Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l.
Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. [2023] HCA 11; (2023) 275 CLR 292
An ICSID tribunal awarded investors €101 million against Spain. When they asked the Federal Court to enforce it, Spain pleaded immunity as a foreign State. Had it already given that immunity up by treaty?
Affirmed by CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9
In CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9, a joint judgment of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ applied this approach, citing Spain at [19]-[26] and [29]. The Court said that the strength of the presumption that a foreign State has not waived its immunity is the primary reason for the principle that any waiver in an international agreement must be clear and unmistakeable, and derived from the express words of the agreement, including necessary implications from those words ([34]). It held that India’s ratification of the New York Convention was not, in and of itself, a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award ([6], [57]).
Clarified by CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9
In CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9, the High Court rejected an argument that Spain supplied an analogy for finding a waiver in a State’s ratification of the New York Convention: “At every point, the asserted analogy fails” ([45]). It gave three reasons. The ICSID Convention is expressly concerned with disputes to which a State is a party, and its travaux préparatoires considered State immunity in detail, whereas the New York Convention is concerned with “persons, whether physical or legal” ([46]). Art 55 of the ICSID Convention expressly preserves State immunity from execution only, whereas Art III of the New York Convention, by requiring enforcement “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon”, supports preservation of immunity from jurisdiction ([47]). And the International Law Commission footnote referred to in Spain at [75] does not equate the two treaties, because the ICSID provisions cited there were Arts 53, 54 and 55, whereas the provisions cited for the New York Convention were different articles ([48]-[49]). Spain’s reasoning on Arts 53-55 therefore rests on the ICSID Convention’s own text and travaux.
What happened?
The respondents, Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and another, relied on provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty to begin arbitration against the Kingdom of Spain under the ICSID Convention, to which Spain is a party ([1]). They obtained an arbitral award of €101 million and brought proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia to enforce it under s 35(4) of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), which provides that, with leave, the Federal Court can enforce an award “as if the award were a judgment or order of that court” ([2]). They sought orders including that Spain pay €101 million with interest ([2]).
Spain relied on the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). Section 9 makes a foreign State immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of Australia, except as the Act provides, and one exception is where the State has submitted to the jurisdiction, including by agreement; an “agreement” includes a treaty, and the treaty relied on was the ICSID Convention ([3]).
Spain’s immunity objection did not wholly succeed before the primary judge (Stewart J) or the Full Court of the Federal Court (Allsop CJ, Perram and Moshinsky JJ). Stewart J ordered that Spain pay the applicants €101 million ([5]). The Full Court made new orders, including an order recognising the award as binding on Spain and an order that judgment be entered against Spain for €101 million ([6]).
Spain appealed to the High Court on two issues: whether its agreement to Arts 53-55 involved any waiver of immunity from the jurisdiction of Australian courts, and, if so, how far any waiver extended and whether the Full Court’s orders fell within it ([7]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs ([80]). Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ gave a single set of joint reasons; no Justice wrote separately. The Full Court’s orders were left undisturbed ([8]). The Court found it unnecessary to consider the grounds of the respondents’ notice of contention, which they raised only in case they failed on their primary submissions ([80]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Spain argued that s 10 of the Foreign States Immunities Act permits an Australian court to recognise a waiver of immunity in a treaty only if the treaty’s words contain an “express”, and not an “implied”, waiver, reflecting an international law principle that waiver by treaty must always be express ([17]). The joint reasons accepted that international authority insists on express waiver in a treaty ([19]-[22]) but gave “express” a particular meaning. An express term takes its meaning primarily from the words expressed, and express meaning can include implications, which are identified by inference ([23]-[24]).
The authorities that insist on express waiver “should not be understood as denying the ordinary and natural role of implications in elucidating the meaning of the express words of the treaty” ([24]). The insistence that waiver be “express” should be understood as “requiring only that the expression of waiver be derived from the express words of the international agreement, whether as an express term or as a term implied for reasons including necessity” ([25]).
That standard is demanding. The insistence on express waiver is an insistence that any inference of waiver “must be drawn with great care when interpreting the express words of that agreement in context”, so that where a treaty does not use the word “waiver”, the inference that an express term involves one is drawn only if the implication is clear from the words used and the context ([26]). The Court found no basis to read s 10(2) as excluding a waiver “evidenced by implications inferred from the express words of a treaty in their context and in light of their purpose” ([27]).
It said: “A high level of clarity and necessity are required before inferring that a foreign State has waived its immunity in a treaty” ([28]). Section 10(2) provides that a foreign State is not taken to have submitted merely because it is party to an agreement whose proper law is the law of Australia, but it refers expressly to submission “by agreement” ([28]).
The Court held that, Spain being the subject of a binding ICSID arbitral award, Spain’s agreement to Arts 53-55 of the ICSID Convention amounted to a waiver of foreign State immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of Australia to recognise and enforce the award, but not to execute it ([8]). Those articles have force of law in Australia through the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) ([37]).
The reasoning began with the text. In Art 54(1) the obligation to “recognize” applies to the whole award and goes no further than recognising it “as binding”, while the obligation to “enforce” applies only to “the pecuniary obligations imposed by [the] award” and goes no further than enforcing them “as if [the award] were a final judgment of a court in that State” ([43]). Execution is governed by the laws of the State where it is sought (Art 54(3)), and Art 55 provides that nothing in Art 54 derogates from the law of a Contracting State on immunity from execution, so that “Whether or not enforcement against a State party to an award can lead to execution is left entirely to be determined under the domestic law” of that State ([4], [41], [44]).
The French and Spanish texts are equally authentic and use “exécution” and “ejecución” where the English text uses “enforcement” and “execution” ([59]). The Court held that no difference needed to be reconciled, because those words slide between enforcement and execution against the background of the civilian process of exequatur ([62]-[63]), and that “there is no real difference” between the texts on the distinction between recognition and enforcement, on one side, and execution, on the other ([66]). It rejected a reconciliation that would extend State immunity law to enforcement as out of step with the object and purpose of the Convention, which includes mitigating sovereign risk ([61]).
On waiver, Spain submitted that Art 54 is not concerned with awards sought to be enforced against a State in a foreign court, and that its words are not sufficiently clear to amount to a waiver ([67]-[68]). The Court said that Spain’s submission required the text to be read “in a contorted manner”. Given Art 53, under which awards are binding, and Art 55, which preserves immunity from execution only, it “would distort the terms of Art 54(1) to require separate conduct that amounted to a waiver of immunity before an award could be recognised and enforced against a foreign State” ([69]).
The Court accepted that Art 54 was included mainly so that States could obtain effective remedies against investors, but said that this was to give parity with the obligations of States, and that Art 54 does not distinguish between awards against investors and awards against host States ([71]-[72]). It concluded that “the express terms of Art 54(1) involve a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in relation to recognition and enforcement”, a conclusion consistent with United States decisions on the ICSID Convention ([74]) and supported by the 1991 Report of the International Law Commission ([75]).
Two further submissions failed. Spain’s alternative argument that any waiver covered only “bare recognition” rested only on the different wording of the French and Spanish texts, which the materials did not support ([76]-[77]). Its reliance on the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Republic of Moldova v Komstroy LLC failed because “the relevant agreement arose from Spain’s entry into the ICSID Convention, which included its agreement as to the consequences of an award rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention” ([79]).
The Court left immunity from execution untouched: “No issue arises in this proceeding concerning the scope of that immunity, including any exceptions to that immunity, such as where the execution relates to commercial property” ([9]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ
Read judgment: [25] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [28] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons use this demanding standard to reject Spain’s argument that s 10 excludes waiver inferred from treaty words. Allowing necessary implications while requiring a high level of clarity supplies the test by which the Court determines whether Spain submitted to jurisdiction through the ICSID Convention. This reasoning is necessary to that ground of decision; it does not establish waiver merely from participation in any treaty.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ
Read judgment: [8] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [43]–[44] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [69] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)
The distinction between recognition and enforcement, on the one hand, and execution, on the other, is necessary to uphold the Full Court’s orders against Spain’s immunity objection. Reading Arts 53-55 together, the joint reasons hold that Spain’s treaty agreement permits recognition and enforcement of its binding ICSID award without a separate waiver. This is the ground for rejecting Spain’s challenge to those orders. The holding preserves immunity from execution; it does not decide the scope or exceptions of that immunity.
Why does this case matter?
Enforcing an award against a government raises a question that does not arise when the debtor is a private company: whether the Australian court may take the proceeding at all. A common error is to begin with the International Arbitration Act and ask only whether the award is valid and enforceable, so that the immunity question is not asked. Examiners look for the student who asks it first, finds the statutory route out of immunity, and then reads the treaty as a text, article by article, instead of assuming that joining a treaty either does or does not give up a State’s protection.
Exam and application relevance
Start the immunity question from the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth): s 9 gives the immunity, s 10 allows a foreign State to submit by agreement, and an agreement includes a treaty ([3], [14]). The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), Pt IV, then explains how an ICSID award reaches an Australian court ([37]).
Identify the treaty provisions relied on and distinguish the court order sought from any later steps against State property. The appeal was about immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts, not about the merits of the tribunal’s award ([7]).
If a problem is about seizing a State’s property, the case marks where its holding stops: immunity from execution, and its exceptions such as commercial property, were not in issue ([9]). If the award is not an ICSID award, the reasoning on Arts 53-55 depended on the text and travaux of those articles. The High Court has since held that ratifying the New York Convention is not in and of itself a waiver (CCDM Holdings LLC v The Republic of India [2026] HCA 9 at [6]), so a different treaty calls for its own words and context to be read against the standard at [25]-[28].
Check your understanding
1. Which two sections of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) did the argument turn on, and what does the Act treat a treaty as for the purposes of s 10 ([3], [14])?
2. What did the joint reasons say the insistence on an “express” waiver in a treaty requires, and how clear must an implication of waiver be before it is drawn ([25], [26], [28])?
3. How do the joint reasons distinguish “recognize”, “enforce” and execution in Arts 54 and 55 ([43], [44])?
4. Why did the Court conclude that the French and Spanish texts did not change the result ([62], [63], [66])?
5. What did the Court say its conclusion left unaffected, and what did it say about the scope of that immunity ([8], [9])?
6. On what ground did the Court reject the argument based on the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision in Komstroy ([79])?