Kapila v Monument Building Group Pty Ltd

Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2025

TortsCivil Liability StatutesTort Defences

Kapila v Monument Building Group Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 1306

A homeowner sues her builder and its director over leaking basement walls. The director blames the engineers, designers and certifier she herself chose and says he owes only his own share. How does a trial judge deal with that argument?

What happened?

Dr Kapila owned a terrace house in Paddington. In a building contract dated 23 August 2015, in the standard form published by NSW Fair Trading, she engaged Monument Building Group Pty Ltd (MBG) as builder for additions and alterations ([1]). Mr Miles Brujic was MBG’s sole director and, at all relevant times, the nominated supervisor under its contractor licence ([1]).

She sued MBG for breach of the contract and sued Mr Brujic alone for breach of the duty of care in s 37 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) ([2], [8]). She did not press a s 37 claim against MBG or her claim in negligence ([7], [11]). Seven defects were pleaded, and she did not press the electrical work ([3]-[4]). The central complaint was that MBG installed no approved waterproof membrane to the new retaining walls on the garage level, using Xypex, a concrete additive, in its place ([188]-[189]).

The defendants pleaded two further defences. The first was that the claims against them were apportionable claims under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) for the water ingress to the garage level, naming as concurrent wrongdoers the principal certifying authority, the firm that prepared the engineering drawings, the firm that prepared the architectural drawings and a further consultant that prepared engineering drawings, all of whom the plaintiff rather than MBG had appointed ([14]). The second was that Mr Brujic’s liability should be reduced for the plaintiff’s contributory negligence ([15]-[16]).

What did the Court decide?

Richmond J delivered judgment on 5 November 2025. He found that MBG was in breach of the contract, and that Mr Brujic was in breach of the s 37 duty, in respect of the items numbered 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7 in the Scott Schedule, but not in respect of item 6.8, the walls on the living room level ([224], [237]-[238], [284]). He held the plaintiff entitled to damages in the amount claimed for those items ([288]). He said he would hear the parties on costs and directed them to bring in short minutes of order to give effect to his reasons, with liberty to apply ([289]-[290]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Richmond J, sitting alone in the Equity Division, held that Mr Brujic, who was sued under s 37 of the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) (the DBPA), did not have an apportionable claim under Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the CLA) ([255]). The defendants argued that the High Court’s decision in Pafburn Pty Limited v The Owners - Strata Plan No 84674 [2024] HCA 49 (Pafburn HCA) was distinguishable because the persons they named as concurrent wrongdoers were not sub-contractors of the defendants ([241]).

Richmond J accepted that it was arguable, on the reasoning of the High Court majority, that only a claim involving the delegation or entrusting of work falls outside Part 4, and that the opposite construction would leave s 41(3) of the DBPA with nothing to do ([247]-[248]). He held, however, that while that argument was open on the majority’s reasoning, it was “inconsistent with the reasoning in Pafburn CA which was not disapproved by the majority in Pafburn HCA” ([249]), Pafburn CA being the Court of Appeal’s decision in The Owners - Strata Plan No 84674 v Pafburn Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 301 in the same litigation.

He read the reasons of Basten JA, with whom he recorded that Ward P agreed, as taking a necessary step that it does not matter whether a putative concurrent wrongdoer is a delegate, and he treated Basten JA’s description of his construction of Part 4 as a “sufficient basis” for allowing the appeal as a distinct basis from the one that depended on s 5Q of the CLA ([250]-[252]). He concluded that “the reasoning in Pafburn CA in support of the conclusion that Part 4 does not apply to a claim under s 37 of the DBPA is part of the ratio of that decision and is binding on me” ([253]).

He noted, as Adamson JA had in Pafburn CA at [14], that a person subject to a s 37 claim is not left without a remedy because that person can cross-claim against concurrent wrongdoers, and that no cross-claim had been brought in this case ([254]).

As to MBG, Richmond J held that the defence of an apportionable claim was not precluded by Pafburn CA, and he noted that the only claim against MBG about ingress of water to the garage level was for breach of the Contract ([256]). The only part of that claim that arose from a failure to take reasonable care was the claim for breach of cl 9(a), which required the work to be done with due care and skill and in accordance with the plans and specifications ([257]).

Cl 9(a) was a clause that, in his words, “merely replicates the statutory warranty in s 18B(1)(a) of the HBA”, the HBA being the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW), so he held that the claim for its breach was properly regarded as a claim for damages arising from breach of a statutory warranty under Part 2C of that Act brought by a person having its benefit, and so was not an apportionable claim by reason of s 34(3A) of the CLA, a conclusion he supported by citing Onslow v Cullen [2022] NSWSC 1257 at [55]-[58] and Gerrard Toltz Pty Ltd v City Garden Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 232 ([257]). It followed that MBG did not have an apportionable claim against the putative concurrent wrongdoers ([257]).

On the plea of contributory negligence against Mr Brujic, Richmond J recorded that it was not in dispute that the defence is capable of being advanced against a breach of s 37 of the DBPA, and said that this was correct, either because s 37(3) of the DBPA assimilates the duty to a duty established by the common law or because of s 9(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) ([260]). He regarded that conclusion as consistent with the nature of the duty under s 37 as a non-delegable duty of the second kind that Gleeson CJ identified in Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery, which makes the defendant answerable for third parties to whom work is delegated and not for the plaintiff’s own acts or omissions ([263]), and with appellate decisions treating the defence as open against non-delegable duty claims ([264]).

He also reasoned that the conclusion was not inconsistent with Pafburn CA, because a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent has been held not to be a “concurrent wrongdoer” under s 34(2) of the CLA (Rennie Golledge Pty Ltd v Ballard), so that a defendant who cannot reduce liability by apportionment can still seek to do so by reference to the plaintiff’s own conduct under s 5R of the CLA and s 9 of the 1965 Act ([265]). The defence is assessed under s 5R(1), which applies the principles in s 5B, and s 5R(2) sets the standard of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position on what the plaintiff knew or ought to have known at the time ([266]-[269]).

Richmond J considered each of the seven matters pleaded against the plaintiff and found none of them established on the evidence ([271]-[278]), and held that Mr Brujic had not discharged his onus of demonstrating any contributory negligence by the plaintiff ([279]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Richmond J

Read judgment: [249]–[253] (opens in a new tab), [255] (opens in a new tab)

Richmond J’s conclusion that the reasoning in Pafburn CA that Part 4 does not apply to a claim under s 37 of the DBPA was part of the ratio of that decision and binding on him was the ground on which he held that Mr Brujic had no apportionable claim ([253], [255]), so it was necessary to the result on that plea.

Obiter · Richmond J

Read judgment: [247]–[248] (opens in a new tab)

Richmond J’s statements that it was arguable on the High Court majority’s reasoning that only claims involving delegation fall outside Part 4, and that the opposite view leaves s 41(3) of the DBPA with nothing to do, were not the ground of decision: he held that the argument was inconsistent with Pafburn CA and did not adopt it ([249], [253]).

Proposition 2

Ratio · Richmond J

Read judgment: [256]–[257] (opens in a new tab)

Richmond J’s classification of the claim for breach of cl 9(a) as a claim for breach of statutory warranty excluded from Part 4 by s 34(3A), and his statement that cl 9(a) was the only part of the claim arising from a failure to take reasonable care, were the reasons he gave for holding that MBG had no apportionable claim, so they were necessary to the result on that plea.

Proposition 3

Obiter · Richmond J

Read judgment: [260]–[265] (opens in a new tab)

Richmond J’s reasons for saying that contributory negligence can be advanced against a claim under s 37 of the DBPA and is not inconsistent with Pafburn CA were given on a point that was not in dispute ([260]), and the defence failed on the facts, so those reasons were not necessary to the result.

Ratio · Richmond J

Read judgment: [271]–[279] (opens in a new tab)

His finding that none of the seven matters was established on the evidence, and his conclusion that Mr Brujic had not discharged his onus, were the ground on which the plea failed ([279]); they are findings on these facts.

Why does this case matter?

A defendant who points at consultants it did not engage is making an argument that sits between two appellate decisions on the same statute, and examiners reward an answer that works out which court’s reasoning bound the judge and why. A student who treats the High Court’s Pafburn decision as the end of the inquiry, or who overlooks the level of court that gave this decision, misreads the position. A building-defect problem can also combine statutory warranties, a statutory duty and the defences to each, so each claim and each defence has to be matched to the instrument it arises under.

Exam and application relevance

Name the instrument each claim arises under, here a contract and a statutory duty of care, and test the Part 4 question separately for each, as Richmond J did ([255]-[257]). Attribute each step to the court that took it: the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Pafburn CA, the High Court majority’s reasoning in Pafburn HCA and Richmond J’s own conclusions are three different things, and say which of them Richmond J treated as binding on him and why ([249], [253]).

Describe the decision as that of a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at first instance. As a first-instance decision it is persuasive for other judges rather than a rule of law that binds them. Keep apart the question whether contributory negligence is open against a statutory claim and the question whether it was proved on the facts, and identify who carried the burden of proving it ([260], [279]).

The position above is the one Richmond J stated in November 2025, on the Design and Building Practitioners Act 2020 (NSW) as he applied it. Check the current text of that Act, and any later appellate treatment of this decision, before relying on it.

Check your understanding

1. Who were the two defendants, and under what instrument was each sued ([2], [8])?

2. Whom did the defendants name as concurrent wrongdoers, and who had appointed them ([14])?

3. What did Richmond J say was arguable on the reasoning of the High Court majority in Pafburn, and why did he not give effect to it ([247]-[249])?

4. What did Richmond J say is open to a person sued under s 37, and had that been done in this case ([254])?

5. Which clause of the Contract did Richmond J identify as the only part of the claim against MBG arising from a failure to take reasonable care, and what did he say about it ([257])?

6. How did Richmond J say contributory negligence fits with Pafburn CA ([265])?

7. Who bore the onus on contributory negligence, and what was the result on the seven pleaded matters ([271]-[279])?