RPS v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 2000

EvidenceUniform Evidence LawJudicial Warnings And Directions

RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620

A father accused of sexual offences against his daughter stayed out of the witness box. The judge told the jury what they might conclude from his not denying her account. Did the uniform Evidence Act allow that?

Affirmed by Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50

In Azzopardi v The Queen the joint reasons of Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said that ‘suggest’ is a word of very wide application and restated the RPS holding that the prohibition in s 20(2) is to be given no narrow construction and its full operation ([56]). They said that, properly understood, there is no tension between RPS and Weissensteiner v The Queen: a judge may comment on an accused’s failure to offer an explanation only in rare and exceptional cases where the evidence is capable of explanation by additional facts known only to the accused, and never merely because the accused failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case ([32], [68]). McHugh J, dissenting in Azzopardi, said that Weissensteiner should be followed in preference to RPS so far as the two conflict ([86]).

What happened?

The appellant was charged in the District Court of New South Wales with two counts of carnal knowledge of his daughter and six counts of sexual intercourse with her, alleged to have occurred between 1983, when she was four years old, and 1993, when she was 14. He pleaded not guilty. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit him of one count of sexual intercourse, and the jury convicted him on four of the remaining five counts of sexual intercourse and acquitted him on the others ([1]).

The prosecution case depended largely on the complainant’s evidence; no other eyewitness, circumstantial evidence or expert evidence was called ([4]). Her mother gave evidence of a conversation in which, she said, the appellant told her that he had never had intercourse with the complainant but that everything else the complainant said was true ([5]). At the close of the prosecution case, counsel told the judge, in the jury’s absence, that he would not call the appellant to give evidence ([8]). The judge reminded the jury that the appellant had denied the offences in a statement to the police, which was not evidence given in court ([16]).

The judge told the jury that the appellant was not obliged to give evidence, that the prosecution bore the onus of proof, and that they must not conclude that he had chosen not to give evidence because he was guilty ([15]). He went on to direct them about the use they could make of the appellant’s election not to deny or contradict the evidence of the complainant and her mother ([16]-[17]). The Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales dismissed the appeal against conviction and the application for leave to appeal against sentence, and the appellant appealed to the High Court by special leave ([2]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal and in its place ordered that the appeal to that Court against the convictions be allowed, the convictions quashed and a new trial held on counts 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the indictment ([44]).

Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons. McHugh J and Callinan J each gave separate reasons and agreed in the orders ([65], [114]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons of Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ held that s 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) “should be given no narrow construction inviting the drawing of fine distinctions”, and that its prohibition on a comment suggesting that the accused failed to give evidence because of guilt must be given full operation: a comment must not make any reference, direct or indirect, by express words or the most subtle allusion, suggesting that reason ([20]). Any belief the appellant held that his evidence would not have assisted him could proceed only from a belief that he was guilty, so the direction that the jury were entitled to draw that conclusion from his election not to deny or contradict the evidence contravened s 20(2) ([19], [21]).

McHugh J agreed that the direction breached s 20. For him the section is breached whenever the summing up, directly or indirectly, encourages or permits the jury to conclude that the accused stayed silent because of guilt, and it was the words “would not have assisted him in this trial” that tilted the balance ([48]-[49], [64]). Callinan J held the directions contrary to s 20(2) and went further, saying that the principles stated by the majority in Weissensteiner v The Queen can have no application where s 20(2) has been enacted ([108]-[109], [112]).

The joint reasons also held, for reasons that do not depend on s 20, that the directions should not have been given at all ([22]). It will seldom, if ever, be reasonable to conclude that an accused would be expected to give evidence ([27]). Where the prosecution leads direct evidence of guilt, as it usually will where sexual offences against a young person are alleged, it is not right to say that it would be reasonable to expect the accused to deny or contradict that evidence, especially where several counts are charged ([34]).

That distinguishes a case like Weissensteiner, where guilt was to be inferred from circumstances ([35]). So the jury should not have been told that the appellant’s silence could lead them more readily to accept the prosecution evidence or feel more confident in relying on it, and they could take no account of it in deciding what he meant by the alleged partial admission ([36], [38]-[40]). McHugh J did not join this part of the reasoning: he considered that a jury may take into account the absence of a denial or explanation of a fact within the accused’s knowledge that reasonably calls for an answer ([50], [59]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [19]–[21] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons construe s 20(2), reject the prosecution’s distinction and hold that the par (3) direction contravened it. That holding is one of the two grounds on which the joint reasons find a misdirection and allow the appeal, so it is necessary to their result.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [47]–[49] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [64] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J concurs in the result and also finds a breach of s 20, but by his own reasoning: the section catches instructions as well as personal opinion, and the decisive feature was the words ‘would not have assisted him in this trial’. He does not share the joint reasons’ wider view about comment on silence.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [108]–[109] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab), [112] (PDF p 44) (opens in a new tab)

Callinan J concurs in the result and holds the directions contrary to s 20(2), but his reasons go further than the joint reasons by treating the Weissensteiner principles as inapplicable wherever s 20(2) has been enacted. That wider view is his own.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [32]–[36] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [38]–[40] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

Applying the principles stated at [22]-[29] to a case resting on the complainant’s direct evidence, the joint reasons hold that the directions should not have been given. This is the second, independent ground of their conclusion that the jury were misdirected ([43]).

Obiter · Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [41]–[43] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

Under the heading ‘Judicial instructions in criminal trials’ the joint reasons give general guidance on the trial judge’s task and the division of functions between judge and jury. Apart from the last two sentences of [43], which restate the misdirection, the guidance goes beyond what was needed to decide this appeal.

Separate reasoning · McHugh J

Read judgment: [50] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [59] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab)

McHugh J concurs in the orders but does not accept that it was wrong in itself to let the jury use the absence of a denial or explanation of facts within the accused’s knowledge; for him the appeal succeeded only because the words used breached s 20.

Why does this case matter?

Directions about an accused who does not give evidence are a common ground of criminal appeal, and a single sentence of a summing up can decide whether a conviction stands. A student who knows only that a judge may comment on silence will often miss what a carefully worded direction left the jury free to infer. Examiners reward close attention to the exact words used, to the evidence the jury had to assess and to the statutory provision in force where the trial took place.

Exam and application relevance

Where an accused has not given evidence, identify the jurisdiction and the provision that governs comment on that fact, set out the exact words of the comment or direction, and ask what chain of reasoning they left open to the jury. Then ask, as a separate question, whether the direction would have been proper apart from the statute, given the kind of evidence the prosecution relied on and the number of counts.

Attribute each step to the judgment that takes it. Where the prosecution case depends on inferences from circumstances, read RPS together with Weissensteiner v The Queen and Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50.

Check your understanding

1. What distinction did the prosecution draw between the trial judge’s direction and the kind of comment s 20(2) forbids, and why did the joint reasons reject it ([19])?

2. Why did the joint reasons consider it wrong, apart from s 20, to tell the jury that it was reasonable to expect the appellant to deny the complainant’s evidence ([27], [34])?

3. Which words of the direction did McHugh J say tilted the balance towards a breach of s 20, and how did his view of the jury’s use of an accused’s silence differ from the joint reasons ([49]-[50], [64])?

4. What did Callinan J say about the Weissensteiner principles in a jurisdiction that has enacted s 20(2) ([108])?