Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

High Court of Australia · 2012

Investment And Financial RegulationContinuous DisclosureMarket Misconduct

Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39

A listed miner told the market it had signed “binding contracts” with Chinese state-owned builders. The documents were short framework agreements, and ASIC said no Australian court would enforce them. Did the announcements mislead?

Qualified by legislation: Treasury Laws Amendment (2021 Measures No. 1) Act 2021 (Cth), from 14 August 2021

Forrest v ASIC was decided on s 674 of the Corporations Act as it stood before 14 August 2021, when s 674(2) was a civil penalty provision with no fault element and s 674(2A) and (2B) dealt with persons involved in a contravention and the excusing provision. From that date s 674(2) is an offence only, and civil penalty and compensation proceedings run under s 674A, whose paragraph (d) requires that the entity knows, or is reckless or negligent with respect to whether, the information would have a material effect. Section 674A(3) and (4) replaced s 674(2A) and (2B), and s 1041H(4) provides that conduct which would contravene s 674A(2) only if paragraph (d) read as it does in s 674(2) does not contravene s 1041H(1). The amendments apply to conduct engaged in on or after 14 August 2021. The High Court’s conclusions about what Fortescue’s announcements conveyed, and about what s 674 required of Fortescue in the light of them, were reached on the earlier text and without any question of the fault element in s 674A(2)(d); the Court did not consider s 674(2A) or (2B) ([66]), and the case does not decide how s 674A(2)(d), s 674A(3) and (4) or s 1041H(4) apply.

What happened?

In 2004 Fortescue Metals Group Ltd was a public company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, and Mr Forrest was its chairman and chief executive and a substantial shareholder ([1]). It planned a mine, a port at Port Hedland and a railway in the Pilbara, and in 2004 it signed agreements, each headed “Framework Agreement”, with three Chinese state-owned companies: CREC on 6 August, CHEC on 1 October and CMCC on 20 October ([2]-[3]). The CREC agreement recorded that CREC had submitted an offer to execute the works and Fortescue had accepted it, but its first clause provided for the parties to “jointly develop and agree” on matters including general conditions of contract, the scope of work, the scheduling of the works and the determination of the value of the works ([12]).

On 23 August 2004 Fortescue told the ASX that it “has entered into a binding contract with China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) to build and finance the railway component” of the project ([13]). Letters and media releases made similar statements about the other agreements ([4]). A March 2005 press article suggested that the contracts were not binding, and Fortescue gave the ASX a copy of the CMCC agreement ([5]).

ASIC alleged that Fortescue contravened s 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct), that it contravened the continuous disclosure requirements of s 674, and that Mr Forrest breached s 180(1) of the Corporations Act on each occasion ([2]). Gilmour J dismissed the claims, and the Full Court of the Federal Court (Keane CJ, Emmett and Finkelstein JJ) allowed ASIC’s appeal and made declarations of contravention ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) allowed both appeals with costs. It set aside the orders of the Full Court and ordered that ASIC’s appeal to the Full Court be dismissed with costs, and it granted ASIC special leave to cross-appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal with costs (orders; [71]). French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[71]) and Heydon J gave separate reasons ([72]-[117]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons identified the determinative issue as what the impugned statements conveyed to their intended audience when they said that the parties had made a “binding contract” ([31]). They described the intended audience as investors, present and possible future, and perhaps a wider section of the commercial or business community ([36]), and said it was “ultimately unprofitable” to classify the statements as fact, opinion or law ([33]). The Full Court had moved from what the parties had said and done to the legal consequences of it, and had assumed that the statements conveyed that an Australian court would enforce the agreements ([35], [38]).

The joint reasons held that the better understanding was that the audience would take the statements as saying what the parties to the agreements understood they had done ([37]): there was no evidence that investors or others would have understood “binding contract” to say that a court would grant relief if a party did not perform ([39]), and “The impugned statements conveyed to their intended audience what the parties to the framework agreements had done and said they had done” ([43]).

They also held that the Full Court’s analysis assumed, without justification, that Australian law governed the agreements ([44]). The counter-parties were foreign state-owned entities, the agreements were signed in Beijing and had no choice of law or forum clause, and it would not have been “extreme or fanciful” for the audience to assume that Chinese law governed or that a state-owned counter-party’s public acceptance of binding obligations was a stronger spur to performance than a court action ([44]-[49]). ASIC had not shown that the audience would have taken the statements as directed to enforcement by an Australian court, and it would be “extreme or fanciful” to attribute that understanding to an ordinary or reasonable member of the audience ([50]).

The letter to the ASX accurately recorded what the framework agreement provided and was not misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive ([58]), and because the inquiry into how an ordinary or reasonable member of the audience would receive a message is hypothetical, it answers both limbs of s 1041H ([59]).

The joint reasons added two limits. They did not establish “any general proposition” that a public statement that one company has made a contract with another conveys only what the contractual document contains, because the message conveyed “cannot be determined without a close and careful analysis of the facts” ([69]). And for a claim of misleading or deceptive conduct, if a person characterises a public statement as a representation about a document’s content, “the critical question will be what the statement conveyed to its intended audience, not what the party concerned says that it was intended to convey” ([70]).

Heydon J, in separate reasons, reached the same result by a different route. He held that the statement that the CREC agreement was a binding contract was identifiable as an opinion, because whether an agreement is a binding contract involves a question of law ([94]), that ASIC had not proved that Fortescue did not genuinely hold the opinion ([96]-[101]), and that ASIC had not established that the audience took Fortescue to be saying that the parties had agreed on all the terms necessary for it to be “practicable to force” CREC to perform ([104]-[106]). He concluded that Fortescue’s conduct was not misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive ([108]).

The joint reasons held that the conclusion that Fortescue’s statements were not misleading or deceptive was “enough to dispose of” ASIC’s primary case under s 674, which proceeded from the premise that the statements misrepresented the effect of the agreements ([61]). They said: “Once it is decided that Fortescue’s statements that it had made binding contracts were not misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, it is not to be supposed that, despite Fortescue lawfully making those statements, the continuous disclosure requirements nonetheless required Fortescue to tell the market that the agreements were not binding contracts” ([62]).

ASIC’s alternative case, advanced by a proposed cross-appeal, was that if the statements expressed an opinion about the effect of the agreements, Fortescue had to disclose the agreements’ terms ([63]-[64]). The joint reasons held that its premise was not established because the statements did not express any relevant opinion and accurately conveyed what the agreements provided, so that “it is not to be supposed that s 674 nonetheless required Fortescue to publish the very text of those agreements” ([65]). There being no failure to disclose, they found it neither necessary nor appropriate to consider the arguments about s 674(2A), which concerned the liability of directors and officers where there is a breach of the continuous disclosure requirements, or about the excusing provisions in s 674(2B) ([66]). ASIC’s claim under s 180(1) against Mr Forrest depended on a contravention of s 1041H or s 674 and failed with them ([67]).

Heydon J reached the same conclusion on s 674. He said that, because s 1041H was not contravened, there was nothing in the argument that s 674 obliged Fortescue to disclose a contravention ([113]), and that nothing in s 674 supported an obligation to disclose the terms of the agreements on the facts as ASIC postulated them ([114]). Unlike the joint reasons, he would have refused special leave to cross-appeal ([114], [117]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ

Read judgment: [31]–[33] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [43] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [50] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [58]–[59] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [69]–[70] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)

Identifying what these announcements conveyed to an ordinary or reasonable member of their intended audience was necessary to reject ASIC’s s 1041H case. The joint reasons found that the statements accurately described what the parties had done and said, without conveying the alleged assurance of enforcement in an Australian court. The hypothetical audience inquiry also disposed of the likelihood limb. Paragraphs 69–70 explain the limits of that ground: its application depends on the particular facts and on the message received, rather than the speaker’s asserted intention. It is not a general rule that announcing a contract merely reports a document’s contents.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J

Read judgment: [94] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab), [96]–[101] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab), [104]–[108] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J concurred in allowing the appeals but used a distinct route: the binding-contract statement was identifiable as opinion, ASIC had not established that the opinion was not genuinely held, and the audience would not have understood the pleaded representation about practicably forcing performance. He also found reasonable grounds for the narrower representation. This is his separate reasoning, not the joint reasons’ adoption of an opinion classification; his audience analysis at [104] tests ASIC’s pleaded formulation.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ

Read judgment: [61]–[62] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [65]–[67] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

These passages supply the grounds for rejecting ASIC’s primary s 674 case, dismissing its cross-appeal and rejecting the dependent s 180(1) claim. The primary case depended on misleading announcements, while the alternative depended on the statements expressing an opinion that required publication of the agreements. Both premises failed on the findings about these announcements. The absence of a disclosure breach also explains why s 674(2A) and (2B) were not determined; this is no general exemption from continuous disclosure.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J

Read judgment: [113]–[115] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J concurred in allowing the appeals: the absence of a s 1041H contravention defeated the consequential disclosure case and the dependent s 180(1) claim. His treatment of the proposed cross-appeal differed from the joint reasons: he would refuse special leave, referring to the trivial significance of agreements on ASIC’s postulated facts and the undeveloped evidentiary argument. Agreement in the appeal result does not turn that refusal of leave into the joint reasons’ merits disposition.

Why does this case matter?

The case is often remembered as the one where Mr Forrest was cleared, but its lasting use is in showing how a regulator’s case can come undone in the way it was put. ASIC’s statement of claim, excluding schedules, ran to 108 pages and pleaded thirteen communications with many alternatives, and the Court said that it did not identify the case ASIC sought to make clearly and distinctly ([9], [25]-[27]). ASIC’s case at trial was treated as one of dishonesty, and on appeal it was argued on a different footing ([18], [28]). A student who reads only the outcome will miss that much of the Court’s criticism went to what was alleged and how, and that the same announcements were examined at trial, in the Full Court and in the High Court through different questions.

Exam and application relevance

Attribute each point to the Justices who made it, using the pinpoints above, and confine the case to announcements on facts like these: the joint reasons themselves warn against treating it as a rule about statements that a contract has been made ([69]).

Apply the current provisions to a present-day problem and use the case for what it decided on the 2004 and 2005 text.

Check your understanding

1. What was the “determinative issue” in the appeals, and which two groups did the joint reasons identify as the intended audience ([31], [36])?

2. What step in the Full Court’s reasoning did the joint reasons identify as critical, and what did the Full Court assume the statements conveyed ([35], [38])?

3. What features of the framework agreements and their counter-parties did the joint reasons say the Full Court had not considered ([44]-[47])?

4. How did the joint reasons describe the limits of their decision, and what did they say was the critical question for a claim of misleading conduct about the content of a document ([69]-[70])?

5. On what footing did Heydon J decide the s 1041H question, and how did the joint reasons’ approach to classifying the statements as fact or opinion differ ([94], [33], [65])?

6. Why did the joint reasons hold that s 674 did not require Fortescue to correct its statements or to publish the agreements ([61]-[65])?

7. What did the Court say about s 674(2A) and (2B), and how did Heydon J’s disposition of ASIC’s cross-appeal differ from the joint reasons ([66], [114], [117])?