Braysich v The Queen
Braysich v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 434
A stockbroker called six witnesses to say he was honest, and the trial judge then told the jury that his statutory defence did not arise. What was the evidence of his honesty for?
What happened?
Mr Braysich was a stockbroker. After a trial before a judge and jury in the District Court of Western Australia he was convicted on 25 counts of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in securities ([1]). The Crown case was that on 26 occasions in February 1998 he had caused sales of Intrepid shares to be made on the account of Walthamstow to Challiston, a client’s company, and had then rebooked the shares, and that to his knowledge the transactions involved no change in beneficial ownership ([2], [11]).
Under s 998(5) of the Corporations Law a person who carried out such a transaction was deemed to have created the false or misleading appearance, so that the finding of fact and the deeming provision were sufficient for conviction ([2]). Section 998(6) gave a defence if the accused proved that the purpose or purposes for which the act was done were not, or did not include, the purpose of creating that appearance, and it was common ground that he bore the burden of establishing it on the balance of probabilities ([2], [7]).
The appellant gave evidence that he had not known the transactions involved no change of beneficial ownership, and he called six character witnesses who deposed to his honesty ([13], [16]). At the close of his evidence the trial judge ruled that the evidence of the two experts the defence wished to call had no probative consequence for the issue the jury had to decide ([20]-[21]). Counsel was told he could not address the jury on the defence, and the jury were told that it did not apply to the appellant ([23], [26]). The Court of Appeal of Western Australia dismissed his appeal, and held in any event that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice ([4]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s order, quashed the conviction and remitted the matter to the District Court of Western Australia for a new trial ([53]). The decision was 3:2. French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ gave joint reasons allowing the appeal on the first two grounds ([51]). Heydon J and Bell J would have dismissed the appeal; Heydon J agreed with Bell J’s reasons ([54]).
On the Court of Appeal’s alternative holding that there had been no substantial miscarriage of justice, the Crown disclaimed reliance on it in the High Court ([4]), and the joint reasons said that the verdicts could not be relied upon in the appeal ([50]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Leaving the defence to the jury. The joint reasons say that where a statute provides a defence and imposes the legal burden of establishing it on the accused, the accused also bears the evidential burden ([35]). The question for the trial judge is whether there is evidence which, taken at its highest in favour of the accused, could lead a reasonable jury, properly instructed, to conclude on the balance of probabilities that the defence had been established ([36]). The appellant “was not required to produce evidence of his subjective purpose or purposes in order to meet the legal burden”; one way of meeting it was “to adduce or point to evidence inconsistent with the proposition that he had that purpose”, and “Any evidence that could support an inference that the appellant did not have the proscribed purpose was relevant to the statutory defence” ([37]).
The honesty evidence. The joint reasons adopted McHugh J’s distinction, drawn in Melbourne v The Queen, between character, which refers to a person’s inherent moral qualities or disposition, and reputation, and said that the evidence of the appellant’s honesty went to his actual disposition ([41]). The defence in s 998(6) “raises an issue of honesty”, because “The purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading is a dishonest purpose”, and “Evidence of the appellant’s honesty was capable of supporting a submission that it was improbable that he acted with that dishonest purpose” ([44]). The Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the evidence as not addressing his subjective purpose was an error ([44]).
Applying it. The evidence relied on to meet the evidential burden included the appellant’s evidence that it did not cross his mind that Mr Scook had an interest in creating a false appearance of active trading, that he acted on instructions from people known to him to be reputable, and the evidence of six character witnesses ([46]). The joint reasons said that a jury could ask whether an honest man acting on instructions from reputable people, who knew of the ASX business rules and the law, was himself acting with the dishonest purpose of creating a false appearance of active trading ([47]).
The dissent. Bell J, with whom Heydon J agreed, described the appellant’s circumstantial case as comprising his good character and his carrying out the transactions on his clients’ instructions as a stockbroker ([110]), and concluded that carrying out the transactions in return for fees on the instructions of valued clients could not, without more, establish that it was probable that his purposes did not include the proscribed outcome, and that the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that the evidence was insufficient to warrant leaving the defence for the jury ([117]-[118]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [35]–[37] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons needed to identify the evidential threshold and the permissible use of circumstantial evidence to decide whether the statutory defence should have gone to the jury. They applied the test for a defence carrying a legal burden on the accused and allowed the appeal because that threshold was met. The alternative in [36] concerning a defence the prosecution must negative was not the test applied here.
Separate reasoning · Bell J, with Heydon J agreeing
Read judgment: [54] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [117]–[119] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J dissented: carrying out the transactions for fees on valued clients’ instructions could not, without more, establish the probable absence of the proscribed purpose. She therefore held the evidence insufficient to leave the defence to the jury and would have dismissed the appeal. Heydon J adopted her reasons at [54]. This is the minority’s assessment of sufficiency, rather than the majority’s ground for allowing the appeal.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ
Read judgment: [44] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [46]–[47] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The relevance of the honesty evidence was part of the joint reasons’ ground for holding that the statutory defence should have been left to the jury. Because the purpose to be negatived under s 998(6) was dishonest, that evidence could support its probable absence. The joint reasons included it with the other circumstances when finding the evidential burden satisfied; they did not hold that good character alone established the defence.
Separate reasoning · Bell J, with Heydon J agreeing
Read judgment: [54] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [110] (PDF p 48) (opens in a new tab), [117]–[119] (PDF p 50) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J included good character in the appellant’s circumstantial execution-service case but concluded that the evidence was insufficient to warrant leaving the defence to the jury. She dissented on the result, with Heydon J adopting her reasons at [54]. Her conclusion concerns the sufficiency of the evidence together and does not expressly reject the joint reasons’ proposition at [44] that honesty evidence was relevant.
Why does this case matter?
Questions on good character evidence usually ask what a judge must tell the jury about it. Braysich is useful because the issue on which the evidence is called is not the usual one, and a student who has learned the character direction as a free-standing rule may not see how it applies in a problem in which the accused carries the burden on a statutory defence.
The case also gives a worked example of a ruling made at the end of the accused’s evidence, before the jury had considered the defence at all, being corrected on appeal ([21]-[23], [51]).
Exam and application relevance
Where a problem gives an accused a statutory defence to establish, identify who bears the burden on the defence and what issue it raises, and then ask what the evidence of good character is capable of showing on that issue. Say whether the defence should have gone to the jury and why.
Keep the limits in view. The Court decided the case under s 998(6) of the Corporations Law, and its reasoning about honesty depends on the defence raising an issue of honesty ([44]). It treated one point as not needed for the appeal: whether, and to what extent, evidence by an accused that he lacked the incriminating knowledge might remain relevant to the statutory defence ([49]). The Court did not need to decide the complaint about the expert evidence, although it said the basis on which the trial judge rejected it was erroneous ([52]).
Check your understanding
1. At [35]-[37] the joint reasons set out the question the trial judge had to ask when deciding whether to leave the statutory defence to the jury. What was the question, and why did the joint reasons say the appellant did not have to point to evidence of his actual purpose?
2. Why, according to [44], was the Court of Appeal wrong to treat the evidence of the appellant’s good character as not addressing his subjective purpose?
3. Which Justices dissented, and what was the ground of the dissent at [117]-[118]?