Contributory negligence and apportionment
How contributory negligence is assessed and apportioned: the standard applied to a plaintiff, what the plaintiff is taken to have known, the comparison of culpability and causal importance, the 100 per cent reduction power, and the intoxication provisions of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland.
Learning outcomes
- State the standard applied to a plaintiff in contributory negligence in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and attribute the common law account in Joslyn v Berryman to the Justice who gave it.
- Explain how a court apportions responsibility between plaintiff and defendant, and why a percentage reached in another case is not a rule.
- Distinguish a reduction of damages from the 100 per cent reduction power, and compare the New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian provisions on intoxicated plaintiffs.
Contributory negligence is the argument that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for their own safety and so shares responsibility for the harm. Under the apportionment provisions of New South Wales and Victoria, a successful argument does not by itself defeat the claim: damages are reduced to the extent the court thinks just and equitable, and a reduction of 100 per cent is a separate power. This article states the standard applied to a plaintiff, what a plaintiff is taken to have known, how a court apportions, the 100 per cent power and the intoxication provisions, for New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. The other States and Territories are not stated here and may differ. Voluntary assumption of risk, obvious risk, illegality and the intentional torts are left to the overview article on tort defences.
The standard applied to the plaintiff
At common law, McHugh J said in Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552 that a plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence “when the plaintiff exposes himself or herself to a risk of injury which might reasonably have been foreseen and avoided and suffers an injury within the class of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed” ([16]). His Honour added that “[t]he test of contributory negligence is an objective one” ([32]), that a plaintiff is held to the standard of an ordinary reasonable person engaging in the conduct that caused the injury ([35]), and that one exception is a child, judged against an ordinary child of the same age ([35]). These are McHugh J’s reasons alone. Gummow and Callinan JJ (jointly), Kirby J and Hayne J each wrote separately.1
The civil liability Acts now state the standard. In each of New South Wales (Civil Liability Act 2002, s 5R), Victoria (Wrongs Act 1958, s 62) and Queensland (Civil Liability Act 2003, s 23), the principles that apply in deciding whether a person has been negligent also apply in deciding whether the person who suffered harm was contributorily negligent in failing to take precautions against the risk of that harm. The standard is “that of a reasonable person in the position of that person”, decided on what that person “knew or ought to have known at the time” (Queensland: “ought reasonably to have known”).356
What the plaintiff is taken to know
In Joslyn, Mr Berryman owned the vehicle, had been drinking until about 4.00 am, and became a passenger when he handed the wheel to Ms Joslyn after she noticed he was dozing ([4], [7], [9]). The accident was at about 8.45 am ([1]). The trial judge reduced his damages by 25 per cent for contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal held there was none, treating the relevant facts as those he observed or ought to have observed when Ms Joslyn took over the driving ([4], [5], [12]). The appeals to the High Court were allowed.1
McHugh J said that the Court of Appeal erred in confining the facts to those observed when Mr Berryman became a passenger ([15]). The relevant facts “include those which a reasonable person could have known by observation, inquiry or otherwise” ([37]), and a passenger’s own intoxication does not excuse a failure to meet the standard of an ordinary, sober reasonable person ([38]-[39]). Gummow and Callinan JJ, applying the statutory test in s 74(2)(b) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW), said that what a person ought to have known “is not comprehended simply by what a person knew or observed at the moment before an accident” ([76]).
Joslyn arose from a 1996 accident under that Act and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) as then in force. The statutory words “knew or ought to have known at the time” were not before the Court, and no decision construing them is relied on here. A student should argue from the statutory words and treat McHugh J’s reasons as one Justice’s account of the common law. Section 74(2)(b) of the 1988 Act, the provision Gummow and Callinan JJ applied, is not the provision for later accidents, and this article does not rely on it. Section 138(2)(b) of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)7 and, in the same terms, s 4.17(2)(b) of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW)8 each require a finding of contributory negligence where an injured voluntary passenger (not being a minor) was aware, or ought to have been aware, that the driver’s ability to drive was impaired as a consequence of the consumption of alcohol or any other drug, unless in the circumstances the passenger could not reasonably be expected to have declined to become a passenger. Section 138 is marked “cf s 74 MAA” and s 4.17 “cf s 138 MACA”. That is legislative succession, with the date of the accident deciding which Act applies, and not judicial disapproval of Joslyn; this article does not say how Joslyn’s reading of s 74 applies to the later sections.
Apportionment
In New South Wales (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965, s 9(1)) and Victoria (Wrongs Act 1958, s 26(1)), where damage results partly from the claimant’s failure to take reasonable care and partly from the wrong of another, the claim is not defeated by the contributory negligence (in Victoria, “except as provided in section 63”), and the damages are reduced “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage”.4 In both Acts a “wrong” is an act or omission that gives rise to tort liability for which a defence of contributory negligence is available at common law, or that amounts to a breach of a contractual duty of care concurrent and co-extensive with a duty of care in tort (New South Wales s 8; Victoria s 25). Queensland’s general apportionment provision is not set out here.
How a court does this is described in Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492; 59 ALR 529, a joint judgment of five Justices on an appeal that arose from a jury’s apportionment in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Apportionment “involves a comparison both of culpability”, meaning the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable person, “and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage”. It is “the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident” that is compared, and how much weight each element carries “will vary from case to case”. A finding on apportionment made by a judge “is not lightly reviewed”.2
Hayne J relied on that description in Joslyn ([157]) and added that “contributory negligence and apportionment are always questions of fact”, so it is wrong “to elevate what was said in past cases about the facts of those cases to any principle of law” ([158]). Kirby J also said that contributory negligence and apportionment are always questions of fact ([100]) and that appellate interference with a trial judge’s assessment is comparatively rare ([84]). On that approach, a percentage from another case is a finding on that case’s facts, not a rule.
A reduction of 100 per cent
New South Wales (s 5S), Victoria (s 63) and Queensland (s 24) each provide that, in deciding the extent of a reduction by reason of contributory negligence, a court “may” determine a reduction of 100 per cent if it thinks (Queensland: considers) it just and equitable, “with the result that the claim for damages is defeated”. The power is discretionary and depends on that evaluation.356
Scope needs checking in each Act.
- New South Wales. Part 1A, which includes ss 5R and 5S, applies to a claim for damages for harm resulting from negligence, in tort, contract, statute or otherwise (s 5A), but not to civil liability excluded by s 3B. Section 3B(1) excludes several classes, including certain motor accident awards, and s 3B(2) applies some provisions to motor accidents, among them Division 8 of Part 1A and s 49 but not s 50. Part 6, which contains s 50, applies to personal injury damages or damage to property, subject to s 3B (s 47).
- Victoria. Sections 62 and 63 are in Part X, which applies to a claim for damages resulting from negligence (s 44) but not to the claims listed in s 45, including certain transport accident and workers compensation claims.
- Queensland. The Act applies to a civil claim for damages for harm (s 4(1)), but not, for personal injury, where the harm is or includes a workers compensation injury (with exceptions), a dust-related condition or a tobacco-related injury (s 5(1), subject to s 5(3)). Sections 23 and 24 apply only to a breach of duty on or after 2 December 2002 (s 4(2)), and Part 4, which contains ss 47-49, to a breach on or after the day the Act received assent (s 4(4)).
Intoxicated plaintiffs
The Acts deal with intoxication differently, so a section from one State cannot be carried to another.
- New South Wales, s 50. Where it is established that the person whose death, injury or damage is the subject of the proceedings (in a personal injury claim, the plaintiff) was intoxicated at the time of the act or omission causing it, to the extent that their capacity to exercise reasonable care and skill was impaired, the court is not to award damages unless satisfied that the harm (or some other injury or damage) is likely to have occurred even if that person had not been intoxicated (s 50(2)). If so satisfied, that person is presumed contributorily negligent unless the court is satisfied that the intoxication did not contribute in any way (s 50(3)). Where the presumption operates, damages are reduced by 25 per cent or a greater percentage the court determines appropriate (s 50(4)). Section 50 does not apply where the court is satisfied that the intoxication was not self-induced (s 50(5)).3
- Queensland, ss 47-49. Where the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the breach and the defendant alleges contributory negligence, it is presumed (s 47(2)). The plaintiff can rebut it only by establishing, on the balance of probabilities, that the intoxication did not contribute to the breach or was not self-induced (s 47(3)). Otherwise the reduction is at least 25 per cent (s 47(4)), and s 47(5) raises the minimum to 50 per cent for certain intoxicated drivers. Sections 48 and 49 add further presumptions and minimum reductions, with their own conditions, where a plaintiff aged at least 16 relied on the care and skill of an intoxicated defendant, and s 48(5) provides that voluntary assumption of risk does not apply to matters within s 48. Those conditions are not set out here.6
- Victoria, s 14G. The Victorian provision is framed differently: in a negligence claim for death or personal injury, in deciding whether the plaintiff has established breach, the court must consider, among other things, whether the plaintiff was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs voluntarily consumed and the level of intoxication, and whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity. It is not framed as a presumption of contributory negligence.5
Applying this in a problem question
- Fix the jurisdiction and check that the Act’s provisions reach the claim (New South Wales ss 5A, 3B and 47; Victoria ss 44-45; Queensland ss 4-5). Some claims, including certain motor accident and workers compensation claims, are excluded in whole or in part and are not covered here.
- Identify the plaintiff’s specific failure to take precautions against the risk of harm, and test it against a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, arguing from the Act’s words (ss 5R, 62, 23). McHugh J’s view in Joslyn that the relevant facts include those a reasonable person could have known by observation, inquiry or otherwise is one Justice’s account of the common law on a 1996 accident, given under earlier provisions.
- Separate the triggers. Where the plaintiff was intoxicated, consider New South Wales s 50 (if the capacity-impairment condition is established), Queensland s 47, or Victorian s 14G (a matter on breach, where the intoxication was voluntarily induced or the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal activity). Where the plaintiff relied on an intoxicated defendant, only Queensland ss 48-49 is stated here, subject to its conditions. Check each section’s exceptions.
- Apportion by comparing the degree of departure from the standard of care and the relative importance of each party’s acts in causing the damage across the whole conduct (Podrebersek, relied on by Hayne J in Joslyn), and give reasons. Do not treat another case’s percentage as a rule, on the approach of Hayne J and Kirby J in Joslyn.
- State whether the result is a reduction or, only if just and equitable, a reduction of 100 per cent (ss 5S, 63, 24).
Self-check
- Have I named the State’s Act, checked its scope, and said the other States are not covered?
- Have I attributed the common law test in Joslyn to McHugh J rather than to the Court?
- Have I treated apportionment as a comparison of culpability and causal importance, without citing a percentage as law?
- Have I kept a reduction of damages separate from the 100 per cent power, and used the right State’s intoxication provision?