Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 10
A lender advanced a million dollars on a forged loan agreement, and its solicitors drew a defective mortgage. The solicitors said they should answer only for their share of the loss. Did the fraudsters count?
What happened?
In late 2005 Mr Caradonna and Mr Vella began a business venture and opened a joint bank account. Mr Caradonna later obtained certificates of title to properties of Mr Vella’s and used them fraudulently to borrow money for himself ([1]). In January 2006 Mitchell Morgan advanced $1,001,748.85 to the joint account on the security of a mortgage over one of the properties ([2]). Mr Caradonna forged Mr Vella’s signature on the loan documents, and his cousin Mr Flammia, acting as his solicitor, dishonestly certified that he had identified the borrower and witnessed the signature ([2]). Hunt & Hunt, a firm of solicitors, acted for Mitchell Morgan and drew the loan agreement and the mortgage ([2]).
Mr Vella was not liable under the forged loan agreement, and the mortgage, which secured his indebtedness only by reference to that agreement, secured nothing ([3]). The primary judge held that Hunt & Hunt was negligent because it should have prepared a mortgage containing a covenant to repay a stated amount, and that is not in issue ([3]). Both fraudsters were bankrupt by the time of the hearing ([2]).
Hunt & Hunt claimed the benefit of Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), and the primary judge gave judgment on Mitchell Morgan’s claim against it ([4], [7]). The Court of Appeal of New South Wales allowed Mitchell Morgan’s appeal, holding that Hunt & Hunt was not a concurrent wrongdoer because the fraudsters’ acts did not cause the loss or damage that Mitchell Morgan claimed against it ([8]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed Hunt & Hunt’s appeal with costs and dismissed its application for special leave to appeal, which concerned the rate of interest, with costs. It set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and in their place dismissed Mitchell Morgan’s appeal from the primary judge’s orders, except that interest was to be allowed on the sum the primary judge assessed at the rates the Court of Appeal had applied ([63]). Mitchell Morgan was ordered to pay Hunt & Hunt’s costs in the Court of Appeal, and the parties were to file a minute of the consequential orders ([63] and the Order).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
In the joint reasons of French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ, solicitors who negligently drew a mortgage for a lender were concurrent wrongdoers within s 34(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) with two fraudsters whose forgery and false certification left the lender unable to recover its advance, so that the solicitors’ liability was limited under s 35(1) to the proportion of the loss the court considered just, which the primary judge had fixed at 12.5 per cent ([7], [9], [58], [63]).
The joint reasons said that s 34(2) poses two questions: what is the damage or loss that is the subject of the claim, and is there a person other than the defendant whose acts or omissions also caused it ([19]). Damage is distinct from the damages awarded ([24]), and the lender’s damage was its inability to recover the sums advanced: “The harm it suffered is that it is unable to recover the sums advanced” ([28]). The Court of Appeal had not identified the damage in that way, pointing instead to the immediate effects of the fraudsters’ conduct and of the solicitors’ negligence, which are steps in causation and cannot be equated with the damage ([29]-[30], [35]).
The Court of Appeal had followed St George Bank v Quinerts, a decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal, in treating the damage caused by concurrent wrongdoers as having to be “the same damage” ([20], [34]). In that case Nettle JA “appears to have assumed that there is some requirement that one wrongdoer contribute to the wrongful actions of the other wrongdoer in order that they cause the same damage”, and the joint reasons said: “There is no such requirement in Pt 4 of the Civil Liability Act” ([39]-[41]).
The question is whether each wrongdoer, separately, materially contributed to the loss or damage ([53]). The joint reasons held that the fraudsters’ conduct in inducing the lender to enter the transaction and pay the money, and in leaving it with an unenforceable loan agreement, was a material cause of its inability to recover ([49]-[51]). Deciding that a defendant is a concurrent wrongdoer is distinct from apportioning its responsibility, which s 35(1)(a) then requires the court to do ([57]-[58]). The joint reasons found it unnecessary to decide a narrower ground on which a Victorian decision might have rested ([42]).
Bell and Gageler JJ dissented. They held that a person whose acts or omissions caused the damage or loss must be, or have been, legally liable to the plaintiff for that same harm ([91]); that where a solicitor’s breach is a failure to protect the client from the consequences of another’s wrongdoing, the harm caused by the solicitor lies in the absence of protection and not in the consequences of the wrongdoing ([94]); that the harm caused by Hunt & Hunt was the lack of security, which the fraudsters did not cause ([100]-[101]); and that Hunt & Hunt was not a concurrent wrongdoer ([67], [101]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Ratio · French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [19] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [28] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [49] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [53] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [58] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
Identifying the loss as the inability to recover the advance, and asking whether each wrongdoer separately materially contributed to it, was necessary to allow the appeal. The forged loan agreement and the negligently drawn mortgage together left the lender without effective recovery. The fraudsters did not have to contribute to the solicitors’ negligence to be concurrent wrongdoers. This reasoning justified limiting Hunt & Hunt’s liability to its responsibility as assessed by the primary judge; it does not establish 12.5 per cent as a general allocation for negligent solicitors.
Classification unresolved · French CJ, Hayne and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
The majority expressly left undecided whether Quinerts could be supported on the narrower basis that the borrower’s and guarantor’s debt liabilities did not qualify as damage or loss the subject of the claim against the valuer. That reservation limits what can be drawn from the criticism of Quinerts: the suggested debt-based ground is not a holding of this decision.
Separate reasoning · Bell and Gageler JJ
Read judgment: [94] (PDF p 39) (opens in a new tab), [101] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab)
These judges dissented on the appeal. They distinguished the absence of protection caused by a professional’s breach from the consequences of the wrongdoing against which protection was required. On that approach the lender’s harm was lack of security, which the fraudsters did not cause, so Hunt & Hunt was not a concurrent wrongdoer. This is the dissent’s distinct route to dismissing the appeal, rather than the majority’s ground for allowing it.
Why does this case matter?
Hunt & Hunt is the High Court’s decision on how “concurrent wrongdoer” is read in the proportionate liability provisions, in a claim against a solicitor whose negligence left a client exposed to another person’s fraud.
Exam and application relevance
Say whose reasons you are relying on, because the Court divided 3 to 2. Cite the joint reasons for the majority’s approach and Bell and Gageler JJ for the contrary view.
The case construed Part 4 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The other States and Territories adopted provisions in substantially the same form ([15]), but the corresponding provisions of another jurisdiction must be read before the decision is applied there.
Check your understanding
1. What were the two questions the joint reasons said s 34(2) poses ([19])?
2. How did the joint reasons describe the lender’s damage, and why did they say the Court of Appeal had not identified it ([28]-[30])?
3. What requirement did the joint reasons say Nettle JA appeared to have assumed in Quinerts, and what did they say about it ([39]-[41])?
4. What was the share of responsibility that the primary judge fixed for Hunt & Hunt ([7])?
5. According to Bell and Gageler JJ, what harm did Hunt & Hunt cause ([94], [100]-[101])?