Insider trading and inside information
The insider trading prohibitions in Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): what counts as inside information, the trading, procuring and communicating limbs, the possession and fault elements, the exceptions and defences, and the criminal and civil consequences.
Learning outcomes
- Apply the two-part definition of inside information, including the extended meaning of information, general availability and material effect, to a set of facts.
- Separate the physical element of possession from the fault element in s 1043A and identify which conduct is caught: trading, procuring and communicating.
- Identify the exceptions and defences, including information barriers, and who bears the evidential burden in a prosecution and in civil penalty proceedings.
- State the criminal and civil consequences of a contravention, including compensation, and how the two tracks affect each other.
The insider trading prohibitions are in Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). That is Commonwealth legislation, and this article cites no State or Territory legislation. The first question is whether the information is “inside information” in the Act’s two-part sense, because the prohibitions attach to a person who possesses it; they are not confined to people connected with the company whose products are traded. The second is which track is in play: a contravention is both an offence and a civil penalty contravention, and the two differ in what must be shown and what follows.
What the Division prohibits
Section 1043A(1) applies when a person (the insider) possesses inside information and knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is not generally available and that a reasonable person would expect it, if it were generally available, to have a material effect on the price or value of particular financial products. The insider must then not, as principal or agent, apply for, acquire or dispose of those products, or enter into an agreement to do so, and must not procure another person to do any of those things.1 Section 1043A(2) separately prohibits communicating the information, or causing it to be communicated, directly or indirectly, to another person if the insider knows or ought reasonably to know that the other person would or would be likely to trade in those products or procure another to do so. Subsection (2) applies only where the products can be traded on a financial market operated in this jurisdiction.
The products are “Division 3 financial products”, which include securities, derivatives, interests in a managed investment scheme and any other financial product able to be traded on a financial market.2 A person who incites, induces or encourages another’s act is taken to procure it, and a body corporate is taken to possess information that an officer possesses and obtained in performing duties as an officer.5
Inside information
Information is inside information if it is not generally available and, were it generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of particular Division 3 financial products (s 1042A(1)). Each part has its own rules.
“Information” is wide. It includes matters of supposition, matters insufficiently definite to warrant being made known to the public, and matters relating to a person’s intentions or likely intentions (s 1042A(2)). In Mansfield v The Queen; Kizon v The Queen [2012] HCA 49 the High Court held that false information is “information”: the joint reasons said that knowledge conveyed about a subject can be described as information whether it is wholly accurate, wholly false or a mixture (at [29]), and Heydon J agreed in separate reasons. The charges were laid under s 1002G, the predecessor of s 1043A, but argument proceeded on the footing that the point applied equally to Division 3 (at [25]); whether the information was material was left for a new trial (at [7]).18 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has treated an inference drawn from conduct about a person’s intentions as information (Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373, at [411]), and in R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 rejected the argument that information must be received under an obligation of confidence (at [139]).2019 In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963 Jacobson J held that a hint must be communicated by words or conduct, but that the inference or supposition drawn from it is information (at [542]).21
Not generally available. Information is generally available if it consists of readily observable matter; if it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in Division 3 financial products of a kind whose price might be affected, and a reasonable period for dissemination has since elapsed; or if it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences drawn from readily observable matter or from information made known in the way described in s 1042C(1)(b)(i) (s 1042C(1)).3 In Citigroup Jacobson J said that the test of whether material is readily observable is whether it could have been observed, not whether it was widely observed (at [551]); in Hannes the Court held that the general availability of aspects of the information did not make the whole generally available (at [382]).
Material effect. A reasonable person is taken to expect a material effect on price or value “if (and only if)” the information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly acquire Division 3 financial products in deciding whether to acquire or dispose of those products (s 1042D).4 The test is objective: in Rivkin the information as particularised, including its source, was imputed to the hypothetical investor, and how it reached the accused was irrelevant (at [232]); the Hannes Court said that materiality is assessed objectively in the context of what is generally available (at [384]-[385]).
Possession and the fault element
The statutory trigger is possession. On its text, s 1043A(1)(a) asks whether the insider possesses inside information, and nothing in s 1043A(1) asks whether the information was the reason for the trade. The High Court described the predecessor provision as prohibiting persons in possession of information of a certain character from trading (at [22]). The predecessor provisions were replaced with effect from 11 March 2002, when the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth) substituted a new Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act, including Division 3 of Part 7.10 (ss 1042A to 1043O); in the respects relevant to that appeal the High Court said that the general scheme of the new prohibitions did not differ from the provisions it replaced (at [23]-[24]).17 It recorded that the change made after the Griffiths Report altered the focus “from the connection which a person had with a corporation to the use of certain information” (at [36]); the operative words of s 1043A are nonetheless possession and the knowledge requirement.18
Section 1043A(3) divides the elements for the Criminal Code. Possession of inside information (paragraph (1)(a) or (2)(a)) is a physical element, and its fault element is the one in paragraph (1)(b) or (2)(b): that the insider knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the information is not generally available and would be expected to have a material effect if it were. Where the Act specifies no fault element for another physical element, the Code supplies intention for conduct and recklessness for a circumstance or result (s 5.6).16 In civil penalty proceedings s 1317QB(1) makes proof of state of mind unnecessary, but s 1317QB(4) disapplies that to the extent that the civil penalty provision, or a provision relating to it, expressly provides otherwise. The sources cited here do not settle how that fits with the knowledge limb in s 1043A, so check later authority before relying on either reading.14
Exceptions and defences
Sections 1043B to 1043K state situations in which s 1043A does not apply or is not contravened: withdrawal from a registered scheme at an asset-based price (s 1043B); underwriting and sub-underwriting (s 1043C); acquisition or communication pursuant to a legal requirement (ss 1043D, 1043E); information barriers for a body corporate or a partnership (ss 1043F, 1043G); awareness of one’s own, or a principal’s, trading, subject to conditions (ss 1043H to 1043J); and a licensee or its representative trading as agent on a principal’s specific instruction behind similar barriers, the principal remaining subject to s 1043A(1) (s 1043K).6
In a prosecution the prosecution need not prove that these circumstances did not exist, “but it is a defence if the facts or circumstances existed”, and the defendant bears an evidential burden (s 1043M(1) and Note, referring to Criminal Code s 13.3(3)). Section 1043M(2) adds two separate defences to a prosecution for trading or procuring: that the information came into the person’s possession solely as a result of being made known in the way described in s 1042C(1)(b)(i), and that the other party knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the information before the transaction; s 1043M(3) provides parallel defences for communicating.8 In civil penalty proceedings a person relying on an exception provided by the law creating the civil penalty provision bears an evidential burden (s 1317QD(1)),14 and the s 1043M(2) and (3) matters are grounds on which the court may relieve a person wholly or partly from liability, as are the circumstances in the sections referred to in s 1043M(1) (s 1043N). Section 1317S separately allows relief for a person who acted honestly and ought fairly to be excused.815
The body corporate exception applies if the decision to enter the transaction was taken by persons other than the officer or employee who held the information; the body had in operation arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure that the information was not communicated to the decision-makers and that no advice about the transaction was given to them by a person holding it; and the information was not communicated and no such advice was given (s 1043F).7 ASIC’s two insider trading claims in Citigroup concerned a public-side trader’s dealings in Patrick Corporation shares on the last trading day before Toll announced a takeover bid, when Citigroup’s private-side employees were acting for Toll. The first failed because the trader was not an “officer”, so under s 1042G(1)(a) his knowledge was not attributed to Citigroup (at [501]), and he had not made the supposition pleaded (at [603]). The second failed because s 1043F was satisfied: the test is objective, asking whether there were “arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure” that the information was not communicated, and does not demand absolute perfection (at [592]-[593]). Jacobson J added that Chinese walls “may not be as solid as the name implies” (at [604]).21
The High Court has since explained the paragraph (b) limbs of the definition of “officer” that Jacobson J applied in Citigroup. The definition was in s 9 when the Court decided Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 18 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King [2020] HCA 4, and is now in s 9AD(1). Neither case concerned insider trading. Shafron said, in remarks not strictly necessary to its result, that the paragraph (b)(i) inquiry asks what role the person plays in the corporation and that participation in making decisions is a question of fact and degree (joint reasons, at [23], [26]). King said that paragraphs (b)(i) and (ii) capture only persons in fact engaged in the corporation’s decision-making as management, citing Citigroup for the origin of that language (joint reasons, at [43]-[45]; Nettle and Gordon JJ quoting it, at [88]).2223
Consequences
Criminal. A contravention of s 1043A(1) or (2) is an offence (s 1311(1)), and Schedule 3 specifies 15 years’ imprisonment for each. Imprisonment is the only penalty specified and is 10 years or more, so an individual is liable to imprisonment, a fine or both, the fine not exceeding the greater of 4,500 penalty units and, if the court can determine the benefit derived and detriment avoided, three times that amount (ss 1311A(1), 1311B(1)(b), (4)); a body corporate’s fine does not exceed the greatest of 45,000 penalty units, three times that benefit and detriment, and 10 per cent of annual turnover for the relevant 12 months (ss 1311A(1), 1311C(1)(b), (3)).10 A penalty unit is set under s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and is $364 from 1 July 2026, and the increased amount only applies to offences committed on or after that date (s 4AA(8)).1112 In Rivkin the Court rejected the description of the offence as “victimless”: the victim is the investing community at large, the injury being the loss of confidence in the efficacy and integrity of the market in public securities (at [412]).19
Civil. Sections 1043A(1) and (2) are financial services civil penalty provisions (s 1317E(3)). ASIC may apply for a declaration of contravention, a pecuniary penalty order or a compensation order; any other person who suffers damage may apply for a compensation order; and proceedings must start within six years of the contravention (ss 1317J, 1317K). A pecuniary penalty requires a declaration and that the contravention materially prejudice acquirers, disposers or the issuer, or be serious, and is capped for an individual at the greater of 5,000 penalty units and three times the benefit derived and detriment avoided (s 1317G(1), (3)). A compensation order may be made for damage resulting from the contravention, including profits made by any person, whether or not a declaration has been made (s 1317HA).13 Section 1043L adds a specific measure: where an insider who knows, or is reckless as to whether, that the information is not generally available and might have a material effect trades or procures trading in contravention of s 1043A(1) in Division 3 financial products other than derivatives, a person who sold to or bought from the insider without possessing the information may recover the difference between the price they dealt at and the price likely had the information been generally available, and the issuer has parallel rights; the action lies against the insider or any person involved, and ASIC may bring it for the issuer (s 1043L(2) to (6)). The court may also restrain the disposal of products or cancel an Australian financial services licence (s 1043O).9
The tracks interact. A court must not make a declaration or a pecuniary penalty order against a person convicted of an offence constituted by substantially the same conduct (s 1317M), civil proceedings for those orders are stayed once criminal proceedings start for it (s 1317N), and criminal proceedings may follow civil ones (s 1317P(1)). Sections 1317M and 1317N do not mention compensation orders.14
Contrast with the officer’s duty not to misuse information
Section 183 is a different prohibition; the current provision is covered in Directors’ statutory duties: the Corporations Act provisions. As quoted in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vizard [2005] FCA 1037, the then s 183(1) was addressed to a person who obtained information because they were or had been a director, other officer or employee, and Finkelstein J described the elements of a contravention as that the defendant was a director, obtained confidential information by virtue of that position, made improper use of it by basing a decision to buy or sell on it, and did so to obtain an advantage (at [24]).24 Division 3 has no equivalent requirement of office, confidentiality or improper use; it turns on possession, and the information need not come from within the company (Mansfield, at [35]).18
Of the decisions cited on the insider trading prohibition itself, Mansfield is the only High Court decision; Shafron, King and Farah are High Court decisions on other points (who is an officer, and the weight of intermediate appellate authority). Rivkin and Hannes are New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal decisions (the Hannes passages cited are from the reasons of Barr and Hall JJ, Basten JA dissenting on the result for the insider trading count), and Citigroup and Vizard are decisions of single judges of the Federal Court, so none binds a court outside its own hierarchy. The High Court has said that intermediate appellate courts and trial judges should not depart from an interstate intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of Commonwealth legislation unless convinced that it is plainly wrong (Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22, at [135]), which gives Rivkin and Hannes more weight than that description alone suggests; the statement concerns intermediate appellate decisions.25 A separate passage of Farah (at [134]), on following seriously considered dicta of a majority of the High Court, has been read by the Full Court of the Federal Court as imposing two requirements: that the dicta are a majority’s and that they conform with long-established authority. The Full Court said the High Court has not definitively settled the point (Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (2020) 282 FCR 530).26 Mansfield, Rivkin and Hannes concern s 1002G, the predecessor of s 1043A, and Vizard the then s 183.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the products and the conduct: Division 3 financial products, and trading, procuring or communicating (s 1043A(1) and (2)); the communication limb needs a market operated in this jurisdiction.
- Identify the information as exactly as the facts allow, including hints, suppositions, intentions and the source, and do not exclude it because it is false or uncertain (s 1042A(2); Mansfield; Hannes; Citigroup).
- Test the two parts of inside information separately and as at the time of the act: not generally available (s 1042C) and material effect on hypothetical investors’ decisions (s 1042D).
- Establish possession at that time, and for a firm whose possession counts (s 1042G). Do not add a requirement that the information was the reason for the trade or was confidential: neither appears in the text of s 1043A(1).
- Separate the physical element of possession from the fault element in s 1043A(1)(b) or (2)(b) (s 1043A(3)), and say whether the question is criminal or civil, because s 1317QB(1) concerns proof of state of mind in civil penalty proceedings and is subject to s 1317QB(4).
- Check the exceptions in ss 1043B to 1043K, the defences in s 1043M(2) and (3) and who bears the evidential burden; for a firm, test its arrangements against each condition of s 1043F.
- State the consequences for the track in play, including s 1043L compensation, and how one track affects the other (ss 1317M to 1317P).