Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd
Podrebersek v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 492; 59 ALR 529
A gas worker left a pin screwed in half a turn and was badly hurt when it fell out and gas exploded. His employer’s pins did not always screw in easily. A jury put 90 per cent of the responsibility on him.
What happened?
On 20 April 1969 the appellant, employed by the respondent as a gas regulator, was cleaning gas pipes when an explosion of gas injured him. The cleaning meant removing and refitting many metal pins, about four inches long, which screwed into holes in the pipes; when properly screwed in, three or four turns, a pin’s cap closed the hole. Employees usually turned the pins by hand, but dirt, damaged threads or threads that did not match sometimes stopped a pin going in far enough. The explosion happened because a pin fell out and let gas escape (joint judgment).
There was evidence from which it could be inferred that the appellant had screwed that pin in by hand only half a turn, whereas with a spanner it could have been screwed in to the required depth. A fellow workman, Mr Kalaitzakis, gave evidence that several years earlier he had trained the appellant in the work and shown him how to use a spanner, and if necessary a tool called a “tap”, on a pin that would not go in by hand. The appellant’s evidence conflicted with that, and a consulting engineer he called said using tools on the pins was unsafe. His own answers in evidence could have satisfied the jury that he knew the pin was in only half a turn and that a pin so fitted might fall out (joint judgment).
In the Supreme Court of New South Wales a jury found both parties negligent, assessed damages at $35,000, and apportioned responsibility 10 per cent to the employer and 90 per cent to the appellant, so judgment was for $3,500. The trial judge’s direction on apportionment was short: the jury should reduce the damages to such extent as they considered just and equitable having regard to the appellant’s responsibility for the damage. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. It reasoned from the way the jury apportioned the damages that they must have accepted Mr Kalaitzakis’s evidence, so that the only negligence they found against the employer was its failure to provide pins that fitted more easily; counsel for the appellant could not challenge that conclusion in the High Court (joint judgment).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed with costs, in one joint judgment of five Justices. It rejected each of the appellant’s three grounds. The jury were “clearly entitled” to find contributory negligence. It was not possible to say that it was unreasonable for the jury to place almost the entire responsibility on the appellant. And although “It may be accepted that the direction given by the learned trial judge to the jury on the question of apportionment was deficient”, a new trial should not be ordered: no further direction had been sought at the trial, the point appears not to have been raised until about four and a half years later in the Court of Appeal, a fuller direction was unlikely to have helped the appellant, the proceedings had suffered extraordinary delay, and it was said that the trial exhibits had been lost. It had not been shown that the Court of Appeal wrongly exercised its discretion in refusing a new trial.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
In a single joint judgment, Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ held that “The making of an apportionment as between a plaintiff and a defendant of their respective shares in the responsibility for the damage involves a comparison both of culpability, i.e. of the degree of departure from the standard of care of the reasonable man ... and of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage”. “It is the whole conduct of each negligent party in relation to the circumstances of the accident which must be subjected to comparative examination.
The significance of the various elements involved in such an examination will vary from case to case; for example, the circumstances of some cases may be such that a comparison of the relative importance of the acts of the parties in causing the damage will be of little, if any, importance.” Because an apportionment is, in words their Honours took from British Fame (Owners) v Macgregor (Owners), a finding on a “question, not of principle or of positive findings of fact or law, but of proportion, of balance and relative emphasis, and of weighing different considerations”, “Such a finding, if made by a judge, is not lightly reviewed. The task of an appellant is even more difficult when the apportionment has been made by a jury”.
Why does this case matter?
Students often stop at the finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and then name a percentage. That leaves out the part of the answer that carries the marks: the reasons for the figure. A percentage with nothing behind it gives an examiner nothing to credit.
The case also shows how much the figure reached at trial matters, even where the direction that produced it was open to criticism. The time to argue the balance, and to ask for a fuller direction, is at the trial.
And it shows the workplace setting in which contributory negligence is assessed. The joint judgment accepted that the question had to be approached on the footing that the employer had failed to take reasonable care, taking into account the circumstances and conditions in which the worker had to do his job, and asking whether his conduct “amounted to mere inadvertence, inattention or misjudgment, or to negligence”. Here the evidence of what he knew about the half-turned pin answered that question against him.
Exam and application relevance
Apportion only after you have established both parties’ negligence and that each contributed to the damage. Then set out, for each party, the facts the comparison will turn on, and say which of them weigh most on your facts and why.
The case was decided before the civil liability statutes. Identify the statute that governs contributory negligence and apportionment in the jurisdiction you are answering on, and read it: in New South Wales, for example, the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) contains provisions on the standard of contributory negligence and on a reduction of 100 per cent, which a pre-2002 case cannot have addressed.
The figures in this case were the jury’s, reached on the evidence the jury accepted, and the High Court held only that it could not say the apportionment was unreasonable. They are not a benchmark for a particular kind of carelessness.
Check your understanding
1. What was the only negligence the jury found against the employer, and how did the Court of Appeal infer it?
2. What two things does an apportionment compare, according to the joint judgment, and whose conduct is examined?
3. Why is an apportionment difficult to challenge on appeal, and why was it harder still in this case?
4. The High Court was prepared to assume that the trial judge’s direction on apportionment was deficient. Why did it refuse a new trial?
5. How did the joint judgment frame the question whether a worker’s conduct in the employer’s workplace amounted to contributory negligence?