Contributory negligence and apportionment

The standard applied to the plaintiff

Contributory negligence happens when a plaintiff exposes themselves to a foreseeable risk they could have avoided, and is then injured by that same kind of risk. This comes from McHugh J in Joslyn v Berryman (2003) 214 CLR 552.[^cite:joslyn-v-berryman-2003-214-clr-552]

McHugh J said the test is objective. The plaintiff is judged against an ordinary reasonable person doing the conduct that caused the injury. The exception is a child, who is judged against an ordinary child of the same age.

These views are McHugh J’s alone. The other judges in the case wrote separate judgments.

The civil liability Acts now set the standard directly. In NSW (s 5R), Victoria (s 62) and Queensland (s 23), the same principles used to decide negligence also decide contributory negligence.

The standard is a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. This depends on what the plaintiff knew or ought to have known at the time (in Queensland, “ought reasonably to have known”).[^cite:nsw-civil-liability-act-2002-ss-3b-5a-5r-5s-50][^cite:vic-wrongs-act-1958-ss-14g-26-62-63][^cite:qld-civil-liability-act-2003-ss-23-24-47-49]

Apportionment

In New South Wales (Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965, s 9(1)) and Victoria (Wrongs Act 1958, s 26(1)), contributory negligence does not defeat a claim. Instead, damages are reduced by what the court thinks is “just and equitable”, based on the claimant’s share of responsibility. In Victoria this is subject to an exception in s 63.

Both Acts define a “wrong” as conduct giving rise to tort liability where contributory negligence is a defence at common law, or a breach of a contractual duty of care that matches a tort duty (NSW s 8; Victoria s 25). Queensland’s general provision is not covered here.

Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) explains how courts apportion responsibility. Apportionment compares “culpability” (how far each party departed from the standard of the reasonable person) and the “relative importance” of each party’s acts in causing the damage.

Courts look at the whole conduct of each negligent party, not isolated acts. How much weight each factor gets “will vary from case to case”. A trial judge’s apportionment finding “is not lightly reviewed” on appeal.

In Joslyn, Hayne J relied on this approach. He added that contributory negligence and apportionment are always questions of fact. He warned against treating past cases’ facts as binding legal principle.

Kirby J agreed that these are always questions of fact, and said appellate courts rarely interfere with a trial judge’s assessment. On this approach, a percentage awarded in one case is just a factual finding, not a rule for other cases.

Applying this in a problem question

First, work out which jurisdiction applies, and check the Act actually covers the claim. New South Wales ss 5A, 3B and 47, Victoria ss 44-45, and Queensland ss 4-5 set this out. Some claims, like certain motor accident and workers compensation claims, are excluded in whole or part, but that’s not covered here.

Next, identify what the plaintiff failed to do to protect against the risk of harm. Test this against a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, using the Act’s wording (ss 5R, 62, 23). McHugh J’s view in Joslyn (that relevant facts include what a reasonable person could have learned by observation or inquiry) was one judge’s account of the common law on a 1996 accident, under older provisions.

Then separate out the different triggers for contributory negligence. If the plaintiff was intoxicated, consider New South Wales s 50 (if capacity-impairment is established), Queensland s 47, or Victorian s 14G (relevant to breach, where intoxication was voluntary or the plaintiff was doing something illegal). If the plaintiff relied on an intoxicated defendant, only Queensland ss 48-49 is discussed here, subject to its conditions. Always check each section’s exceptions.

Apportionment involves comparing how far each party departed from the standard of care, and how important each party’s conduct was in causing the damage, looking at the whole picture. This follows Podrebersek, applied by Hayne J in Joslyn. Reasons must be given. Percentages from other cases aren’t a fixed rule, per Hayne J and Kirby J in Joslyn.

Finally, state whether the outcome is a reduction, or — only if just and equitable — a full 100 per cent reduction (ss 5S, 63, 24).

Self-check

Before finishing, check a few things.

Did you name the specific State Act you relied on? Confirm its scope, and note that other States are not covered.

Did you credit the common law test in Joslyn correctly? Remember it comes from McHugh J, not the whole Court.

Did you treat apportionment as comparing culpability and causal importance? Avoid citing any percentage as if it were a fixed legal rule.

Did you keep “reduction of damages” separate from the power to reduce damages by 100 per cent? Make sure you used the correct State’s intoxication provision.

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