Azzopardi v The Queen
Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50
A judge told the jury not to treat the accused’s silence as an admission of guilt, then said doubts about a witness’s evidence ‘may be more readily discounted’ because he had not denied it. Could both instructions stand together?
Affirmed by GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537
In GBF v The Queen, an appeal from Queensland decided by a single joint judgment of Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ, the High Court applied the reasoning of the Azzopardi joint reasons. The trial judge had directed the jury correctly on silence in language drawn from Azzopardi, and later said that the absence of sworn evidence from the accused contradicting the complainant’s account “may make it easier” to assess her credibility; the Court held that this invited the same false process of reasoning as the impugned passage in Azzopardi and that it contradicted the earlier directions (at [11]-[12], [21]-[23], [26]). The Court said that it is false because it proceeds upon a view that the accused may be expected to give evidence and that, “rare and exceptional cases apart, there can be no expectation that the accused will give evidence”, which explains “the need in almost all cases in which the accused does not give evidence to give a direction along the lines proposed in Azzopardi” (at [23]).
Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015
In Victoria, Part 4 Division 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) now governs what may be said to a jury when the accused does not give evidence, and s 20 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the counterpart of the provision considered in Azzopardi, has been repealed (by s 70(1) of that Act). Section 41 allows defence counsel to request a direction, and requires the judge in giving it to explain that the prosecution must prove guilt, that the accused is not required to give evidence, that the jury should not guess or speculate about what the accused’s evidence might have contained, and that the fact the accused did not give evidence is not evidence against the accused, is not an admission, must not be used to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence and does not strengthen the prosecution case. Section 42 prohibits the judge, the prosecution and defence counsel from saying or suggesting that, because the accused did not give evidence, the jury may conclude that the accused is guilty from that fact, may use the failure to provide an explanation of facts that must be within the accused’s knowledge to more safely draw an adverse inference based on those facts, or may infer that the accused did not give evidence because it would not have assisted. Section 44(1) provides that, except as that Division provides, a trial judge is not required to direct the jury when the accused does not give evidence, s 44(2) abolishes any rule of common law to the contrary, and a note to s 44 states that the provision abolishes directions based on the rule attributed to Weissensteiner and applied in Azzopardi. In a Victorian jury trial, Azzopardi therefore no longer states the source of what must or may be said. Other jurisdictions are governed by their own law.
Affirmed by GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537
GBF v The Queen, a Queensland appeal decided by a single joint judgment, quoted and applied the passage from the Azzopardi joint reasons that cases in which a judge may comment on the failure of an accused to offer an explanation will be both rare and exceptional and that a comment will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case (at [21]). The Court noted that it was not suggested that the issues in the trial brought it within the rare and exceptional category, and held that the trial judge’s statement that the absence of sworn evidence from the accused “may make it easier” to assess the complainant’s credibility occasioned a miscarriage of justice and required a new trial (at [21]-[27]).
Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015
In Victoria, s 20 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the counterpart of s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), has been repealed (by s 70(1) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic)), and a note to the section refers to Division 6 of Part 4 of that Act, which governs the failure to give evidence or call a witness in criminal trials. In a Victorian jury trial the construction of s 20(2) in Azzopardi therefore does not state the governing provision. Section 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the provision considered in Azzopardi, is in the current consolidation in the terms the Court set out.
Qualified by Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300; [2005] HCA 81
The joint reasons declined to apply the proviso after finding the misdirection: “It cannot be said in the circumstances of this case that the misdirection did not deprive the appellant of a chance of acquittal. The jury may have been affected in their assessment of the case against the appellant, which depended so much on the evidence given by the man whom he was alleged to have solicited to murder the victim. That being so this is not a case in which the proviso can be applied” ([76]). That reasoning asks what the jury might have done. Weiss v The Queen, a single joint judgment of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ on the proviso in the common form criminal appeal provision (there s 568(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)), said that expressions such as a “real chance” of acquittal “must not be taken as substitutes for that language” ([32]-[33]), and held that applying the proviso “is not to be undertaken by attempting to predict what a jury (whether the jury at trial or some hypothetical future jury) would or might do”; the appellate court must itself decide whether a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred ([35], [39]). Such expressions remain useful as emphasising the high standard of proof, but reference to a jury is liable to distract from the statutory task ([40]). Weiss does not mention Azzopardi and does not touch what the joint reasons held about s 20(2) or about comment and direction; it qualifies the chance-of-acquittal approach to the proviso on which [76] rests.
What happened?
Joseph Azzopardi was charged with soliciting Daniel Joseph Papalia to murder Paul Gauci. At the trial in the District Court of New South Wales, Mr Papalia gave evidence that he shot Mr Gauci with intent to murder him and did so at the appellant’s request, and evidence from Mr Knibbs and Miss Madigan, if accepted, supported his evidence that the appellant gave him the gun (joint reasons at [70]). The appellant did not give evidence. His interview with the police, in which he denied the allegations, was in evidence, and two character witnesses were called for him (Callinan J at [178], [180]).
In his summing-up Nield DCJ told the jury, in terms the joint reasons called unexceptionable, that an accused is not obliged to give evidence because the prosecution bears the onus, and that the jury “must not think that he decided not to give evidence because he is, or believes himself to be, guilty” ([71]). He then said that “when assessing the value of the evidence presented by the Crown, you are entitled to take into account the fact that the accused did not deny or contradict evidence about matters which were within his personal knowledge and of which he could have given direct evidence from his personal knowledge”, and that where the evidence of a witness “is left undenied or uncontradicted by the accused, any doubt which may have been cast upon that witness’s evidence may be more readily discounted and that witness’s evidence may be more readily accepted as the truth” ([71]). The Court of Criminal Appeal (Spigelman CJ, Sully and Hidden JJ) dismissed the appeal against conviction (Callinan J at [184]-[185]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, five Justices to two, set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons ([30]-[83]) and Callinan J gave separate reasons allowing the appeal ([176]-[197]). Gleeson CJ ([1]-[29]) and McHugh J ([84]-[175]) each dissented and would have dismissed it.
The appeal was heard with Davis v The Queen, an application for special leave to appeal against a conviction for sexual offences in which the trial judge had made similar comments about the accused’s silence. The application was refused (joint reasons at [83]); Gleeson CJ, McHugh J and Callinan J would each have granted special leave and dismissed the appeal.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Silence, warnings and comment. The joint reasons hold that the fact that an accused does not give evidence at trial “is not of itself evidence against the accused”, that “It is not an admission of guilt by conduct; it cannot fill in any gaps in the prosecution case; it cannot be used as a make-weight”, and that “as a general rule an accused cannot be expected to give evidence at trial” because a criminal trial is accusatorial (205 CLR 50 at 64-65 [34]).
They distinguish a direction from a comment: “Telling a jury that they may attach particular significance to the fact that the accused did not give evidence is a comment by the judge. Because it is a comment, the jury may ignore it and they should be told they may ignore it. By contrast, warning a jury against drawing impermissible conclusions from that fact is a direction by the judge which the jury is required to follow” ([50]). It “will almost always be desirable” for the judge to give the warnings, but “It by no means follows ... that the judge should go on to comment on the way in which the jury might use the fact that the accused did not give evidence” ([51], at 70), and it will often be better and safer to leave the assessment of the facts to the jury ([52]).
Gleeson CJ, dissenting, said that there is “not much use, or fairness, in telling jurors what they may not do, and leaving them to their own devices as to what they may do” ([26]), and McHugh J, dissenting, said that nothing in s 20 or the common law prevents a judge from telling the jury that it can take into account the accused’s failure to explain or deny evidence which he or she is in a position to deny or explain ([169]).
Comment on a failure to explain. The joint reasons hold that Weissensteiner “was not a case in which the accused simply failed to contradict the direct evidence of other witnesses” ([61]), and that a case in which the prosecution depends largely on the evidence of an alleged victim is not of that kind, because “The accused’s plea of not guilty stands as that denial” ([62]). A comment is justified “only if” additional facts, which would explain or contradict the inference sought and “would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused”, could have been given, and the fact that the accused could have contradicted evidence already given “will not suffice” ([64]).
Such cases “will be both rare and exceptional”, and “A comment will never be warranted merely because the accused has failed to contradict some aspect of the prosecution case” ([68], at 75). If a comment is made, it should be put as a comment on the failure to offer an explanation, made plain as one the jury are free to disregard, placed in the context of directions on onus and on the limited use of silence, and should not go beyond that made in Weissensteiner as adapted ([65]-[67]). Gleeson CJ, dissenting, said there is “no justification for limiting the occasion for comment to facts known only to the accused” ([20]).
Section 20(2). Section 20(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) permits the judge or any party other than the prosecutor to comment on the failure of the defendant to give evidence, but a comment not made by another defendant “must not suggest” that the defendant failed to give evidence because of guilt ([30]). The joint reasons reasoned that, because the prosecution may say nothing about the fact that the accused did not give evidence, it would be surprising to read s 20(2) as permitting the judge to point out that the silence is an argument for the prosecution’s conclusion ([53]); that a co-accused may make the suggestion ([54]); that s 20(2) deals only with an accused who does not give evidence at all, and not with a failure to deal with a topic ([55]); and that “Suggest” is “a word of very wide application”, so that the prohibition is given no narrow construction ([56]).
They held that the passage impugned in Azzopardi was a misdirection even without regard to s 20 ([73]) and, in the context of the summing-up, contravened s 20(2) ([74]-[75]). McHugh J and Gleeson CJ, dissenting, held that the comments did not suggest that the accused failed to give evidence because of guilt (McHugh J at [86]; Gleeson CJ at [27]-[28]). Callinan J adhered to his view in RPS v The Queen that the Weissensteiner principles can have no application where s 20(2) has been enacted, held that the comments fell on the wrong side of the line drawn by the section ([189]-[191]), and said it was not an appropriate case to decide whether, and in what terms, a judge bound to apply the Act should speak about the accused’s absence from the witness box ([195]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [34] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [50] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [72] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [73] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)
The accusatorial burden and the distinction between binding warnings and optional factual comment underpin the joint reasons’ finding of common-law misdirection. Inviting acceptance of prosecution evidence because Azzopardi had not contradicted it assumed a response could be required, contrary to those principles. These are reasons for allowing his appeal, not a classification of every statement about silence.
Obiter · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [51] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [52] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
The advice that warnings will almost always be desirable, and that leaving factual assessment to the jury will often be safer, guides future trials. The appeal concerned contradictory instructions actually given; deciding it did not require prescribing how frequently warnings should be given or when judges should refrain from otherwise permissible comment.
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ; McHugh J
Read judgment: [26] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [169] (PDF p 68) (opens in a new tab)
Both judges dissented in Azzopardi and would have dismissed the appeal. They accepted a wider scope for explaining how silence could affect evaluation of prosecution evidence, subject to warnings about the burden of proof and against treating silence as an admission. Their approach is not the joint reasons’ ground of decision.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [64] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [68] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [73] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)
The requirement for additional explanatory facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge supplied the distinction from Weissensteiner needed to reject the Crown’s justification for the summing-up. Mere failure to contradict the prosecution witnesses did not suffice. The joint reasons applied that limit to Azzopardi in finding a common-law misdirection.
Obiter · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [67] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The detailed instructions on framing a permissible comment concern a situation not present in Azzopardi: the joint reasons held that no such comment was warranted. This is guidance for the rare case where comment is permissible, rather than a necessary ground for setting aside this conviction.
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ; McHugh J
Read judgment: [20] (PDF p 13) (opens in a new tab), [117] (PDF p 47) (opens in a new tab)
Both judges dissented and would have dismissed Azzopardi’s appeal. They rejected the distinction restricting comment to additional facts known only to the accused and regarded failure to contradict direct evidence as potentially relevant too. This disagreement explains the limits of agreement with the joint reasons.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [53] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [56] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [74] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab), [75] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)
Giving the prohibition against suggesting guilt its full operation was necessary to the joint reasons’ statutory ground for allowing the appeal. Read in the summing-up as a whole, the challenged comment still suggested that silence flowed from guilt. This was an additional ground alongside common-law misdirection.
Obiter · Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
Read judgment: [54] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [55] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)
The discussion of a co-accused’s ability to suggest guilt and of an accused who testifies but leaves a topic unanswered explains the statute’s boundaries. Neither situation arose in Azzopardi, so these observations were not necessary to the finding that this summing-up infringed s 20(2).
Separate reasoning · Callinan J
Read judgment: [190] (PDF p 78) (opens in a new tab), [191] (PDF p 79) (opens in a new tab)
Callinan J concurred in allowing Azzopardi’s appeal and ordering a retrial. He adhered to his distinct view in RPS that the Weissensteiner principles could not apply where s 20(2) operated, and also applied the RPS majority’s construction to find that the comments suggested guilt. Agreement in the orders did not adopt the joint reasons’ entire common-law analysis.
Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ; McHugh J
Read judgment: [27] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [86] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab)
Both judges dissented in Azzopardi. They construed the restriction as directed to suggesting consciousness of guilt as the reason for silence and concluded that the challenged comments did not infringe it. Their conclusion supports their proposed dismissal, not the statutory ground on which the appeal succeeded.
Why does this case matter?
Azzopardi is the case that later appeals about a judge’s remarks on the accused’s silence return to, and the High Court applied it in a Queensland appeal in GBF. It produced four sets of reasons, and the Justices who reached the same order did not agree on why, so a statement attributed to “the High Court” has to be tied to the joint reasons and to the other Justices by name.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the source that governs the trial in the problem: a provision like s 20, legislation such as the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), or the common law alone. Ask what the judge told the jury about the accused’s silence and on what footing it was said.
Where the facts include remarks that the accused did not deny or contradict prosecution evidence, ask whether the remarks invited the jury to treat the silence as making the prosecution case easier to accept, and compare them with the passage the Court held to be a misdirection and with the passage in GBF v The Queen. Attribute the reasoning to the Justices who gave it: the joint reasons of Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, the separate reasons of Callinan J, and the dissents of Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.
Check your understanding
1. The trial judge told the jury that the appellant’s silence was not an admission and must not be thought to show guilt, and then gave the passage about doubts being “more readily discounted”. Why did the joint reasons treat the second passage as a misdirection even without regard to s 20 ([71]-[73])?
2. What is the difference between a direction and a comment on the joint reasons’ account, and what should the jury be told about a comment ([50])?
3. Why did the joint reasons say that Weissensteiner was not a case in which the accused simply failed to contradict the evidence of other witnesses, and what kind of facts did they say a comment on a failure to explain requires ([61]-[64])?
4. On what ground did Gleeson CJ and McHugh J dissent, and how did Callinan J’s reasons for allowing the appeal differ from the joint reasons ([23], [86], [189]-[191])?