Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4)
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963
A Citigroup trader bought over a million Patrick shares while Citigroup’s bankers were secretly advising Toll on a bid for Patrick. ASIC sued Citigroup for insider trading on two footings. What did Citigroup have to meet on each?
Clarified by Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 18
The High Court later explained paragraph (b)(i) of the s 9 definition of officer in Shafron v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 18. In joint reasons, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said that the inquiry is directed to the role the person plays in the corporation ([23]); that the persons described in paragraph (b) are identified by what they do, what capacity they have or what influence on the directors they have had, so that a person within (b)(i) need not be in substantially the same position as a director ([25]); that participating in making decisions is a question of fact and degree about the significance of the person’s role in the ultimate act of making a decision ([26]); and that the decisions must have the significance for the business that the statute prescribes ([27]). Heydon J, writing separately, held that Mr Shafron fell within paragraph (a) as company secretary ([40]).
Affirmed by Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King [2020] HCA 4
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v King [2020] HCA 4, which concerned whether the chief executive of a parent company was an officer of a subsidiary under paragraph (b)(ii), the High Court adopted the management reasoning in Citigroup. Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ said that the inquiry under (b)(i) and (ii) asks what role the person played in the corporation, not for an a priori classification of his or her position ([35]); that (b)(i) and (ii) capture only persons who are in fact engaged in the corporation’s decision-making qua management ([43]); and, citing Jacobson J in Citigroup, that the language of those paragraphs has its origin in Ormiston J’s description of management in Bracht and corresponds in large measure with it ([44]-[45]). Nettle and Gordon JJ, agreeing with the orders in separate reasons, said that paragraph (b) is essentially functional in character, that persons within it do not hold a named office and need not be in substantially the same position as directors, and, citing Citigroup [483] and [490], that sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) are concerned with identifying persons involved in management, that is, people involved in policy making and decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of the business of the corporation ([87]-[88]). King did not consider Mr Manchee’s position.
What happened?
Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Limited divided its business between private side employees, such as those in the Investment Banking Division, who were exposed to confidential information, and public side employees, who were not, and it maintained what it called Chinese walls between them ([7]-[9]). On 8 August 2005 Toll Holdings engaged Citigroup, through the Investment Banking Division, as joint adviser on a proposed takeover of Patrick Corporation Limited ([34]).
On 19 August 2005 the market was alive with rumours that Toll would bid for Patrick, and Mr Andrew Manchee, a proprietary trader on the public side, bought over one million Patrick shares for Citigroup ([11], [41]). ASIC did not allege that he possessed inside information when he bought them ([12], [473]). Mr Bartels, who headed a private side division, noticed the trading and told Mr Sinclair, the Head of Equities, who asked Mr Darwell, Mr Manchee’s superior on the public side, to look into it ([42]-[50]). Mr Darwell took Mr Manchee downstairs, asked how many shares he had bought and why, and told him not to buy any more ([56]). Mr Manchee then sold 192,352 Patrick shares between about 3:37pm and 4:05pm ([478]). Toll announced its offer at 8:30am on Monday 22 August 2005 ([199]).
ASIC sued Citigroup under s 1043A of the Corporations Act on two footings: the sale of the 192,352 shares through Mr Manchee, and Citigroup’s trading throughout the day while its private side officers knew that it was acting for Toll ([466], [572]-[573]). It also brought claims that Citigroup breached fiduciary duties to Toll and contravened other provisions ([253]).
What did the Court decide?
Jacobson J of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed ASIC’s application and ordered ASIC to pay Citigroup’s costs. Both of ASIC’s insider trading claims failed, each for reasons given in Jacobson J’s conclusion ([603]-[604]), and so did its conflicts claims, which failed at the outset because the engagement letter excluded a fiduciary relationship between Citigroup and Toll ([599]-[600]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
ASIC’s first claim was that Citigroup, through Mr Manchee, sold 192,352 Patrick shares at or shortly after 3:37pm on 19 August 2005 while in possession of inside information, which it said was a supposition Mr Manchee made at about 3:30pm that Citigroup was acting for Toll on the takeover of Patrick ([466]). Jacobson J treated attribution as a threshold question. Under s 1042G(1)(a), even if Mr Manchee possessed inside information, “his knowledge is not attributable to Citigroup unless he was an officer of that body corporate” ([479]).
Mr Manchee was not a director or secretary, so the question was whether he fell within the remaining limbs of the s 9 definition, which the Court described as covering a person who made, or participated in making, decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business; who had the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors were accustomed to act ([480]).
His Honour held that the first two of those categories, (b)(i) and (b)(ii), are both concerned with identifying persons who are involved in management of the corporation ([483]). He drew on the legislative history, which distinguished officers from employees ([484]-[487]), on the origin of the definition in Ormiston J’s description of management in Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht ([488]-[490]), and on cases applying the definition ([491]-[495]), and said that the duties imposed on officers by ss 180 to 184 reinforced the view ([496]). The result was that “an officer is involved in policy making and decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of the business of the corporation” ([490]).
Applying that, he held that Mr Manchee did not fall within (b)(i) or (b)(ii): “ASIC has not established that he had any involvement in policy making or decisions that affected the whole or a substantial part of the business of Citigroup”, and he was one of five proprietary traders with no evidence that anyone reported to him or that he had any responsibilities apart from proprietary trading ([497]). His AUD$10 million daily trading limit was not of itself sufficient to give him the capacity to affect Citigroup’s financial standing, because a loans officer at a large branch who may lend recklessly “is an employee, not an officer of the corporation” ([499]), and it had not been shown that the figure was significant in Citigroup’s business ([500]). The first claim therefore failed because Mr Manchee was not an officer ([501]).
Jacobson J gave a second reason that applied “even if” Mr Manchee was an officer. The claim could not succeed unless Mr Manchee made the supposition in precisely the terms pleaded ([502]-[503]), and ASIC had not established that he did: its counsel had not asked him whether he made the supposition in those terms, he sold nearly 200,000 shares after the conversation with Mr Darwell rather than retaining them or buying more, and a supposition of some involvement of Citigroup “begs the question as to what it was” ([504]-[505], [512]).
ASIC’s second claim was that Citigroup acquired and sold Patrick shares throughout 19 August 2005 while Citigroup personnel possessed the information that Citigroup was acting for Toll on the proposed bid and that there was a substantial likelihood that Toll would launch it in the near future ([572]-[573]). Jacobson J held that Mr Roberts as CEO was plainly an officer and so, as Citigroup’s counsel conceded, were Mr Sinclair and Mr Bartels, that each knew at the opening of trading that Citigroup was acting for Toll and that the bid was likely to be launched on Monday 22 August 2005, and that Citigroup was therefore aware, through at least those officers, of the elements of the inside information alleged ([574]-[576]). The substantial question was whether Citigroup could rely on s 1043F ([579]).
To make good that defence Citigroup had to show that the transaction met each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 1043F ([580]). Paragraph (a) was satisfied because the decision to buy or sell was made by Mr Manchee, who was not a person in possession of the information ([580]). Paragraph (c) was satisfied because Mr Darwell did not communicate the information to Mr Manchee and, although his instruction not to purchase any more shares might be characterised as advice, s 1043F(b) is satisfied even if advice was given, so long as it is not given by a person in possession of the information, and Mr Darwell was not ([581]-[584]).
That left whether Citigroup had in place arrangements which satisfied paragraph (b) ([585]). Jacobson J accepted that what took place on the afternoon was unscripted, that Mr Manchee remained isolated from the information only as a result of the oblique nature of the communications and Mr Darwell’s circumspect behaviour, and, on the assumption that what Mr Sinclair told Mr Darwell was material non-public information, that his first communication with Mr Darwell did not follow Citigroup’s written procedures ([588], [590]). But the arrangements required by s 1043F(b) “do not require a standard of absolute perfection”; the test is objective, and is “arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure that the information was not communicated” ([592]).
The arrangements described by Mr Monaci, who was not cross-examined on their adequacy, “did not, in express terms, anticipate the situation which arose on 19 August 2005 but they laid down general procedures which could reasonably be expected to ensure that legal or compliance officers of Citigroup vetted any communication of potentially price sensitive information to prevent it crossing the Chinese wall” ([586], [589], [593]). He found no evidentiary support for ASIC’s submission that proprietary traders had to be brought across the wall, accepting Mr Monaci’s evidence that doing so risks sending a signal to the market ([594]-[595]), and rejected the submission that adequate arrangements entailed Toll’s informed consent to proprietary trading, since it would follow that Chinese walls could never amount to a defence in the absence of informed consent, which “would be contrary to the express recognition of the Chinese walls defence in s 1043F” ([597]-[598]).
Jacobson J added that the events of that afternoon and evening “show that Chinese walls may not be as solid as the name implies” ([604]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Jacobson J
Read judgment: [479]–[501] (opens in a new tab)
Jacobson J treated attribution through an officer as a threshold issue, construed the statutory officer categories and held that Mr Manchee was not an officer. That finding was one of the two stated grounds on which the first insider trading claim failed.
Ratio · Jacobson J
Read judgment: [502]–[515] (opens in a new tab)
Jacobson J held in the alternative that ASIC had to prove the supposition as pleaded and had not proved that Mr Manchee made it. The conclusion identifies this as a second ground for dismissing the first insider trading claim, so it independently supports the result.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Jacobson J
Read judgment: [574]–[580] (opens in a new tab), [585]–[598] (opens in a new tab)
Jacobson J found that Citigroup possessed the alleged information through officers, identified compliance with s 1043F as the substantial question, and held that Citigroup’s arrangements met the statutory standard. That defence was the stated ground on which the second insider trading claim failed.
Obiter · Jacobson J
Read judgment: [604] (opens in a new tab)
After holding that the s 1043F defence was engaged, Jacobson J observed that the events showed Chinese walls may not be as solid as their name implies. The warning was unnecessary to the dismissal and did not qualify the finding that the statutory defence succeeded.
Why does this case matter?
A common first move on a problem about a bank’s trading is to ask whether anyone at the bank had the information. The case is worth reading for the steps that come after that first question, and for how a heavy day of trading, a chain of calls between executives and a sale after an instruction to stop buying were not enough on their own. A problem about a bank’s trading is best built the way the case is built: who traded, who knew, in what capacity, and what the firm had in place are separate questions, and a regulator can win on some and lose the claim on another.
Exam and application relevance
Cite this as a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court applying Division 3 of Part 7.10 as it stood in 2007, on how ASIC’s two insider trading claims against a body corporate failed ([603]-[604]). Section 1043F is in the same words today as the version the Court set out at [252]. The Court’s approach to the definition of “officer” is tied to the s 9 wording it set out at [480], so confirm the present wording of s 9 and s 1042G before relying on its reasoning for a different kind of employee, and apply the test as the High Court has since stated it, functionally and by what the person does or can do in the corporation rather than by title or by equivalence to a director (ASIC v King [2020] HCA 4 at [35], [87]-[88]; Shafron v ASIC [2012] HCA 18 at [25]).
The Court gave two separate reasons for dismissing the first claim ([603]) and one for the second ([604]); keep them apart when describing the result. For the same kind of arrangements in the fiduciary and confidential-information setting, see Bolkiah v KPMG, on which Jacobson J drew for what makes a wall effective ([317]-[319]).
Check your understanding
1. Why did Jacobson J treat attribution as a threshold question on the first insider trading claim, and which provision did he apply ([479])?
2. What facts about Mr Manchee did Jacobson J rely on in finding that he was not an officer, and what did he say about his AUD$10 million daily limit ([497], [499]-[500])?
3. What second reason did Jacobson J give for dismissing the first claim, and what did he say about the evidence on it ([502]-[505])?
4. Which Citigroup personnel did Jacobson J find were officers who knew of the Toll bid, and why did that not decide the second claim ([574]-[576], [579])?
5. What are the three requirements Citigroup had to meet under s 1043F, and which of them was the substantial question ([580]-[585])?
6. How did Jacobson J state the test for the arrangements required by s 1043F(b), and why did he hold that Citigroup’s arrangements met it even though the events of 19 August were unscripted ([588]-[593])?
7. Why did Jacobson J reject ASIC’s submission about Toll’s informed consent as part of the Chinese walls defence ([597]-[598])?