R v Rivkin

Supreme Court of New South Wales · 2004

Investment And Financial RegulationInsider Trading

R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7

An airline chairman, negotiating to buy a house, told its owner his company was merging with Qantas, subject to ACCC approval. The owner bought Qantas shares that day and said he had not believed a word. Was that “information”?

Affirmed by Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373

In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373, an appeal against another conviction under s 1002G, Barr and Hall JJ applied Rivkin in their joint reasons. They accepted that it is the particularised information that has to be shown to satisfy the elements of the offence and that sets the ambit of the evidence that is properly admissible ([449]), and, relying on Rivkin, that the legislation does not require the information to be “specific” ([450], [556]). They also drew from Rivkin that where the substance and effect of the evidence is in accordance with the particulars, or its overall effect materially coincides with them, that is sufficient ([451]-[452]). Basten JA, who would have set aside the conviction on the insider trading count because of uncertainty between the particulars and the evidence ([58]-[60]), otherwise concurred in the reasoning of Barr and Hall JJ on that count ([61]).

Clarified by Mansfield v The Queen; Kizon v The Queen [2012] HCA 49

Rivkin records an argument that the Crown had particularised the information as what Mr McGowan said in order to avoid the contention that a false statement could not be “information” ([129]). The High Court later decided that question directly, in Mansfield v The Queen; Kizon v The Queen [2012] HCA 49, an appeal concerning s 1002G(2)(b). Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held in joint reasons that for the insider trading provisions “information” includes false information, and that knowledge conveyed about a subject-matter is properly described as information “whether the knowledge conveyed is wholly accurate, wholly false or a mixture of the two” ([28]-[29]). Heydon J, writing separately, also rejected the appellants’ argument that a proposition must correspond with factual reality to be information ([55]-[64]), and both appeals were dismissed ([51], [77]).

Qualified by legislation: Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), from 11 March 2002

The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), s 3 and Schedule 1 item 1, replaced Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act from 11 March 2002. Rivkin applied the predecessor provisions, ss 1002A, 1002C and 1002G. The corresponding provisions in Division 3 of Part 7.10 are s 1042A on information, s 1042D on material effect on price or value, and s 1043A on prohibited insider trading. This is statutory replacement rather than judicial disapproval of Rivkin’s reasoning. In Mansfield v The Queen; Kizon v The Queen [2012] HCA 49 at [23]-[24], Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ explained the replacement and said that the general scheme did not differ in any presently relevant way from the provisions it replaced.

What happened?

Gerard McGowan was the Executive Chairman of Impulse Airlines, which was in financial difficulty and was holding confidential meetings with Qantas throughout April 2001 about an arrangement between the two companies ([5], [9]-[10]). He was interested in buying the Rose Bay residence of the appellant, Rene Rivkin, and on the morning of 24 April 2001 he spoke to Mr Rivkin by telephone ([4], [16]-[17]). McGowan said that he told Mr Rivkin: “I am currently in merging my Impulse business with Qantas.

We are awaiting ACCC approval for that transaction.” He said that he also told Mr Rivkin that he believed the ACCC would approve and that Mr Rivkin could not trade in Qantas shares ([17]). Mr Rivkin’s evidence was that McGowan said he had to do a deal first, that he thought it was a deal with Qantas, and that he “didn’t believe a word of that”; he denied having been warned not to trade ([29], [33]).

McGowan accepted in cross-examination that the only deal discussed with Qantas was a wet lease arrangement, that the deal eventually made was neither a takeover nor a merger, and that Qantas’s board did not approve the arrangement until 30 April 2001 ([15], [21]). On 24 April 2001, the day of the call, Mr Rivkin instructed Mr Kerstens, an operator with Rivkin Discount Stockbroking, to buy 50,000 Qantas shares for Rivkin Investments Pty Limited ([35]). On 1 May 2001 Impulse and Qantas announced a long term relationship, and Rivkin Investments sold the shares that day for a profit of $2,664.94 ([38], [40]).

The Crown charged that Mr Rivkin contravened s 1002G(2) of the Corporations Act by procuring Rivkin Investments to buy the shares while possessed of information that was not generally available and that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price of Qantas shares, knowing or ought reasonably to have known that ([1]). It particularised the information as three things McGowan said: that there was a deal for the merging of Impulse’s business with Qantas; that he had to wait until he had ACCC approval of the deal before making the purchase of the property; and that he believed ACCC approval would be forthcoming ([4]). A jury returned a verdict of guilty and Mr Rivkin was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment by periodic detention and fined $30,000 ([2]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales (Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J), in a single judgment of the Court, dismissed the appeal against conviction. It granted leave to appeal against the sentence and dismissed that appeal as well ([436]). The appeal raised many grounds, from apprehended bias to the effect of a brain tumour on fitness to stand trial. The Court rejected the grounds about the information the Crown particularised and its materiality, which were grounds 2 to 6 and grounds 16 and 17 ([140], [166], [174], [235]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court rejected the argument that what Mr Rivkin possessed could not be “information” for the purposes of s 1002G because the Crown had particularised it as what Mr McGowan said, and not as the state of affairs he described ([123]-[124], [128]). At the time s 1002A(1) defined “information” to include “matters of supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant being made known to the public” and “matters relating to the intentions, or the likely intentions, of a person” ([79]). The Court said that the explanatory memorandum to the 1991 amending Bill and the terms of s 1002A itself made it clear that the information did not need to be “specific” ([126]).

It described the arguments as “of the most technical kind that are entirely lacking in merit” and held: “We see no reason why the information should not, in addition to any underlying facts stated, identify the person who made the relevant statements. What the appellant was in possession of was the state of affairs described and its source.” ([131]). Its “potential reliability depends upon its source” ([134]), so the state of affairs communicated and the source were both relevant, and it was open to the Crown to lead evidence, cross-examine and make submissions on the basis that the information included the source as well as the state of affairs ([137]-[138]).

On the argument that there was no “done deal”, the Court accepted that the transaction was not a “done deal” but held that neither the evidence nor the particulars asserted the degree of finality for which the appellant contended ([157]). It said: “The word “deal” is itself a colloquial expression. Although a degree of uncertainty may attach to it, that does not prevent it from being information, for the purposes of the section, given the extended statutory definition of that term” ([159]). It rejected the argument that information is “information” only if the person charged receives it under “an obligation of confidence”: “There is no warrant in the legislation for imposing such a condition upon the recipient of such information. His or her obligation begins and ends with the restrictions on its use, which are expressly laid down in the Act” ([139]).

The Court accepted that the particulars are “a critical aspect of the Crown case” and that “It is the particularised information that has to be shown to satisfy the elements of the offence, and that sets the ambit for the evidence that is properly admissible” ([125]).

Section 1002C provided that a reasonable person would be taken to expect information to have a material effect on the price or value of securities if it “would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether or not to subscribe for, buy or sell” them ([82]). Whealy J told the jury that this test is objective and concerns a hypothetical group of investors, not the accused, so that the jury was to put out of mind the circumstances in which the information reached Mr Rivkin, including the telephone call, the people present and any warning not to trade ([227]).

The hypothetical investors would nonetheless be taken to know the background of the price war and the Qantas share price, that Mr McGowan was the Executive Chairman of Impulse and would be expected to know of any deal with Qantas, and to be able to assess the reliability of the information and draw inferences from it ([227]).

The Court held that these directions “were both correct and appropriate, in the distinction which was drawn”, and said: “It was the information as particularised, including its source, that had to be imputed to the hypothetical investor, although the precise manner in which it came to the knowledge of the appellant himself was irrelevant” ([232]). It added that the directions appeared to have been generally approved by counsel for the appellant, including the matters imputed to the hypothetical investor ([233]).

The Court also rejected the submission that a verdict of acquittal should have been directed on materiality because Mr Sellars-Jones, asked about an investor who had read a newspaper article and then heard the information, said he could not assess its reliability ([168]). The jury were not bound to accept any expert, other evidence was capable of making out the Crown case, and the hypothetical put to him “excluded the critical aspect of the source” ([170]-[172]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J (joint judgment of the Court)

Read judgment: [125]–[140] (opens in a new tab), [157]–[160] (opens in a new tab)

These passages were necessary to reject the appeal grounds challenging whether the particularised communication, its source and an uncertain deal could constitute information, and whether an obligation of confidence was required. The Court’s construction and application of the statutory definition supported its conclusions that grounds 2 to 4 and ground 5 were not made good.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Mason P, Wood CJ at CL and Sully J (joint judgment of the Court)

Read judgment: [167]–[174] (opens in a new tab), [228]–[235] (opens in a new tab)

The first passage was necessary to reject the ground that the materiality evidence could not support conviction because the expert hypothetical omitted the source. The second was necessary to reject the grounds attacking the jury directions: the Court held that the particularised information and its source were imputed to the hypothetical investor, while the precise manner in which the accused received it was irrelevant.

Why does this case matter?

Insider trading is easily pictured as the use of a settled secret that later proves true. Rivkin is a record of a prosecution that was fought over something much less tidy: a short, spoken exchange in which the speaker’s exact words, his reliability and the state of his negotiations were all in dispute, and the recipient said he had not believed any of it. That makes it a better guide to how the elements of the offence are contested in practice than a reading of the section alone. A student who knows only the elements will not see where a defence has to be run, and the way the grounds were framed and answered here shows that.

Exam and application relevance

Say which provisions the Court was applying. The charge was under s 1002G(2) and “information” was defined by s 1002A(1) ([1], [79]). The Financial Services Reform Act 2001 replaced those provisions from 11 March 2002, and the High Court has said that the general scheme of the new prohibitions did not differ in any presently relevant way from the provisions it replaced, and that “information” is defined there to include matters of supposition (Mansfield [2012] HCA 49 at [23]-[24]). A problem question under the current Division 3 of Part 7.10 therefore treats Rivkin as a decision on the predecessor provisions.

Present it as a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal on the information particularised in that trial, not as a decision of the High Court. Where the facts involve a tentative or second-hand statement, begin by identifying exactly what the person is said to have possessed: Rivkin shows the particulars being used as the reference point for the possession, general availability and materiality questions ([125], [162]).

Check your understanding

1. What three things did the Crown particularise Mr McGowan as having said, and in what form did Mr McGowan describe the conversation in his evidence ([4], [17])?

2. How did the Court answer the argument that the “information” could not be that Mr McGowan had said something ([131])?

3. What did the Court say about a degree of uncertainty attaching to the word “deal”, and what were the words it used about the “done deal” argument ([157], [159])?

4. Why did the Court reject the argument that information must be received under an obligation of confidence ([139])?

5. On the materiality element, what could the jury treat the hypothetical investors as knowing about Mr McGowan, and what were they to put out of mind ([227], [232])?

6. What did Basten JA say in Hannes (No 2) about the insider trading count, and which parts of Barr and Hall JJ’s reasoning did he concur in ([60]-[61])?