Dhanhoa v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 2003

EvidenceJudicial Warnings And Directions

Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1

The victim identified the accused from a photograph as one of four attackers. Then the accused gave evidence and admitted he was at the flat. Did the judge still have to warn the jury about the identification evidence?

Qualified by legislation: Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), from 29 June 2015

Dhanhoa concerned the New South Wales provision. In Victoria, s 116 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) has been repealed (by s 73(1) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic)), and a note to the section refers to Division 4 of Part 4 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), which governs directions on identification evidence in Victorian jury trials. Under s 36 of that Act the prosecution or defence counsel may request a direction on identification evidence and must specify the significant matters that may make the evidence unreliable, and s 37(1) provides that, except as that Division provides, a trial judge is not required to direct the jury regarding the unreliability of identification evidence. In a Victorian jury trial, Dhanhoa’s reading of s 116 therefore does not state the source of the obligation. Section 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the provision considered in Dhanhoa, is in the current consolidation in the terms the Court set out.

What happened?

Raju Kamaljeet Dhanhoa was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of aggravated robbery in company with wounding and of detaining a man for advantage and causing injury (McHugh and Gummow JJ at [39]). The victim, Mr Schembri, said that on the evening of 19 January 1999 he met four men of Indian or Sri Lankan appearance at a hotel and took them back to his flat, where all four attacked him, wounded and robbed him and took him from the flat at knife-point (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [1]).

Fingerprints at the flat were later identified as Dhanhoa’s, and in April 2000, before the trial, the police showed Mr Schembri 11 photographs. He said the man in photograph No 8, who was Dhanhoa, looked “very similar” to one of the men at the flat (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [3]-[4]). When Dhanhoa gave evidence he did not challenge the fingerprints, did not deny that he was the man in photograph No 8 and did not deny that he had gone to the flat with three other men; he said that he left before any violence occurred (at [7]).

The trial judge gave no direction about identification evidence, and none was sought (at [10]). The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected a ground of appeal about that omission; its reasons made no reference to s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (at [10]-[11]), the section on which the appellant relied in the High Court (at [13]).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court dismissed the appeal. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J gave joint reasons, McHugh and Gummow JJ gave joint reasons, and Callinan J gave separate reasons, dissenting.

On the first ground, the absence of a direction under s 116, the appeal failed for Gleeson CJ, Hayne, McHugh and Gummow JJ (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [24]; McHugh and Gummow JJ at [54]); Callinan J would have held the ground made out (at [95]). On a second ground, the absence of a direction about lies said to have been told to the police, the appeal also failed for those four Justices; Callinan J would have allowed the appeal on that ground as well and ordered a retrial (at [96]-[97], [101]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The text and its limit. Section 116(1) provides that if identification evidence has been admitted, the judge is to inform the jury that there is a special need for caution before accepting it and of the reasons for that need, both generally and in the circumstances of the case (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [17]). Gleeson CJ and Hayne J said that read literally, and apart from its statutory context, s 116 could be taken to require the information whenever identification evidence has been admitted, “even if the reliability of the evidence is not in dispute”, and that “would be absurd” (at [19]).

They said that the Evidence Act “applies in an adversarial context” in which the parties and their counsel define the issues, select the witnesses and choose the evidence (at [20]), and that the provision “means that the information referred to is to be given where the reliability of the identification evidence is disputed” (at [22]).

Three formulations. McHugh and Gummow JJ said that “The obligation imposed by s 116 must be read in the context of the adversarial system of criminal justice”, and that it is not to be supposed that the legislature intended juries to be given directions about identification evidence “when identification was not an issue” (at [53]). Callinan J gave different reasons for the same limit and put it in his own words: s 116 “applies only to those cases in which the identification of the accused as the, or a perpetrator of the relevant acts ... is in issue” (at [94]).

Application. In Dhanhoa, Gleeson CJ and Hayne J held that the dispute was not about the reliability of the identification but about the reliability of the account of the conduct of the person identified, and in particular whether he remained with his companions throughout the attack (at [23]). McHugh and Gummow JJ held that identification was a vital issue until Dhanhoa gave evidence, and that if he had continued to deny that he was at the flat the judge would have been bound to give the direction, but that after his evidence it was not an issue (at [51]-[52]). Callinan J considered that an issue of identification remained, about whether Dhanhoa was a person present when the offences, including a further assault in the street, were committed (at [95]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gleeson CJ and Hayne J

Read judgment: [22]–[24] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)

Their construction of s 116 and its application were necessary to rejecting the identification ground: reliability of identification was undisputed; the dispute concerned whether the identified man remained during the attack. The absence of a direction therefore did not establish that ground of appeal.

Ratio · McHugh and Gummow JJ

Read judgment: [51]–[54] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab)

These reasons also formed part of the majority rejection of the identification ground. Reading s 116 in its adversarial context, they held that identification ceased to be an issue after the accused gave evidence admitting presence at the flat, so no direction was required.

Separate reasoning · Callinan J

Read judgment: [92]–[95] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

Dissenting on the result, Callinan J derived a limit from the statutory language but treated identification as a perpetrator as still disputed. His application required a warning despite the admission of earlier presence. This explains his disagreement with the majority; it is not the majority holding.

Why does this case matter?

Section 116 is expressed in mandatory terms, and Dhanhoa is the High Court’s authority on how it operates in a trial in which no direction was sought. It is the case to reach for when a conviction is challenged on the ground that the jury was never given an identification direction.

Exam and application relevance

Ask what the accused’s case actually disputes by the end of the evidence: the identification of the accused as a person present, or something else about the accused’s conduct. Ask whether that changed during the trial, and what turned on the change.

Attribute each formulation of the test by name, since Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, McHugh and Gummow JJ, and Callinan J did not use the same words. For a trial governed by s 116 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), apply s 116 as the three judgments read it; for a Victorian jury trial, identification directions are governed by the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic).

Check your understanding

1. Why did Gleeson CJ and Hayne J say that a literal reading of s 116 would be absurd, and what did they treat the common law principle in Domican as containing (at [19])?

2. At what point in Dhanhoa’s trial did identification stop being an issue on the reasoning of McHugh and Gummow JJ, and what would the judge have been bound to do if he had continued to deny being at the flat (at [51]-[52])?

3. How does Callinan J’s statement of when s 116 applies differ in its words from that of Gleeson CJ and Hayne J, and why did he nonetheless disagree with the result on the first ground (at [94]-[95])?