apportionable claim at all. His Honour also held that a contractual claim merely replicating the statutory warranty in s 18B(1)(a) of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) is excluded by s 34(3A). That is a decision at first instance: it does not bind the Court of Appeal or the High Court, and it does not qualify what the High Court held.4
Applying this in a problem question
- State that New South Wales law is being applied, and check whether s 3B excludes the civil liability in question.
- Ask whether the claim is an apportionable claim, taking the two paragraphs of s 34(1) separately: the exclusion of claims arising out of personal injury is in s 34(1)(a) and does not appear in s 34(1)(b). Then check s 34(3A) and the excluded concurrent wrongdoers in s 34A.
- Identify the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim, as the Hunt & Hunt joint reasons did: the harm, not the damages. Then ask whether another person’s acts or omissions also caused it. If the defendant’s duty was to protect the plaintiff from another person’s wrong, note that Bell and Gageler JJ dissented on this point in Hunt & Hunt; the majority’s reasons bind lower Australian courts.
- Ask whether the defendant’s liability is for a non-delegable duty or is vicarious. If so, consider s 5Q and s 39(a), and use Pafburn only for a claim of the kind decided there.
- If the defendant is a concurrent wrongdoer, apply s 35(1): the court excludes the proportion for which the plaintiff is contributorily negligent and may consider non-party wrongdoers (s 35(3)). Under s 36, a defendant against whom judgment is given under Part 4 cannot be required to contribute to damages or contribution recovered from another concurrent wrongdoer in respect of that apportionable claim, or to indemnify that wrongdoer.
Self-check
- Have I confined the answer to New South Wales and said that the other jurisdictions are not covered?
- Have I distinguished the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim from the damages?
- Have I attributed the Hunt & Hunt and Pafburn reasoning to the majority and dissent correctly?