Identification evidence: the warning the jury must be given
What a jury must be told about admitted identification evidence: the s 116 warning, confined by Dhanhoa v The Queen to identification whose reliability is disputed, the content of an adequate warning under Domican v The Queen, and Victoria’s Jury Directions Act provisions.
Learning outcomes
- Identify identification evidence using the statutory definition, including identification not based on sight.
- Decide whether s 116 requires a warning by asking whether the reliability of the identification is disputed, applying Dhanhoa v The Queen.
- Test the adequacy of a warning against Domican v The Queen, including the requirement to identify the particular weaknesses of the identification.
- Apply ss 36 and 37 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) to an identification direction in a Victorian trial.
An honest and confident eyewitness can be wrong, and a jury may not appreciate how easily. The law therefore controls identification evidence twice: some of it is excluded altogether, and what is admitted comes with a warning. This article is about the warning. The student’s prior question is whether the reliability of the identification is actually disputed, because if it is not, the warning has no work to do; if it is, the warning must deal with the weaknesses of the particular identification, not with eyewitness evidence in general.
The statutory rule stated below is s 116 of the uniform Evidence Acts in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory.12 Victoria has repealed its s 116 and uses the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). The content of an adequate warning comes from the High Court’s common law decision in Domican v The Queen. For the general warning about evidence that may be unreliable, see Judicial warnings about unreliable evidence.
What counts as identification evidence
The Dictionary to the Commonwealth Act defines identification evidence as an assertion by a person that a defendant was, or resembles (visually, aurally or otherwise), a person who was present at or near the place where the offence, or an act connected to it, was done, at or about the time it was done, being an assertion based wholly or partly on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived there; or a report of such an assertion. It is not confined to sight.
Part 3.9 applies only in a criminal proceeding (s 113). Sections 114 and 115 exclude some prosecution identification evidence. Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made, it would not have been reasonable to hold one, or the defendant refused to take part, and the identification was made without the witness being intentionally influenced (s 114(2)). Identification from pictures kept for the use of police officers is excluded in the circumstances listed in s 115. The Tasmanian Act does not enact ss 114 and 115; it carries notes recording that the Commonwealth Act does.
The s 116 direction
If identification evidence has been admitted, s 116(1) provides that the judge is to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence, and of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case. Section 116(2) provides that no particular form of words is required. The ACT text says the judge “must tell” the jury.
A separate, request-based warning applies to pictures. Where picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted, s 115(7) requires the judge, on the defendant’s request, to tell the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was taken into custody, or otherwise to warn them not to assume that the defendant has a criminal record or has been charged before.
Only where reliability is disputed: Dhanhoa
Read literally, s 116 would require the warning whenever identification evidence is admitted. In Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1 the High Court read it more narrowly.3 Shown eleven photographs, the victim said the accused’s looked “very similar” to one of the men who had been there that night. By the end of the trial the accused admitted he had been at the victim’s flat with three other men; his case was that he had left before the attack.
Gleeson CJ and Hayne J said that a literal reading “would be absurd” where the truth of the assertion is not questioned, and held that, read in the light of the adversarial context, s 116 requires the information to be given “where the reliability of the identification evidence is disputed”. They noted that the common law principle in Domican carries the same qualification. McHugh and Gummow JJ agreed that the legislature did not intend a direction about identification evidence when identification was not an issue. The appeal was dismissed.
Callinan J also read s 116 as applying only where the identity of the accused as a perpetrator is in issue, but dissented on the facts. In his view identification remained in issue, because whether the accused was among the men who assaulted the victim in the flat and in the street was disputed.
What an adequate warning contains: Domican
Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 was a New South Wales trial decided at common law, before the uniform Act. The victim’s wife identified the accused as the gunman some months after a shooting, having seen him on television in the meantime.4
The joint reasons of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ held that where identification evidence is any significant part of the proof of guilt and its reliability is disputed, the judge must warn the jury of the dangers of convicting on it. The warning need follow no formula, but it must be cogent and effective and appropriate to the circumstances of the case. A warning in general terms is insufficient, and so is a repetition of defence counsel’s arguments: the jury must have a direction with the authority of the judge’s office behind it. The judge should isolate and identify any matter of significance that may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of the identification.
The adequacy of the warning is judged against the identification evidence itself, not the strength of the rest of the prosecution case: the judge must direct on the assumption that the jury may convict on the identification evidence alone. In Domican the trial judge gave a full general warning but did not point to the weaknesses in this witness’s identification, and a new trial was ordered.
Domican also said what follows from an inadequate warning. A new trial will ordinarily be ordered even where other evidence makes a strong case, unless the appellate court concludes that the jury “must inevitably have convicted” independently of the identification evidence, and the joint reasons held that the proviso to the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) could not be applied. That is language of prediction, and it is not how the High Court has since said the proviso is applied. In Weiss v The Queen all six Justices held that the appellate court is not to predict what the trial jury, or a hypothetical reasonable jury, would or might do. It must itself decide, on its own assessment of the whole record including the verdict, whether a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred, and it cannot conclude that none has unless persuaded that the evidence properly admitted proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.5
Brennan J dissented. He accepted that a warning was required, but held that a trial judge need not put every argument available to the defence, and that the warning given was sufficient.
Victoria: the Jury Directions Act
In Victoria the subject is governed by Part 4 Division 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).6 The prosecution or defence may request a direction on identification evidence and must specify the significant matters that may make the evidence unreliable (s 36(1)-(2)). Under s 14(1) the judge must give a requested direction unless there are good reasons for not doing so, and under s 16(1) must give a direction that was not requested if there are substantial and compelling reasons for it. In giving the direction, the judge must warn of the need for caution in deciding whether to accept the evidence and what weight to give it, inform the jury of the significant matters the judge considers may make it unreliable, and tell the jury that a witness may honestly believe the evidence is accurate when mistaken and that mistaken evidence may be convincing; and, if relevant, that several witnesses may all be mistaken and that mistaken identification has led to innocent people being convicted (s 36(3)). Division 4 has its own definition of identification evidence (s 35), which extends to recognising an object as well as a person. Section 37 provides that, except as Division 4 provides, the judge is not required to direct the jury about the unreliability of identification evidence, and abolishes any contrary common law rule.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the identification evidence by the Dictionary definition: an assertion, or a report of an assertion, that the accused was or resembles a person present at or near the scene.
- Before the warning, check admissibility under ss 114 and 115 (in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victorian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts; Tasmania has not enacted them), and whether the defendant requested a s 115(7) warning about pictures.
- Ask whether the reliability of the identification is disputed at the end of the evidence; if it is not, Dhanhoa means s 116 does not require the warning.
- If it is disputed, test the warning against Domican: did the judge identify the particular weaknesses of this identification, with the authority of the judge’s office, rather than relying on a general warning or counsel’s arguments?
- Do not answer an inadequate warning by pointing to the strength of other evidence; the warning must proceed as if the jury may convict on the identification alone.
- In Victoria, apply ss 36 and 37 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), starting with whether a direction was requested and what matters were specified.
Self-check
- Can I state the definition of identification evidence, including that it is not confined to sight?
- Do I know the two things s 116(1) requires the jury to be told?
- Can I explain why there was no s 116 obligation in Dhanhoa, and why Callinan J disagreed on the facts?
- Can I list what Domican requires of an adequate warning, and what Brennan J would have held?
- Do I know which jurisdiction uses the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) instead of s 116?
Where the authority sits
Section 116 is enacted in the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmanian, ACT and Northern Territory Acts, and Victoria’s s 116 has been repealed in favour of Part 4 Division 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). Tasmania has not enacted ss 114 and 115. Dhanhoa construed the New South Wales s 116; Domican states the common law. High Court decisions bind lower Australian courts; the High Court can reconsider its own decisions. Western Australia’s Evidence Act 2025 (WA) contains a counterpart to s 116, s 135, under which the judge “must inform” the jury, in a Part that commences on 18 September 2027.7 Queensland and South Australia are not stated here.