Joslyn v Berryman

High Court of Australia · 2003

TortsTort Defences

Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552

A passenger who had been drinking gets into a car with a driver they know is affected. Both are at fault — so how does a court split the loss?

Qualified by legislation: Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 138, from 5 October 1999

Section 138 succeeds s 74 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 for accidents from 5 October 1999 to 30 November 2017. Section 138(2)(b) preserves the relevant passenger-awareness test, including awareness that the driver was impaired or what the passenger ought to have appreciated, the exclusion of injured minors and the exception where the passenger could not reasonably be expected to decline the ride. This is legislative succession for a different accident period, rather than judicial disapproval of Joslyn. The accident periods are confirmed by the NSW Motor Accident Guidelines published on 8 April 2022 (2022 No 139), under Commencement of the Guidelines.

Qualified by legislation: Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) s 4.17, from 1 December 2017

Section 4.17 succeeds s 138 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 for accidents on or after 1 December 2017. Section 4.17(2)(b) preserves the relevant passenger-awareness test, the exclusion of injured minors and the exception where the passenger could not reasonably be expected to decline the ride. Its heading cross-refers to s 138. The qualification concerns the governing legislation and accident period; it does not record the holding as doubted or overturned. The accident periods are confirmed by the NSW Motor Accident Guidelines published on 8 April 2022 (2022 No 139), under Commencement of the Guidelines.

What happened?

Allan Berryman and Sally Joslyn had been drinking at a party until about 4.00am. Berryman drove afterwards, and when Joslyn noticed he was falling asleep at the wheel she insisted on taking over. Shortly after she began driving the vehicle overturned, injuring Berryman. The accident was at about 8.45am. The driving capacity of both was affected by intoxication; the vehicle also had a propensity to roll over and a broken speedometer ([1]).

Berryman was the passenger when he was injured, and he sued the driver and the Wentworth Shire Council, alleging that the Council had failed to provide proper warning signs ([4]). What is unusual is only how he came to be a passenger: he had been driving himself minutes earlier, after the same night’s drinking, and handed over the wheel ([7]).

The trial judge found both defendants negligent, held Joslyn 90 per cent and the Council 10 per cent responsible, and reduced Berryman’s damages by 25 per cent for his contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed Berryman’s appeal and held that he was not guilty of contributory negligence ([4]-[5]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeals were allowed. In each matter the Court set aside paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the order of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales made on 11 April 2001, remitted the matter to that Court “for determination of the issues not so far dealt with and the cross-appeal regarding the assessment of the contributory negligence of the first respondent”, and ordered the first respondent, Berryman, to pay the costs of the appeal to this Court.

The question the appeals turned on was whether Berryman was guilty of contributory negligence, which the trial judge had found and the Court of Appeal had set aside ([5]). There were four sets of reasons: McHugh J ([1]-[50]), Gummow and Callinan JJ jointly ([51]-[79]), Kirby J ([80]-[152]) and Hayne J ([153]-[159]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Section 74(2)(b) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) requires a finding of contributory negligence where an injured voluntary passenger who is not a minor was aware, or ought to have been aware, that the driver’s ability to drive was impaired by alcohol or another drug. The test is objective, so actual knowledge need not be shown, and what the passenger ought to have appreciated may be judged on facts and circumstances occurring before they entered the vehicle.

The case runs on statute, not on general principle. Section 74(2) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) requires a finding of contributory negligence where an injured person was a voluntary passenger and “was aware, or ought to have been aware” that the driver’s ability was impaired by alcohol; s 74(6) takes a person outside “voluntary passenger” where they “could not reasonably be expected to have declined to become a passenger”. Otherwise s 74 leaves the common law rules alone ([1]).

Two things follow, and the first is the one commonly got wrong. Actual knowledge is not required. “The test of contributory negligence is an objective one” ([32]), and the statutory limb is satisfied by what the passenger ought to have been aware of. And in deciding that, a court may have regard to facts and circumstances occurring before the passenger entered the vehicle. What a person ought to have known “is not comprehended simply by what a person knew or observed at the moment before an accident, or at the moment at which that person became a passenger” ([76]); the statutory question “invited attention to wider considerations ... not just observations which it was open to the injured person to make at the time of handing over control” ([156]).

Here those wider considerations were an evening’s drinking that ended at 4.00am. What Joslyn looked like at the handover was not irrelevant, but on Kirby J’s view it “could not in the circumstances enjoy the factual significance which the Court of Appeal assigned” to it ([145]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gummow and Callinan JJ

Read judgment: [69]–[70] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [76]–[77] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons apply the mandatory statutory test to Berryman and measure his awareness objectively. Their conclusion that the Court of Appeal had wrongly confined its inquiry to appearances at the handover depended on considering the earlier drinking and its continuing effects. This reasoning was necessary to their ground for allowing the appeals: actual awareness was unnecessary, and the inquiry extended to what the passenger ought to have known from the preceding events. The classification concerns this statutory reasoning, not every observation in the joint judgment.

Why does this case matter?

Take the principle from it, but not the percentages. The judgment settles points of law — McHugh J works through common-law contributory negligence as well as the statutory limb — and Hayne J is equally explicit about what cannot be carried away: “contributory negligence and apportionment are always questions of fact. It is, therefore, wrong to elevate what was said in past cases about the facts of those cases to any principle of law”, and wrong in particular to deduce general rules for drunk-driver-and-passenger cases from decisions reached “in a different legal context”, since “[e]ach case turns on its own special facts” ([158]). A student who arrives with a remembered figure has taken the one thing his Honour said could not be taken.

The other lesson is about who decides. Nobody showed that the primary judge’s findings were wrong; the Court of Appeal put a different and narrower question in their place and then treated it as one he had failed to address ([156]), deciding it on how Ms Joslyn “momentarily appeared to others after the accident” ([77]). Gummow and Callinan JJ treat that reframing as an error of law in its own right and not merely as a wrong answer ([73]), which is why the appeals succeeded without anyone showing the primary judge’s findings were wrong. Reading any appellate judgment on contributory negligence, check first whether the question being answered is the one the statute asks.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the governing provision before the principle, and date it: the date of the accident decides which of three New South Wales schemes applies. This case concerned s 74 of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (a 1996 accident). Later accidents fall under s 138 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) for accidents from 5 October 1999 to 30 November 2017, or s 4.17 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) for accidents on or after 1 December 2017. Each may compel a finding the common law would only permit, and each carries the same escape for a passenger who could not reasonably have been expected to decline the ride, so say whether the facts raise it.

Then decide what you must establish about the passenger’s awareness, by whose standard, and over what period, and set out the evidence you would gather for it. Say what the passenger did and did not know, and what the circumstances before the handover show. Where you are outside the statute and back at common law, resist quoting percentages from other cases: on Hayne J’s approach they are findings of fact, not authority.

Check your understanding

Suppose a passenger genuinely never turned his mind to whether the driver was fit to drive, and nothing in the evidence shows that he did. Why would that not help him under s 74(2)(b)?