Insider trading and inside information
Inside information
Information counts as inside information if two things are true. First, it is not generally available. Second, if it were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to affect the price or value of Division 3 financial products materially (s 1042A(1)). Each requirement has separate rules.
“Information” has a wide meaning under s 1042A(2). It covers guesses, matters too vague to tell the public, and a person’s intentions or likely intentions. In Mansfield v The Queen; Kizon v The Queen [2012] HCA 49, the High Court held that false information still counts as information. The joint reasons said knowledge conveyed can be “information” whether true, false, or mixed (at [29]); Heydon J agreed separately. The charges arose under s 1002G, the predecessor to s 1043A, but the parties argued the same principle applies to Division 3 (at [25]). The Court left the question of materiality for a new trial (at [7]).
In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373, the Court treated an inference drawn from conduct about someone’s intentions as “information” (at [411]). In R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7, the Court rejected an argument that information must be received under a duty of confidence (at [139]).
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963, Jacobson J held that a hint must be conveyed through words or conduct. However, the inference or supposition drawn from that hint is itself “information” (at [542]).
Turning to “not generally available”: s 1042C(1) sets out three ways information can be generally available. It may consist of readily observable matter. It may have been disclosed in a way likely to reach people who commonly invest in that kind of Division 3 product, once enough time has passed for the market to absorb it. Or it may consist of deductions, conclusions or inferences drawn either from readily observable matter or from information already disclosed under s 1042C(1)(b)(i).
In Citigroup, Jacobson J said the test for “readily observable” is whether the matter could have been observed, not whether anyone actually observed it (at [551]). In Hannes, the Court held that some parts of information being generally available does not make the whole body of information generally available.
Consequences
Breaching s 1043A(1) or (2) is a criminal offence under s 1311(1). Schedule 3 sets a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment for each. Because imprisonment is 10 years or more, courts can also impose a fine, or both.
For individuals, the fine cannot exceed the greater of 4,500 penalty units or, if the benefit and detriment can be calculated, three times that amount. For a body corporate, the fine cannot exceed the greatest of 45,000 penalty units, three times the benefit and detriment, or 10 per cent of annual turnover.
A penalty unit’s value is set under s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). It becomes $364 from 1 July 2026, applying only to offences committed from that date onward.
In Rivkin, the Court rejected calling the offence “victimless”. It reasoned that the investing community at large is harmed, through loss of confidence in market integrity.
Sections 1043A(1) and (2) are also financial services civil penalty provisions under s 1317E(3). ASIC may seek a declaration of contravention, a pecuniary penalty order, or a compensation order. Anyone who suffers damage may also seek compensation, but proceedings must start within six years.
A pecuniary penalty needs a declaration of contravention, plus proof the breach materially prejudiced acquirers, disposers or the issuer, or was otherwise serious. For individuals, it is capped at the greater of 5,000 penalty units or three times the benefit and detriment.
A compensation order can cover damage from the contravention, including any profits made, even without a declaration of contravention.
Section 1043L provides a further remedy. Where an insider knowingly or recklessly trades without the information being generally available, in breach of s 1043A(1), for Division 3 products other than derivatives, affected counterparties who lacked that information may recover the price difference caused by the non-disclosure. The issuer has similar rights, and the action is brought against the insider.
Contrast with the officer’s duty not to misuse information
Section 183 is a different, separate prohibition, covered elsewhere. In Vizard, Finkelstein J described the old s 183(1): the defendant had to be a director, obtain confidential information because of that position, misuse it by basing a trading decision on it, and do so to gain an advantage.
Division 3 is different. It does not require office, confidentiality or improper use. It only requires possession of the information, and that information need not come from inside the company (Mansfield).
Of the cases cited, only Mansfield is a High Court decision on insider trading itself. Shafron, King and Farah are High Court decisions on other points. Rivkin and Hannes are NSW Court of Criminal Appeal decisions; in Hannes, Basten JA dissented on the insider trading count. Citigroup and Vizard are single-judge Federal Court decisions. None of these bind a court outside its own hierarchy.
However, Farah (at [135]) says intermediate appellate courts and trial judges should generally follow an interstate intermediate appellate court’s interpretation of Commonwealth legislation, unless plainly wrong. This gives Rivkin and Hannes extra weight, though this rule applies only to intermediate appellate decisions.
A different part of Farah (at [134]) deals with following seriously considered dicta of a High Court majority. The Full Federal Court, in Harvard Nominees, read this as requiring both that the dicta be a majority’s, and that they fit long-established authority. The Full Court noted the High Court has not finally settled this point.
Finally, Mansfield, Rivkin and Hannes concern s 1002G, the predecessor to s 1043A. Vizard concerns the earlier s 183.
Applying this in a problem question
Start by identifying the products and conduct involved. Look for Division 3 financial products and for trading, procuring or communicating under s 1043A(1) and (2). The communicating limb only applies if there is a market operated in this jurisdiction.
Next, pin down the information as precisely as the facts allow. Include hints, suppositions, intentions and its source. Do not exclude it just because it is false or uncertain (s 1042A(2); Mansfield; Hannes; Citigroup).
Then test whether it is “inside information” by checking its two elements separately, at the time of the act: that it is not generally available (s 1042C), and that it would materially affect a hypothetical investor’s decisions (s 1042D).
Establish that the person possessed the information at that time. For a firm, check whose possession counts under s 1042G. Do not assume the information must have caused the trade or been confidential -- s 1043A(1) does not require either.
Separate the physical element of possession from the fault element in s 1043A(1)(b) or (2)(b), as s 1043A(3) requires. Identify whether the question is criminal or civil, since s 1317QB(1) governs proof of state of mind in civil penalty proceedings, subject to s 1317QB(4).
Check whether any exceptions apply (ss 1043B–1043K) or defences under s 1043M(2) and (3), and note who carries the evidential burden. For a firm, test its internal arrangements against each condition in s 1043F.
Finally, state the consequences for whichever track applies, including compensation under s 1043L, and explain how the criminal and civil tracks interact (ss 1317M–1317P).
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