GBF v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 2020

EvidenceCompetence And CompellabilityJudicial Warnings And Directions

GBF v The Queen (2020) 271 CLR 537

A judge correctly told the jury that the accused’s silence was not evidence against him, then said that the lack of sworn evidence denying the complainant’s account “may make it easier”. Which direction did the jury follow?

What happened?

The appellant was tried in the District Court of Queensland on seven counts of sexual offences alleged to have been committed against his half-sister between December 2012 and August 2013, when she was 13 and 14 and he was 33 and 34 ([1], [4]). The prosecution case was wholly dependent upon acceptance of her evidence, and the appellant did not give or call evidence ([1]). His case was that none of the acts she described had occurred, and his counsel argued in closing that her account contained inconsistencies and implausible features ([10]). The jury convicted him of six offences and acquitted him on two counts of rape ([5]).

The trial judge gave directions on the presumption of innocence and the onus and standard of proof, and, in language drawn from the joint reasons in Azzopardi, told the jury that the accused’s silence in court was not evidence against him, was not an admission, could not be used to fill gaps in the prosecution evidence and could not be used as a makeweight ([11]). Later in the charge, after reminding the jury of the complainant’s evidence, he told them: “But, in this case, bear in mind that she gave evidence and there is no evidence, no sworn evidence, by the defendant to the contrary of her account. That may make it easier. It is a matter for you in assessing her credibility, but you have got to consider all of the matters that Defence addressed to you about in relation to her credit” ([12]).

The Court of Appeal of Queensland accepted that the statement should not have been made, but held that there was no real possibility the jury had misunderstood the earlier directions and that the appellant had not been deprived of a real chance of acquittal, taking into account that neither counsel had sought a redirection ([2], [13]-[14]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and ordered that the appellant’s convictions be set aside and a new trial had ([28]). Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ gave a single joint judgment.

The High Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the statement had not occasioned a miscarriage of justice ([26]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The remark. The joint reasons say that it “strains credulity” to read the instruction as anything other than “an invitation to find it easier to accept the complainant’s allegations because the appellant had not given sworn evidence denying them”, and that “the impugned statement encouraged the jury to reason in this way” ([22]).

Why the reasoning is false. “Such a process of reasoning is false because it proceeds upon a view that the accused may be expected to give evidence. And in an accusatorial system of criminal justice, which places the onus on the prosecution to prove the allegation that it brings, rare and exceptional cases apart, there can be no expectation that the accused will give evidence” ([23]). The Court said that it is the attractiveness of reasoning that an allegation is more likely to be true in the absence of denial that explains the need, in almost all cases in which the accused does not give evidence, for a direction along the lines proposed in Azzopardi ([23]).

The arguments for the respondent. The respondent argued that the statement was a comment and not a direction of law, that neither counsel sought a redirection, and that “that may make it easier” was ambiguous ([18]-[20]). The joint reasons rejected the first argument: if the jury viewed the statement as a judicial observation on the facts that did not bind them, it remained an observation inviting them to engage in the false process of reasoning contrary to the directions already given ([21]).

They rejected the ambiguity argument as too strained ([22]). On redirection, they accepted that a failure to seek one may support a conclusion that a challenged statement does not bear the interpretation sought on appeal ([25]), but held that here the statement contradicted the earlier directions on onus and silence, so that its effect was to invite the same false reasoning as in Azzopardi ([26]), and that the absence of a request did not warrant a conclusion that the jury ignored the incorrect instruction ([27]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Gordon and Edelman JJ

Read judgment: [22]–[23] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [26]–[27] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

These passages supply the joint judgment’s necessary reasoning for allowing the appeal: the remark encouraged acceptance of the complainant’s account because the accused had not testified, contrary to the accusatorial onus and the earlier correct directions. Applying Azzopardi, the judges held that this caused a miscarriage of justice. Its capacity to affect the assessment of the complainant’s credibility and reliability also prevented a finding that no substantial miscarriage had occurred. That conclusion concerns this trial; at [27] the judges expressly declined to decide whether this kind of irregularity is categorically beyond the proviso.

Why does this case matter?

Problems on silence usually quote one remark from a summing-up and ask what follows. A student who answers by pointing out that the judge also gave a correct direction has answered half of that problem, because the examiner is looking for the test applied to the remark itself: what it invited the jury to do. GBF is a worked example of that test applied to a short remark.

Exam and application relevance

When a problem quotes a remark about the accused’s failure to give evidence, set it beside the Azzopardi joint reasons and ask what the remark invited the jury to do. State the result as the unanimous view of the five Justices who gave the joint reasons in GBF, and state the principle of Azzopardi as that of Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ, which the Court applied ([16], [21], [23], [26]).

Keep the limits in view. GBF came from Queensland, and the joint reasons record that the Azzopardi conclusion on the impugned passage did not depend on s 20 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ([16]). The Court left open whether an irregularity of this kind is beyond the reach of the proviso ([27]). The result turned on the particular remark, the earlier directions and the way the trial was conducted; the Court recognised that a charge is shaped by the way the trial is conducted and the issues that are live ([25]).

Check your understanding

1. At [11]-[12] the trial judge gave two statements about the appellant’s failure to give evidence. What did each say, and why did the joint reasons hold that the later statement contradicted the earlier one ([26])?

2. The respondent argued that the remark was a comment the jury were free to ignore. How did the joint reasons answer that argument at [21]?

3. What did the Court of Appeal’s test of a “real chance of acquittal” belong to, according to [24], and why did the joint reasons say the antecedent question was a different one?