CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India

High Court of Australia · 2026

Investment And Financial RegulationInvestment Award Enforcement

CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9

Investors held a US$111 million award against India and asked the Federal Court to enforce it under the New York Convention. India pleaded immunity as a foreign State. Had it given that up by ratifying the Convention?

What happened?

In 1998 India and Mauritius made a bilateral investment treaty, in force from 20 June 2000 until 22 March 2017, which provided for arbitration of investment disputes under different regimes ([8]). One regime was arbitration under the ICSID Convention, which required both States to be parties to it; India was not ([9]). Another was ad hoc arbitration under modified UNCITRAL Rules ([9]). In July 2012 three Mauritian investors began an ad hoc arbitration against India in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, seated in The Hague, alleging that India had expropriated their investments, which arose from their shareholding in an Indian company that had agreed to lease part of an electromagnetic spectrum on satellites from an Indian State-owned company, by annulling that agreement in 2011 ([10]-[13]).

The tribunal found by majority that India had breached its obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment, and on 13 October 2020 it issued a Quantum Award of US$111,296,000 ([14]-[15]).

The appellants are assignees of the investors and were substituted as parties ([1]). They sought in the Federal Court an order under s 8(3) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) that the award be enforced as if it were a judgment of the Court ([17]). India applied to set the enforcement application aside on the ground that it had immunity under s 9 of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) ([18]). The appellants said India had submitted to the jurisdiction under s 10 by ratifying the New York Convention.

They did not rely on the arbitration agreement in the treaty as an agreement to submit to the Court’s jurisdiction, or on the arbitration exception in s 17 ([2], [18]). India had ratified the Convention in 1960 with a reservation that it would apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships considered commercial under Indian law ([22]).

Jackman J held that India had waived its immunity by ratifying the Convention ([4]). The Full Court of the Federal Court (Derrington, Stewart and Feutrill JJ) allowed India’s appeal. It assumed that India had waived its immunity, but held that India’s reservation reduced the other Convention States’ obligations correspondingly, so that any waiver did not extend to this award, which it held was not commercial ([5], [29]-[30]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs ([58]). Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ gave a single set of joint reasons; no Justice wrote separately. The Court decided the appeal on what it called the “principal, and narrow, issue” of whether India’s act of ratifying the New York Convention was a waiver of its foreign State immunity from jurisdiction for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award ([6]). The Attorney-General of the Commonwealth intervened.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

India’s act of ratifying the New York Convention was not, in and of itself, a waiver of its foreign State immunity from jurisdiction in proceedings to recognise and enforce, under Pt II of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), a foreign arbitral award to which it is a party. The joint reasons said that the Convention “displays neither a clear nor an unequivocal intention that entry into the Convention involves such a waiver”, and that its text and context “suggest that State ratification was not intended to constitute, in and of itself, a waiver of foreign State immunity” ([6]).

The Court began from a “strong presumption that a foreign State has not abandoned its independence and autonomy by waiving that otherwise preserved immunity” ([33]). The strength of that presumption is the primary reason for the principle that any waiver of foreign State immunity in an international agreement must be clear and unmistakeable, and such a waiver “must be derived from the express words of the agreement (including necessary implications from those words)” ([34]).

The presumption was not overcome. The text of the Convention “contains no express reference to foreign State immunity” and the travaux préparatoires contain only limited and potentially conflicting consideration of it ([35]); what consideration there is “demonstrates an intention to preserve foreign State immunity in the courts of other States” ([37]). Art III obliges contracting States to recognise awards as binding and enforce them “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon” ([20]).

The Court rejected the submission of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth that those words are confined to matters such as the presentation of documents and translations, and said that the rules of foreign State immunity, although jurisdictional, are treated at international law as rules of procedure ([38]). Art III therefore “qualifies the obligation of contracting States to enforce arbitral awards by reference to whatever rules of foreign State immunity are adopted by the territory where the award is relied upon”, and that qualification is inconsistent with a waiver having occurred merely by ratification, which would have left no role for those rules ([39]).

State practice did not show otherwise. The Court found it unnecessary to consider in detail the present position in the United States ([41]), but said that subsequent practice must show a “common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the terms”, and that even if the appellants and the Attorney-General were right about the United States, that “would plainly not be sufficient to establish any substantial degree of common understanding across the 172 State parties” ([41]). It added that it was at least arguable that the understanding discernible from the United States, United Kingdom and Canadian authority is that ratification, by itself, is not a sufficient act of waiver ([42]).

The Court did not decide the scope of the New York Convention, including whether it extends to arbitrations to which a State is a party that do not involve a commercial or private law dispute, or the effect of India’s reservation, because neither question arose once ratification was not a waiver ([7], [57]). It declined to entertain a late submission of the Attorney-General that ratification together with entry into an arbitration agreement could amount to a waiver, because it lay beyond the grounds of appeal, was not addressed by the courts below and raised issues not explored in the Court ([44]). It said that any indications that the Convention might not extend to disputes concerning the exercise of sovereign power “provide further support” for the conclusion that, if those disputes are within it, ratification does not involve a waiver ([57]).

The appellants and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth sought to draw an analogy with Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl (2023) 275 CLR 292, in which the Court held that Spain had waived its foreign State immunity from recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by entering the ICSID Convention and becoming bound by Arts 53, 54 and 55 ([45]). The Court said: “At every point, the asserted analogy fails” ([45]). It gave three reasons.

First, the ICSID Convention is expressly concerned with disputes to which a State is a party, and its travaux préparatoires involved detailed consideration of the existence and scope of foreign State immunity, whereas the New York Convention is concerned with “persons, whether physical or legal” ([46]). Secondly, foreign State immunity was the subject of express provision in Art 55 of the ICSID Convention, which was inserted to preserve State immunity from execution only; its express words, read with Art 54, were a basis for the conclusion in United States authority that ratification of the ICSID Convention involved a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction. By contrast, the express words of Art III of the New York Convention support the preservation of immunity from jurisdiction ([47]).

Thirdly, the reasons in Spain refer to a footnote in commentary of the International Law Commission that lists the ICSID Convention as an example of State practice in which a State has previously expressed its consent to jurisdiction in a treaty, and the same source lists the New York Convention as another example. The appellants said that the footnote equated the two. The Court said that the ICSID provisions referred to in that source were Arts 53, 54 and 55, the very articles in issue in Spain, whereas the New York Convention provisions referred to were Arts II, III, V, VI, VII, XI, XIII and XIV, so it was unclear whether the Commission’s suggestion rested on Art III or, for example, on Art II, which might be seen as corresponding in part to the arbitration exception to foreign State immunity in provisions such as s 17(2) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [39] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons interpret Art III as preserving the immunity rules of the enforcing State. That interpretation defeats the asserted waiver by ratification alone and supplies the ground for dismissing the appeal. This classification concerns the Court’s reasoning, rather than the commentary quoted in support of it.

Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)

The suggestion that United States, United Kingdom and Canadian authority may disclose an understanding against waiver is expressly tentative. It is unnecessary to the result because the Court had already rejected the claimed United States practice as insufficient to establish a common understanding among the Convention parties.

Obiter · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [57] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

The suggestion that possible limits on the Convention’s coverage of sovereign acts provide further support against waiver is supplementary. The Court expressly leaves the scope question for a case in which it is determinative; this passage does not establish that such disputes are excluded.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [45]–[49] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)

These passages reject the appellants’ and intervenor’s reliance on Spain as a reason to infer waiver from New York Convention ratification. The differences in subject matter, express immunity provisions and the International Law Commission reference answer that argument within the Court’s chosen ground of decision. They distinguish Spain; they do not alter its ICSID holding or decide the unargued arbitration exception.

Why does this case matter?

An award against a government is often discussed as if it were an award against any other debtor, so that the question becomes which arbitration convention the creditor invokes and whether the award fits it. An examiner expects the next step: the immunity question is a separate question about the foreign State’s own agreement, and it is answered from the Act that governs immunity and from the instrument the creditor relies on.

Exam and application relevance

Frame the question under the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth): s 9 gives the immunity and s 10 allows a foreign State to submit by agreement ([3]). Then identify which instrument is said to contain the agreement and read its words and context for a clear and unmistakeable waiver ([34]).

State the holding at the width the Court gave it, which is the one the joint reasons put at [6] and [57]. The Full Court’s route through India’s reservation is not the basis on which the High Court decided ([5], [7]), and a problem that relies on an arbitration agreement or on s 17 raises questions this appeal did not decide ([18], [44]).

Keep the comparison with Spain to what the Court said: the ICSID Convention is expressly concerned with disputes to which a State is a party, and Art 55 expressly addresses immunity ([46]-[47]). For an ICSID award the question is what Arts 53-55 show; for a Pt II award it is what the New York Convention shows.

Check your understanding

1. What was the “principal, and narrow, issue” on which the High Court decided the appeal, and on what basis had the primary judge and the Full Court each approached it ([5], [6], [26]-[30])?

2. Why does the Court say that the strength of the presumption of foreign State immunity matters to how a treaty is read ([33], [34])?

3. What does Art III of the New York Convention say about the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, and how did the Court use that wording ([38], [39])?

4. Why did the Court say that the United States authority relied on by the appellants would not be sufficient to establish a common understanding among the State parties ([41])?

5. Give the three reasons the Court gave for saying that the analogy with Spain failed ([46]-[49]).

6. What did the Court decline to decide about the scope of the New York Convention, and why ([7], [51], [57])?