JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia

High Court of Australia · 2012

PropertyInvestment And Financial RegulationCompulsory Acquisition

JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43; (2012) 250 CLR 1

Plain packaging left tobacco companies owning trade marks they could barely put on their own packets. Does a law that strips property of its commercial use acquire it, so that the Constitution demands just terms?

What happened?

The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) imposes significant restrictions on the colour, shape and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products. It prohibits the use of trade marks on that packaging other than as the Act permits, which allows the use of a brand, business or company name ([1]). Earlier requirements for health messages and graphic warnings stayed in place, including the Quitline logo and telephone number ([1]).

JT International SA and members of the British American Tobacco group argued that the Act effected an acquisition of their intellectual property rights and goodwill on other than just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution ([2]). JT International demurred to the Commonwealth’s defence, which pleaded that s 51(xxxi) was not engaged ([63]); in the British American Tobacco matter, questions were reserved for the Full Court under s 18 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ([65]). Philip Morris Ltd and other tobacco companies intervened in support of the plaintiffs in that matter, and Queensland, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory supported the Commonwealth ([64], [66]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court made its orders on 15 August 2012 and published its reasons on 5 October 2012. In JT International’s action, the demurrer was overruled, judgment was entered for the Commonwealth, and JT International was ordered to pay the Commonwealth’s costs. In the British American Tobacco matter, the Court answered “No” to the question whether the Act, apart from s 15, would result in an acquisition of the plaintiffs’ property otherwise than on just terms; answered “No” to whether that question required a trial of disputed facts; said the third question did not arise; answered “No” to the fourth question; and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

French CJ ([3], [45]), Gummow J ([46], [159]-[160]), Hayne and Bell JJ in joint reasons ([161]), Crennan J ([244]) and Kiefel J ([373]-[374]) joined in those orders, each writing separately; Kiefel J would have answered the fourth question “Unnecessary to answer” ([373]). Heydon J dissented: he would have declared the Act invalid, apart from s 15, and answered the first question “Yes” ([242]-[243]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution is engaged by an acquisition of property, and a law that takes or restricts property is not such a law unless the Commonwealth or another person acquires an interest or benefit of a proprietary character. French CJ put the distinction this way: “Taking involves deprivation of property seen from the perspective of its owner. Acquisition involves receipt of something seen from the perspective of the acquirer”, and “the interest or benefit accruing to the Commonwealth or another person must be proprietary in character” ([42]). Hayne and Bell JJ called it a “bedrock principle”: there is no acquisition without “the Commonwealth or another acquir[ing] an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial it may be” ([169]).

The decisive step was acquisition, not taking. Gummow J held that the Act’s operation was a “taking” of the plaintiffs’ statutory intellectual property ([137]-[141]); Hayne and Bell JJ assumed a taking ([164]); French CJ said the controls “may be said to constitute a taking” ([44]). Hayne and Bell JJ held that the Act’s requirements “are no different in kind from any legislation that requires labels that warn against the use or misuse of a product” ([181]), that the tobacco companies still own and use the packaging ([182]), and that “Compliance with the TPP Act creates no proprietary interest” ([183]); Gummow J agreed with that analysis ([150]). Pursuing the Act’s objects, including public health and giving effect to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, was not a benefit of a proprietary nature, and any saving in health expenditure was conjectural (Gummow J, [147]-[148]; Kiefel J, [368]-[372]).

Loss of value is not what the provision protects. Hayne and Bell JJ said s 51(xxxi) does not protect “the general commercial and economic position occupied by traders” ([167]); Crennan J said it “is not directed to preserving the value of a commercial business” or of an item of property ([295]); Kiefel J said it is “directed to proprietary interests and not to the commercial position of traders” ([357]). Earlier references to an “identifiable benefit or advantage” in the Tasmanian Dam Case and Mutual Pools were read as referring to a benefit of a proprietary nature (Hayne and Bell JJ, [172]-[173]; Gummow J, [151]-[154]).

Heydon J dissented. He held that the plaintiffs’ rights were “rendered useless for all practical purposes” ([216]), that the legislation “caused the Commonwealth to acquire the use of the space on the proprietors’ cigarette packets for its own purposes” ([217]), and that the resulting rights of control were “identifiable benefits or advantages relating to the ownership or use of property” ([218]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · French CJ

Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [44] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

French CJ distinguished deprivation from acquisition and required a proprietary benefit to the Commonwealth or another person. His conclusion that the packaging controls conferred no such benefit was necessary to his rejection of both challenges, even though the restrictions could be described as a taking. This classification concerns that acquisition reasoning, not every observation about intellectual property in his reasons.

Ratio · Hayne and Bell JJ; Gummow J agreeing with their acquisition analysis

Read judgment: [169] (PDF p 66) (opens in a new tab), [181]–[183] (PDF p 70) (opens in a new tab), [188] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab), [150] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab), [155] (PDF p 62) (opens in a new tab)

Hayne and Bell JJ applied the requirement of a proprietary acquisition to the alleged use or control of packaging: the companies retained the packaging, and compliance with the legislation created no proprietary interest in the Commonwealth. That conclusion answered the challenges even assuming a taking. Gummow J expressly adopted their analysis and identified absence of acquisition as the ground on which the Commonwealth succeeded. The language from Mason J in the Tasmanian Dam Case at [169] is an earlier formulation adopted and applied here, rather than a new test originating in this case.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [216] (PDF p 81) (opens in a new tab), [217] (PDF p 82) (opens in a new tab), [218] (PDF p 83) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J dissented. He treated the restrictions as destroying the practical utility of the companies’ rights and transferring control of the packet space to the Commonwealth for compulsory messages. He regarded those rights of control as identifiable benefits relating to ownership or use of property and therefore an acquisition. This explains his opposing route to invalidity; it is not the majority’s ratio or an obiter qualification of it.

Why does this case matter?

Plain packaging is the leading modern example of a law that leaves owners holding valuable intellectual property they can barely use, and students often treat the severity of the owner’s loss as the end of the s 51(xxxi) analysis. An examiner expects this case where a problem involves Commonwealth regulation of a product, its packaging or its marketing, and the answer that earns marks works through each element of the provision rather than the size of the harm.

The case answers a constitutional question only. A claim under an investment treaty about the same kind of measure is decided under the treaty’s own text, so a comparison has to keep the two sets of tests apart.

Exam and application relevance

Start with the property. French CJ said registered trade marks, designs, patents and copyright “are property to which s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution can apply” ([35]), so intellectual property can be the subject of the guarantee. Then identify precisely what the law confers, and on whom, and test that against the majority reasons.

State the limit. The Commonwealth also argued that a law restricting a harmful trading activity stands outside s 51(xxxi) even if it acquires property. Gummow J said propositions of that width “have not so far been endorsed by decisions of this Court” and would “require most careful consideration on an appropriate occasion” ([158]); Hayne and Bell JJ ([189]), Crennan J ([307]) and Kiefel J ([344]) found it unnecessary to decide. The case is therefore authority neither for nor against that argument.

Check your understanding

1. What did the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act prohibit on retail packaging, and what did it still allow?

2. How did French CJ distinguish a taking from an acquisition, and why did that distinction decide the case?

3. Why did Hayne and Bell JJ reject the argument that the Commonwealth obtained the use of, or control over, the packaging?

4. Which Justice dissented, and what did he say the Commonwealth acquired?

5. Which argument of the Commonwealth did the majority Justices find it unnecessary to decide, and what did Gummow J say about it?