Vicarious liability and non-delegable duty

Vicarious liability for the torts of employees, the employee/contractor distinction after Personnel Contracting, the course-of-employment question for intentional wrongdoing, and how non-delegable duty differs from both.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
torts
Topics
vicarious-liability

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish vicarious liability, non-delegable duty and an employer’s own direct negligence.
  • Apply the contract-focused approach to the employee/independent contractor distinction.
  • Explain why the course-of-employment inquiry is framed differently for intentional torts.

Three distinct routes can make one party answerable for harm caused by another, and problem questions routinely confuse them. Vicarious liability is strict and derivative: the employer is liable because the employee committed a tort, without any wrongdoing of its own. A non-delegable duty is personal and direct: the defendant owes a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken, and cannot discharge it by engaging someone competent. Direct negligence is the defendant’s own failure. Identifying which is in play determines what must be proved.

Vicarious liability: the relationship

Vicarious liability attaches to the employment relationship and, in general, not to the engagement of an independent contractor. Australian law long approached the distinction through a multifactorial survey — control, provision of equipment, delegation, presentation to the public, mode of remuneration — of the kind applied in Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 21.

That approach was substantially reframed in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (2022) 275 CLR 165.1 Where the parties have committed their relationship to a comprehensive written contract that is not a sham and has not been varied, the characterisation is determined by the rights and obligations that contract creates, not by how the work was performed in practice. The multifactorial matters survive, but only insofar as they bear on the rights and duties the contract establishes, not as a free-ranging inquiry into how the working relationship operated in practice.

Vicarious liability: the course of employment

The tort must be committed in the course of employment. Negligent acts are usually straightforward: an authorised act performed carelessly remains within the course of employment, and even an act performed in an unauthorised manner may be. The difficulty lies with deliberate wrongdoing, which rarely looks like what the employer engaged the employee to do. That does not take it outside the course of employment: even a criminal act can fall within it, as the next paragraph explains.

For intentional torts, Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC (2016) 258 CLR 134 directs attention to whether the employment provided the occasion for the wrongdoing — the special role, and the authority, power, trust, control and intimacy it conferred.2 The question is not whether the employer authorised the act, but whether the employment placed the employee in a position that made the wrong possible in the way it occurred. Mere opportunity, of the kind any co-worker would have, is not enough.

For ordinary employee status under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) itself, Parliament has since reversed that approach where s 15AA applies. Section 15AA7, in force from 26 August 2024, requires the question to be answered by “ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship”, with regard had “not only to the terms of the contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice”. The Note to the section says it was enacted in response to Personnel Contracting and Jamsek.

It does not follow that Personnel Contracting is displaced here. Section 15AA operates “for the purposes of this Act”, so characterisation at common law — which is the question vicarious liability turns on — is untouched, and ss 15AB to 15AD let a qualifying high-income individual opt out of s 15AA altogether. Section 15AA(3) also disapplies it for Divisions 2A and 2B of Part 1-3 and, where Part 3-1 applies only because of s 30G or s 30R, for that Part. Check which question you are answering before choosing the test.

Non-delegable duty

Some relationships attract a duty that goes further: a duty to ensure that reasonable care is taken, which is not discharged by delegating the task to an apparently competent contractor. School authorities and pupils, hospitals and patients, and employers and employees are established categories, and the unifying idea identified in Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 is the vulnerability of the person to whom the duty is owed and their dependence on the defendant’s care.3 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 extended comparable reasoning to a dangerous activity conducted on land.

There was a limit, and in 2026 it went. In New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 a majority held that there could be no common law non-delegable duty in respect of harm caused by an intentional criminal act.4 The High Court re-opened and overturned that holding in AA v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle [2026] HCA 2, allowing the appeal 5:2: a non-delegable duty may be breached by the intentional conduct of the duty-holder or their delegate.6 Two things survive. The duty is still not absolute liability — there is no liability unless the duty-holder or its delegate defaulted in taking reasonable care — but an intentional criminal act by a delegate now counts as such a default. And overturning the holding decides no particular case: AA’s own damages were reduced to the caps in Pt 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).

Why the distinction changes the answer

The three routes fail in different places, which is why they must be pleaded and analysed separately. A vicarious liability claim fails if the wrongdoer was an independent contractor, whatever the employer’s own conduct. A non-delegable duty claim fails if the relationship is not one in which such a duty arises, or if neither the duty-holder nor its delegate defaulted in taking reasonable care. A direct negligence claim — negligent selection, inadequate systems, failure to supervise — may remain available when both of those fail, but it needs its own proof of duty, breach, causation and damage, and it can fail too: in Bird v DP (a pseudonym) the Diocese’s direct liability failed because the primary judge did not accept that it knew or ought to have known of the risk.5

The civil liability statutes should also be checked: several jurisdictions modify the operation of proportionate liability and contribution in ways that affect how loss is apportioned once liability is established.

Agents, partners and the limits of the categories

At common law, vicarious liability proper requires employment.5 Two other routes can make one person answerable for another’s wrong, and they should not be labelled vicarious liability. A principal may be liable for an agent’s acts done with its express, implied or apparent authority, or ratified by it: that is attribution of the acts to the principal, which is a form of primary liability. And the partnership legislation makes partners liable for a partner’s wrongs in the ordinary course of the firm’s business, subject to the qualifications that limited partnership legislation makes for limited partners. Neither should be assumed: a relationship described as agency in a contract may not be one in law, and the scope of authority conferred is a question of construction.

Courts have also declined to extend vicarious liability to relationships resembling employment but falling outside it. The invitation to recognise a broader “akin to employment” category was pressed in Bird v DP (a pseudonym) without the success it has found elsewhere: six of the seven Justices held that there is no vicarious liability for those outside employment, while Gleeson J would have recognised such a relationship but held that the abuse was not committed in the course of it.5 The safer approach in a problem question is to characterise the relationship carefully rather than to reason by analogy from the outcome one would prefer.

That is the common law, and a statute can displace it for a particular class of claim. Part XIIIA of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) makes an institution vicariously liable for the abuse of a child by an employee or by an individual akin to an employee, where the apparent performance of a role the institution placed that person in supplies the occasion for the abuse, and that person takes advantage of or uses that occasion to abuse the child.9 In deciding whether an individual is akin to an employee, a court may consider whether the individual carries out activities as an integral part of the institution’s activities and for its benefit, and how far the institution controls the carrying out of those activities. An independent contractor is expressly excluded from that category, so the contractor limit described above holds for this statutory route as well: what the Part adds is a relationship category reaching past employment without reaching independent contracting, and it does so for child abuse claims against institutions in that State. It applies whether the abuse occurred before, on or after its commencement on 25 February 2026, so it reaches historic abuse, and it does not limit the separate organisational duty of care, with its reversed onus, in Part XIII of the same Act.

Two things follow for a problem question. The first is to establish which jurisdiction’s law governs the claim before reasoning from the common law categories alone: Victoria has enacted a statutory category for this class of claim, and whether another jurisdiction has done so is a question to check rather than to assume. The second is that the statutory test turns on the same occasion requirement rather than a looser one. It asks whether the role supplied the occasion for the abuse, and directs attention to whether the institution placed the person in a role carrying authority, power or control over the child, the child’s trust, or the ability to achieve intimacy with the child. The relationship question is widened; the connection question is not.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the wrongdoer and the relationship precisely — employee, or independent contractor under a comprehensive written contract?
  2. If a comprehensive written contract governs, characterise the relationship by its rights and obligations first. Do not generally use how the work was later performed to construe the contract, though conduct can matter for formation, terms not wholly in writing, sham, variation, waiver or estoppel.
  3. Identify the nature of the conduct and how it connects with the work assigned. For deliberate wrongdoing, the special-role inquiry in step 4 usually decides the question.
  4. For deliberate wrongdoing, ask what the role conferred — authority, trust, control, intimacy — and whether it supplied the occasion rather than mere opportunity.
  5. Ask separately whether the relationship is one attracting a non-delegable duty. Since AA it reaches a delegate’s intentional criminal act, but it still requires a default in taking reasonable care by the duty-holder or the delegate, and it is not absolute liability.
  6. Plead the defendant’s own direct negligence in the alternative where the facts support it; it needs its own proof of duty, breach, causation and damage.

The limit of that approach was marked in CCIG Investments Pty Ltd v Schokman (2023) 278 CLR 1658. Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon and Jagot JJ held at [33] that “[w]here no more can be pointed to than that the employment provides an opportunity for the employee’s wrongful act to take place, the connection with the employment is tenuous”. Opportunity is not occasion; ask whether the employment placed the employee in a special position.

Self-check

  • Have I kept vicarious liability, non-delegable duty and direct negligence separate rather than merging them?
  • Have I applied the contract-focused approach where a comprehensive written contract exists?
  • Have I asked whether the employment supplied the occasion, not merely the opportunity?
  • Have I checked the relevant civil liability statute before apportioning loss?

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